

GREEN'S HISTORY
OF THE
ENGLISH PEOPLE



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A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE

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COMPLETE IN TEN VOLUMES



VOLUME X

1760-1815

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THE ENGLISH PEOPLE.

BOOK IX.

MODERN ENGLAND.

(1760—1815.)

CHAPTER I.

ENGLAND AND ITS EMPIRE.

1458. NEVER had England played so great a part in the history of mankind as in the year 1759. It was a year of triumphs in every quarter of the world. In September came the news of Minden, and of a victory off Lagos. In October came tidings of the capture of Quebec. November brought word of the French defeat at Quiberon. "We are forced to ask every morning what victory there is," laughed Horace Walpole, "for fear of missing one." But it was not so much in the number as in the importance of its triumphs that the Seven Years' war stood and remains still without a rival. It is no exaggeration to say that three of its many victories determined for ages to come the destinies of mankind. With that of Rossbach began the re-creation of Germany, the revival of its political and intellectual life, the long process of its union under the leadership of Prussia and Prussia's kings. With that of Plassey the influence of Europe told for the first time since the days

of Alexander on the nations of the East. The world, in Burke's gorgeous phrase, "saw one of the races of the north-west cast into the heart of Asia new manners, new doctrines, new institutions." With the triumph of Wolfe on the heights of Abraham began the history of the United States. By removing an enemy whose dread had knit the colonists to the mother-country, and by breaking through the line with which France had barred them from the basin of the Mississippi, Pitt laid the foundation of the great republic of the West.

1459. Nor were these triumphs less momentous to Britain. The Seven Years' war is, in fact, a turning-point in our national history, as it is a turning-point in the history of the world. Till now the relative weight of the European states had been drawn from their possessions within Europe itself. Spain, Portugal, and Holland indeed had won a dominion in other continents; and the wealth which two of these nations had derived from their colonies had given them for a time an influence among their fellow-states greater than that which was due to their purely European position. But, in the very years during which her rule took firm hold in South America, Spain fell into a decay at home which prevented her empire over sea from telling directly on the balance of power; while the strictly commercial character of the Dutch settlements robbed them of political weight. France, in fact, was the first state to discern the new road to greatness which lay without European bounds; and the efforts of Dupleix and Montcalm aimed at the building up of an empire which

would have lifted her high above her European rivals. The ruin of these hopes in the Seven Years' war was the bitterest humiliation to which French ambition has ever bowed. But it was far from being all that France had to bear. For not only had the genius of Pitt cut her off from the chance of rising into a world-power, and prisoned her again within the limits of a single continent, but it had won for Britain the position that France had lost. From the close of the Seven Years' war it mattered little whether England counted for less or more with the nations around her. She was no longer a mere European power; she was no longer a rival of Germany or France. Her future action lay in a wider sphere than that of Europe. Mistress of Northern America, the future mistress of India, claiming as her own the empire of the seas, Britain suddenly towered high above nations whose position in a single continent doomed them to comparative insignificance in the after-history of the world.

1460. It is this that gives William Pitt so unique a position among our statesmen. His figure, in fact, stands at the opening of a new epoch in English history—in the history not of England only, but of the English race. However dimly and imperfectly, he alone among his fellows saw that the struggle of the Seven Years' war was a struggle of a wholly different order from the struggles that had gone before it. He felt that the stake he was playing for was something vaster than Britain's standing among the powers of Europe. Even while he backed Frederick in Germany, his eye was not on the Weser, but on the

Hudson and the St. Lawrence. "If I send an army to Germany," he replied in memorable words to his assailants, "it is because in Germany I can conquer America!" But greater even than Pitt's statesmanship was the conviction on which his statesmanship rested. He believed in Englishmen, and in the might of Englishmen. At a moment when few hoped that England could hold her own among the nations of Europe, he called her not only to face Europe in arms, but to claim an empire far beyond European bounds. His faith, his daring, called the English people to a sense of the destinies that lay before it. And once roused, the sense of these destinies could never be lost. The war, indeed, was hardly ended when a consciousness of them showed itself in the restlessness with which our seamen penetrated into far-off seas. With England on one side and her American colonies on the other, the Atlantic was dwindling into a mere strait within the British Empire; but beyond it to the westward lay a reach of waters where the British flag was almost unknown. The vast ocean which parts Asia from America had been discovered by a Spaniard and first traversed by a Portuguese; as early, indeed, as the sixteenth century Spanish settlements spread along its eastern shore and a Spanish galleon crossed it year by year from Acapulco to the Philippines. But no effort was made by Spain to explore the lands that broke its wide expanse; and though Dutch voyagers, coming from the eastward, penetrated its waters and first noted the mighty continent that bore from that hour the name of New Holland, no colonists followed in

the track of Tasman or Van Diemen. It was not till another century had gone by, indeed, that Europe again turned her eyes to the Pacific. But in the very year which followed the peace of Paris, in 1764, two English ships were sent on a cruise of discovery to the Straits of Magellan.

1461. "Nothing," ran the instructions of their commander, Commodore Byron,—“nothing can redound more to the honor of this nation as a maritime power, to the dignity of the crown of Great Britain, and to the advancement of the trade and navigation thereof, than to make discoveries of countries hitherto unknown.” Byron himself hardly sailed beyond Cape Horn; but three years later a second English seaman, Captain Wallis, succeeded in reaching the central island of the Pacific and in skirting the coral-reefs of Tahiti, and in 1768 a more famous mariner traversed the great ocean from end to end. At first a mere ship-boy on a Whitby collier, James Cook had risen to be an officer in the royal navy, and had piloted the boats in which Wolfe mounted the St. Lawrence to the heights of Abraham. On the return of Wallis he was sent in a small vessel with a crew of some eighty men and a few naturalists to observe the transit of Venus at Tahiti, and to explore the seas that stretched beyond it. After a long stay at Tahiti Cook sailed past the Society Isles into the heart of the Pacific, and reached at the further limits of that ocean the two islands, as large as his own Britain, which make up New Zealand. Steering northward from New Zealand over 1000 miles of sea he touched at last the coast of the great

“southern land,” or Australia, on whose eastern shore, from some fancied likeness to the district at home on which he had gazed as he set sail, he gave the name of New South Wales. In two later voyages Cook traversed the same waters, and discovered fresh island groups in their wide expanse. But his work was more than a work of mere discovery. Wherever he touched, in New Zealand, in Australia, he claimed the soil for the English crown. The records which he published of his travels not only woke the interest of Englishmen in these far-off islands, in their mighty reaches of deep blue waters, where lands as big as Britain die into mere specks on the huge expanse, in the coral-reefs, the palms, the bread-fruit of Tahiti, the tattooed warriors of New Zealand, the gum-trees and kangaroos of the southern continent, but they familiarized them more and more with the sense of possession, with the notion that this strange world of wonders was their own, and that a new earth was open in the Pacific for the expansion of the English race.

1462. Cook, in fact, pointed out the fitness of New Holland for English settlements; and projects of its occupation, and of the colonization of the Pacific islands by English emigrants, became from that moment, in however vague and imperfect a fashion, the policy of the English crown. Statesmen and people alike, indeed, felt the change in their country's attitude. Great as Britain seemed to Burke, it was now in itself “but part of a great empire, extended by our virtue and our fortune to the furthest limits of the east and the west.” Its parliament no longer

looked on itself as the local legislature of England and Scotland; it claimed, in the words of the same great political thinker, "an imperial character, in which, as from the throne of heaven, she superintends all the several inferior legislatures, and guides and controls them all, without annihilating any." Its people, steeped in the commercial ideas of the time, saw in the growth of such a dominion, the monopoly of whose trade was reserved to the mother-country, a source of boundless wealth. The trade with America alone was, in 1772, within less than half a million of being equal to what England carried on with the whole world at the beginning of the century. So rapid had been its growth that, since the opening of the eighteenth century, it had risen from a value of £500,000 to one of six millions, and whereas the colonial trade then formed but a twelfth part of English commerce, it had now mounted to a third. To guard and preserve so vast and lucrative a dominion, to vindicate its integrity alike against outer foes and inner disaffection, to strengthen its unity by drawing closer the bonds, whether commercial or administrative, which linked its various parts to the mother-country, became from this moment not only the aim of British statesmen, but the resolve of the British people.

1463. And at this moment there were grave reasons why this resolve should take an active form. Strong as the attachment of the Americans to Britain seemed at the close of the war, keen lookers-on like the French minister, the Duc de Choiseul, saw in the very completeness of Pitt's triumph a danger to

their future union. The presence of the French in Canada, their designs in the west, had thrown America for protection on the mother-country. But with the conquest of Canada all need of protection was removed. The attitude of England toward its distant dependency became one of simple possession; and the differences of temper, the commercial and administrative disputes which had long existed as elements of severance, but had been thrown into the background till now by the higher need for union, started into a new prominence. Day by day, indeed, the American colonies found it harder to submit to the meddling of the mother-country with their self-government and their trade. A consciousness of their destinies was stealing in upon thoughtful men, and spread from them to the masses around them. At this very moment the quick growth of population in America moved John Adams, then a village schoolmaster of Massachusetts, to lofty forebodings of the future of the great people over whom he was to be called to rule. "Our people in another century," he wrote, "will be more numerous than England itself. All Europe will not be able to subdue us. The only way to keep us from setting up for ourselves is to disunite us." The sense that such an independence was drawing nearer spread even to Europe. "Fools," said a descendant of William Penn, "are always telling their fears that the colonies will set up for themselves." Philosophers, however, were pretty much of the same mind on this subject with the fools. "Colonies are like fruits," wrote the foreseeing Turgot, "which cling

to the tree only till they ripen. As soon as America can take care of itself it will do what Carthage did." But from the thought of separation almost every American turned as yet with horror. The colonists still looked to England as their home. They prided themselves on their loyalty; and they regarded the difficulties which hindered complete sympathy between the settlements and the mother-country as obstacles which time and good sense could remove. England, on the other hand, looked on America as her noblest possession. It was the wealth, the growth of this dependency which, more than all the victories of her arms, was lifting her to a new greatness among the nations. It was the trade with it which had doubled English commerce in half a century. Of the right of the mother-country to monopolize this trade, to deal with this great people as its own possession, no Englishman had a doubt. England, it was held, had planted every colony. It was to England that the colonists owed not their blood only, but the free institutions under which they had grown to greatness. English arms had rescued them from the Indians, and broken the iron barrier with which France was holding them back from the west. In the war which was drawing to a close, England had poured out her blood and gold without stint in her children's cause. Of the debt, which was mounting to a height unknown before, no small part was due to her struggle on behalf of America. And with this sense of obligation mingled a sense of ingratitude. It was generally held that the wealthy colonists should do something to lighten the load of

this debt from the shoulders of the mother-country. But it was known that all proposals for American taxation would be bitterly resisted. The monopoly of American trade was looked on as a part of an Englishman's birthright. Yet the colonists not only murmured at this monopoly, but evaded it in great part by a wide system of smuggling. And behind all these grievances lay an uneasy sense of dread at the democratic form which the government and society of the colonies had taken. The governors sent from England wrote back words of honest surprise and terror at the "leveling principles" of the men about them. To statesmen at home the temper of the colonial legislatures, their protests, their bickerings with the governors and with the board of trade, their constant refusal of supplies when their remonstrances were set aside, seemed all but republican.

1464. To check this republican spirit, to crush all dreams of severance, and to strengthen the unity of the British empire by drawing closer the fiscal and administrative bonds which linked the colonies to the mother-country, was one of the chief aims with which George the Third mounted the throne on the death of his grandfather, George the Second, in 1760. But it was far from being his only aim. For the first and last time since the accession of the house of Hanover, England saw a king who was resolved to play a part in English politics; and the part which George succeeded in playing was undoubtedly a memorable one. During the first ten years of his reign he managed to reduce government to a shadow,

and to turn the loyalty of his subjects at home into disaffection. Before twenty years were over he had forced the American colonies into revolt and independence, and brought England to what then seemed the brink of ruin. Work such as this has sometimes been done by very great men, and often by very wicked and profligate men, but George was neither profligate nor great. He had a smaller mind than any English king before him save James the Second. He was wretchedly educated, and his natural powers were of the meanest sort. Nor had he the capacity for using greater minds than his own by which some sovereigns have concealed their natural littleness. On the contrary, his only feeling toward great men was one of jealousy and hate. He longed for the time when "decrepitude or death" might put an end to Pitt; and even when death had freed him from "this trumpet of sedition," he denounced the proposal for a public monument to the great statesman as "an offensive measure to me personally." But, dull and petty as his temper was, he was clear as to his purpose and obstinate in the pursuit of it. And his purpose was to rule. "George," his mother, the Princess of Wales, had continually repeated to him in youth—"George, be king." He called himself always "a whig of the revolution," and he had no wish to undo the work which he believed the revolution to have done. But he looked on the subjection of his two predecessors to the will of their ministers as no real part of the work of the revolution, but as a usurpation of that authority which the revolution had left to the crown. And to this usurpation he

was determined not to submit. His resolve was to govern, not to govern against law, but simply to govern, to be freed from the dictation of parties and ministers, and to be in effect the first minister of the state.

1465. How utterly incompatible such a dream was with the parliamentary constitution of the country as it had received its final form from Sunderland it is easy to see; and the effort of the young king to realize it plunged England at once into a chaos of political and social disorder which makes the first years of his reign the most painful and humiliating period in our history. It is with an angry disgust that we pass from the triumphs of the Seven Years' war to the miserable strife of whig factions with one another or of the whole whig party with the king. But, wearisome as the story is, it is hardly less important than that of the rise of England into a world-power. In the strife of these wretched years began a political revolution which is still far from having reached its close. Side by side with the gradual development of the English empire and of the English race has gone on, through the century that has passed since the close of the Seven Years' war, the transfer of power within England itself from a governing class to the nation as a whole. If the effort of George failed to restore the power of the crown, it broke the power which impeded the advance of the people itself to political supremacy. While laboring to convert the aristocratic monarchy of which he found himself the head into a personal sovereignty, the irony of fate doomed him to take the first step in an

organic change which has converted that aristocratic monarchy into a democratic republic, ruled under monarchical forms.

1466. To realize, however, the true character of the king's attempt, we must recall for a moment the issue of the revolution on which he claimed to take his stand. It had, no doubt, given personal and religious liberty to England at large. But its political benefits seemed as yet to be less equally shared. The parliament, indeed, had become supreme, and, in theory, the parliament was a representative of the whole English people. But, in actual fact, the bulk of the English people found itself powerless to control the course of English government. We have seen how at the very moment of its triumph opinion had been paralyzed by the results of the revolution. The sentiment of the bulk of Englishmen remained tory, but the existence of a Stuart pretender forced on them a system of government which was practically whig. Under William and Anne they had tried to reconcile toryism with the revolution; but this effort ended with the accession of the house of Hanover, and the bulk of the landed classes and the clergy withdrew in a sulky despair from all permanent contact with politics. Their hatred of the system to which they bowed showed itself in the violence of their occasional outbreaks, in riots over the excise bill, in cries for a Spanish war, in the frenzy against Walpole. Whenever it roused itself, the national will showed its old power to destroy; but it remained impotent to create any new system of administrative action. It could aid one clique of whigs to destroy

another clique of whigs, but it could do nothing to interrupt the general course of whig administration. Walpole and Pelham were alike the representatives of a minority of the nation; but the minority which they represented knew its mind and how to carry out its mind, while the majority of the people remained helpless and distracted between their hatred of the house of Hanover and their dread of the consequences which would follow on a return of the Stuarts.

1467. The results of such a divorce between the government and that general mass of national sentiment on which a government can alone safely ground itself at once made themselves felt. Robbed as it was of all practical power, and thus stripped of the feeling of responsibility which the consciousness of power carries with it, among the mass of Englishmen public opinion became ignorant and indifferent to the general progress of the age, but, at the same time, violent and mutinous, hostile to government because it was government, disloyal to the crown, averse from parliament. For the first and last time in our history parliament was unpopular, and its opponents secure of popularity. But the results on the governing class were even more fatal to any right conduct of public affairs. Not only had the mass of national sentiment been so utterly estranged from parliament by the withdrawal of the tories that the people had lost all trust in it as an expression of their will; but the parliament did not pretend to express it. It was conscious that for half a century it had not been really a representative of the nation,

that it had represented a minority, wiser, no doubt, than their fellow-countrymen, but still a minority of Englishmen. At the same time it saw, and saw with a just pride, that its policy had, as a whole, been for the nation's good; that it had given political and religious freedom to the people in the very teeth of their political and religious bigotry; that, in spite of their narrow insularism, it had made Britain the greatest of European powers. The sense of both these aspects of parliament had sunk, in fact, so deeply into the mind of the whigs as to become a theory of parliamentary government. They were never weary of expressing their contempt for public opinion. They shrank with instinctive dislike from Pitt's appeals to national feeling, and from the popularity which rewarded them. They denied that members of the commons sat as representatives of the people, and they shrank with actual panic from the thought of any change which could render them representatives. To a whig such a change meant the overthrow of the work done in 1688, the coercion of the minority of sound political thinkers by the mass of opinion, so brutal and unintelligent, so bigoted in its views, both of church and state, which had been content to reap the benefits of the revolution while villifying and opposing its principles.

1468. And yet, if representation was to be more than a name, the very relation of parliament to the constituencies made some change in its composition a necessity. That changes in the distribution of seats in the house of commons were called for by the natural shiftings of population and wealth which had

gone on since the days of Edward the First had been recognized as early as the civil wars. But the reforms of the Long Parliament were canceled at the restoration; and from the time of Charles the Second to that of George the Third not a single effort had been made to meet the growing abuses of our parliamentary system. Great towns like Manchester or Birmingham remained without a member, while members still sat for boroughs which, like Old Sarum, had actually vanished from the face of the earth. The effort of the Tudor sovereigns to establish a court party in the house by a profuse creation of boroughs, most of which were mere villages then in the hands of the crown, had ended in the appropriation of these seats by the neighboring land-owners, who bought and sold them as they bought and sold their own estates. Even in towns which had a real claim to representation the narrowing of municipal privileges ever since the fourteenth century to a small part of the inhabitants, and in many cases the restriction of electoral rights to the members of the governing corporation, rendered their representation a mere name. The choice of such places hung simply on the purse or influence of politicians. Some were "the king's boroughs;" others obediently returned nominees of the ministry of the day; others were "close boroughs" in the hands of jobbers like the Duke of Newcastle, who, at one time, returned a third of all the borough members in the house. The counties and the great commercial towns could alone be said to exercise any real right of suffrage, though the enormous expense of contesting such

constituencies practically left their representation in the hands of the great local families. But even in the counties the suffrage was ridiculously limited and unequal. Out of a population of 8,000,000 of English people, only 160,000 were electors at all.

1469. "The value, spirit, and essence of a house of commons," said Burke, in noble words, "consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation." But how far such a house as that which now existed was from really representing English opinion we see from the fact that, in the height of his popularity, Pitt himself could hardly find a seat in it. Purchase was becoming more and more the means of entering parliament; and seats were bought and sold in the open market at a price which rose to £4,000. We can hardly wonder that a reformer could allege without a chance of denial, "this house is not a representative of the people of Great Britain. It is the representative of nominal boroughs, of ruined and exterminated towns, of noble families, of wealthy individuals, of foreign potentates." The meanest motives naturally told on a body returned by such constituencies, cut off from the influence of public opinion by the secrecy of parliamentary proceedings, and yet invested with almost boundless authority. Walpole and Newcastle had, in fact, made bribery and borough-jobbing the base of their power. But bribery and borough-jobbing were every day becoming more offensive to the nation at large. A new moral consciousness, as we have seen in the movement of the Wesleys, was diffusing itself through England; and behind this moral consciousness came

a general advance in the national intelligence, which could not fail to tell vigorously on politics.

1470. Ever since the expulsion of the Stuarts an intellectual revolution had been silently going on in the people at large. The close of the seventeenth century was marked by a sudden extension of the world of readers. The development of men's minds under the political and social changes of the day, as well as the rapid increase of wealth, and the advance in culture and refinement which accompanies an increase of wealth, were quickening the general intelligence of the people at large; and the wider demand for books to read that came of this quickening gave a new extension and vigor to their sale. Addison tells us how large and rapid was the sale of his "Spectator;" and the sale of Shakespeare's works shows the amazing effect of the new passion for literature on the diffusion of our older authors. Four issues of his plays in folio, none of them probably exceeding 500 copies, had sufficed to meet the wants of the seventeenth century. But through the eighteenth ten editions at least followed each other in quick succession; and before the century was over as many as 30,000 copies of Shakespeare were dispersed throughout England. Reprints of older works, however, were far from being the only need of English readers. The new demand created an organ for its supply in the publisher, and through the publisher literature became a profession by which men might win their bread. That such a change was a healthy one, time was to show. But, in spite of such instances as Dryden, at the moment of the

change its main result seemed the degradation of letters. The intellectual demand for the moment outran the intellectual supply. The reader called for the writer; but the temper of the time, the diversion of its mental energy to industrial pursuits, the influences which tended to lower its poetic and imaginative aspirations, were not such as to bring great writers rapidly to the front. On the other hand, the new opening which letters afforded for a livelihood was such as to tempt every scribbler who could handle a pen; and authors of this sort were soon set to hack-work by the Curles and the Tonsons, who looked on book-making as a mere business. The result was a mob of authors in garrets, of illiterate drudges as poor as they were thriftless and debauched, selling their pen to any buyer, hawking their flatteries and their libels from door to door, fawning on the patron and the publisher for very bread, tagging rhymes which they called poetry or abuse which they called criticism, vamping up compilations and abridgments under the guise of history, or filling the journals with empty rhetoric in the name of politics.

1471. It was on such a literary chaos as this that the one great poet of the time poured scorn in his "Dunciad." Pope was a child of the revolution; for he was born in 1688, and he died at the moment when the spirit of his age was passing into larger and grander forms in 1744. But from all active contact with the world of his day he stood utterly apart. He was the son of a Catholic linen-draper, who had withdrawn from his business in Lombard street to a retirement on the skirts of Windsor Forest; and there

amid the stormy years which followed William's accession the boy grew up in an atmosphere of poetry, buried in the study of the older English singers, stealing to London for a peep at Dryden in his arm-chair at Wills's, himself already lisping in numbers, and busy with an epic at the age of twelve. Pope's latter years were as secluded as his youth. His life, as Johnson says, was "a long disease;" his puny frame, his crooked figure, the feebleness of his health, his keen sensitiveness to pain, whether of mind or body, cut him off from the larger world of men, and doomed him to the faults of a morbid temperament. To the last he remained vain, selfish, affected; he loved small intrigues and petty lying; he was incredibly jealous and touchy; he dwelt on the fouler aspect of things with an unhealthy pruriency; he stung right and left with a malignant venom. But nobler qualities rose out of this morbid undergrowth of faults. If Pope was quickly moved to anger, he was as quickly moved to tears; though every literary gnat could sting him to passion, he could never read the lament of Priam over Hector without weeping. His sympathies lay, indeed, within a narrow range, but within that range they were vivid and intense; he clung passionately to the few he loved; he took their cause for his own; he flung himself almost blindly into their enthusiasms and their hates. But, loyal as he was to his friends, he was yet more loyal to his verse. His vanity never led him to literary self-sufficiency; no artist ever showed a truer lowliness before the ideal of his art; no poet ever corrected so much, or so invariably bettered his work

by each correction. One of his finest characteristics, indeed, was his high sense of literary dignity. From the first he carried on the work of Dryden by claiming a worth and independence for literature; and he broke with disdain through the traditions of patronage which had degraded men of letters into hangers-on of the great.

1472. With aims and conceptions such as these, Pope looked bitterly out on the phase of transition through which English letters were passing. As yet his poetic works had shown little of the keen and ardent temper that lay within him. The promise of his spring was not that of a satirist, but of the brightest and most genial of verse writers. When after some fanciful preludes his genius found full utterance in 1712, it was in the "Rape of the Lock;" and the "Rape of the Lock" was a poetic counterpart of the work of the essayists. If we miss in it the personal and intimate charm of Addison, or the freshness and pathos of Steele, it passes far beyond the work of both in the brilliancy of its wit, in the lightness and buoyancy of its tone, in its atmosphere of fancy, its glancing color, its exquisite verse, its irresistible gayety. The poem remains Pope's masterpiece; it is impossible to read it without feeling that his mastery lay in social and fanciful verse, and that he missed his poetic path when he laid down the humorist for the philosopher and the critic. But the state of letters presented an irresistible temptation to criticism. All Pope's nobler feelings of loyalty to his art revolted from the degradation of letters which he saw about him; and, after an interval of hack-

work in a translation of Homer, he revealed his terrible power of sarcasm in his poem of the "Dunciad." The poem is disfigured by mere outbursts of personal spleen, and in its later form by attacks on men whose last fault was dullness. But in the main the "Dunciad" was a noble vindication of literature from the herd of dullards and dunces that had usurped its name, a protest against the claims of the journalist or pamphleteer, of the compiler of facts and dates, or the grubber among archives, to the rank of men of letters.

1473. That there was work and useful work for such men to do, Pope would not have denied. It was when their pretensions threatened the very existence of literature as an art, when the sense that the writer's work was the work of an artist, and like an artist's work must show largeness of design and grace of form and fitness of phrase, was either denied or forgotten; it was when every rhymers was claiming to be a poet, every fault-finder a critic, every chronicler an historian, that Pope struck at the herd of book-makers and swept them from the path of letters. Such a protest is as true now, and perhaps as much needed now, as it was true and needed then. But it had hardly been uttered when the chaos settled itself, and the intellectual impulse which had as yet been felt mainly in the demand for literature showed itself in its supply. Even before the "Dunciad" was completed a great school of novelists was rising into fame; and the years which elapsed between the death of Pope in 1744 and that of George the Second in 1760 were filled with the master-pieces

of Richardson, Smollett, and Fielding. Their appearance was but a prelude of a great literary revival which marked the closing years of the eighteenth century. But the instant popularity of "*Clarissa*" and "*Tom Jones*" showed the work of intellectual preparation which had been going on through Walpole's days in the people at large; and it was inevitable that such a quickening of intelligence should tell on English politics. The very vulgarization of letters, indeed, the broadsheets, and pamphlets, and catch-penny magazines of Grub street, were doing for the mass of the people a work which greater writers could hardly have done. Above all, the rapid extension of journalism had begun to give opinion a new information and consistency. In spite of the removal of the censorship after the revolution, the press had been slow to attain any political influence. Under the first two Georges its progress had been hindered by the absence of great topics for discussion, the worthlessness of the writers, and, above all, the lethargy of the time. But, at the moment of George the Third's accession, the impulse which Pitt had given to the national spirit, and the rise of a keener interest in politics, was fast raising the press into an intellectual and political power. Not only was the number of London newspapers fast increasing, but journals were being established in almost every considerable town.

1474. With impulses such as these telling every day on it more powerfully, roused as it was, too, into action by the larger policy of Pitt, and emboldened at once by the sense of growing wealth and

of military triumph, it is clear that the nation must soon have passed from its old inaction to claim its part in the direction of public affairs. The very position of Pitt, forced as he had been into office by the sheer force of opinion in the teeth of party obstacles, showed the rise of a new energy in the mass of the people. It showed that a king who enlisted the national sentiment on his side would have little trouble in dealing with the whigs. George, indeed, had no thought of such a policy. His aim was not to control the parliament by the force of national opinion, but simply to win over the parliament to his side, and through it to govern the nation with as little regard to its opinion as of old. But whether he would or no, the drift of opinion aided him. Though the policy of Walpole had ruined Jacobitism, it long remained unconscious of its ruin. But when a Jacobite prince stood in the heart of the realm, and not a Jacobite answered his call, the spell of Jacobitism was broken; and the later degradation of Charles Edward's life wore finally away the thin coating of disloyalty which clung to the clergy and the squires. They were ready again to take part in politics; and in the accession of a king who, unlike his two predecessors, was no stranger but an Englishman, who had been born in England and spoke English, they found the opportunity they desired. From the opening of the reign tories gradually appeared again at court.

1475. It was only slowly, indeed, that the party as a whole swung round to a steady support of the government; and in the nation at large the old toryism

was still for some years to show itself in opposition to the crown. But from the first the tory nobles and gentry came in one by one; and their action told at once on the complexion of English politics. Their withdrawal from public affairs had left them untouched by the progress of political ideas since the revolution of 1688, and when they returned to political life it was to invest the new sovereign with all the reverence which they had bestowed on the Stuarts. In this return of the tories, therefore, a "king's party" was ready made to his hand; but George was able to strengthen it by a vigorous exertion of the power and influence which was still left to the crown. All promotion in the church, all advancement in the army, a great number of places in the civil administration and about the court, were still at the king's disposal. If his vast mass of patronage had been practically usurped by the ministers of his predecessors, it was resumed and firmly held by George the Third; and the character of the house of commons made patronage a powerful engine in its management. George had one of Walpole's weapons in his hands, and he used it with unscrupulous energy to break up the party which Walpole had held so long together. The whigs were still, indeed, a great power. "Long possession of government, vast property, obligations of favors given and received, connection of office, ties of blood, of alliance, of friendship, the name of whigs dear to the majority of the people, the zeal early begun and steadily continued to the royal family, all these together," says Burke justly, "formed a body of power

in the nation." But George the Third saw that the whigs were divided among themselves by the factious spirit which springs from a long hold of office, and that they were weakened by the rising contempt with which the country at large regarded the selfishness and corruption of its representatives.

1476. More than thirty years before, the statesmen of the day had figured on the stage as highwaymen and pickpockets. And now that statesmen were represented by hoary jobbers such as Newcastle, the public contempt was fiercer than ever, and men turned sickened from the intrigues and corruption of party to a young sovereign who aired himself in a character which Bolingbroke had invented, as a patriot king. Had Pitt and Newcastle held together, indeed, supported as the one was by the commercial classes, the other by the whig families and the whole machinery of parliamentary management, George must have struggled in vain. But the ministry was already disunited. The bulk of the party drew day by day further from Pitt. Attached as they were to peace by the traditions of Walpole, dismayed at the enormous expenditure, and haughty with the pride of a ruling oligarchy, the whigs were in silent revolt against the war and the supremacy of the great commoner. It was against their will that he rejected proposals of peace from France which would have secured to England all her conquests on the terms of a desertion of Prussia, and that his steady support enabled Frederick still to hold out against the terrible exhaustion of an unequal struggle. The campaign of 1760, indeed, was one of the grandest efforts of

Frederick's genius. Foiled in an attempt on Dresden, he again saved Silesia by a victory at Liegnitz and hurled back an advance of Daun by a victory at Torgau; while Ferdinand of Brunswick held his ground as of old along the Weser. But even victories drained Frederick's strength. Men and money alike failed him. It was impossible for him to strike another great blow, and the ring of enemies again closed slowly around him. His one remaining hope lay in the support of Pitt, and, triumphant as his policy had been, Pitt was tottering to his fall.

1477. The envy and resentment of the minister's colleagues at his undisguised supremacy gave the young king an easy means of realizing his schemes. George had hardly mounted the throne when he made his influence felt in the ministry by forcing it to accept a court favorite, the Earl of Bute, as secretary of state. Bute had long been his counselor, and, though his temper and abilities were those of a gentleman usher, he was forced into the cabinet. The new drift of affairs was seen in the instant desertion from Pitt of the two ablest of his adherents, George Grenville and Charles Townshend, who attached themselves from this moment to the rising favorite. It was seen yet more when Bute pressed for peace. As Bute was known to be his master's mouthpiece, a peace party at once appeared in the cabinet itself, and it was only a majority of one that approved Pitt's refusal to negotiate with France. "He is madder than ever," was Bute's comment on this refusal in his correspondence with the king; "he has no thought of abandoning the continent."

Conscious, indeed, as he was of the king's temper and of the temper of his colleagues, Pitt showed no signs of giving way. So far was he from any thought of peace that he proposed at this moment a vast extension of the war. In 1761 he learned the signature of a treaty which brought into force the family compact between the courts of Paris and Madrid, and of a special convention which bound the last to declare war on England at the close of the year. Pitt proposed to anticipate the blow by an instant seizure of the treasure-fleet which was on its way from the Indies to Cadiz, and for whose safe arrival alone the Spanish court was deferring its action. He would have followed up the blow by occupying the Isthmus of Panama, and by an attack on the Spanish dominions in the New World. It was almost with exultation that he saw the danger which had threatened her ever since the peace of Utrecht break at last upon England. His proud sense of the national strength never let him doubt for a moment of her triumph over the foes that had leagued against her. "This is the moment," he exclaimed to his colleagues, "for humbling the whole house of Bourbon." But the cabinet shrank from plans so vast and daring; and the Duke of Newcastle, who had never forgiven Pitt for forcing himself into power, and for excluding him from the real control of affairs, was backed in his resistance by the bulk of the whigs. The king openly supported them, and Pitt with his brother-in-law, Lord Temple, found themselves alone. Pitt did not blind himself to the real character of the struggle. The question, as he

felt, was not merely one of peace or war, it was whether the new force of opinion which had borne him into office and kept him there was to govern England or no. It was this which made him stake all on the decision of the cabinet. "If I cannot in this instance prevail," he ended his appeal, "this shall be the last time I will sit in the council. Called to office by the voice of the people, to whom I conceive myself accountable for my conduct, I will not remain in a situation which renders me responsible for measures I am no longer allowed to guide." His proposals were rejected; and the resignation of his post, which followed in October, 1761, changed the face of European affairs.

1478. "Pitt disgraced!" wrote a French philosopher; "it is worth two victories to us!" Frederick, on the other hand, was almost driven to despair. But George saw in the removal of his powerful minister an opening for the realization of his long-cherished plans. The whigs had looked on Pitt's retirement as the restoration of their rule, unbroken by the popular forces to which it had been driven during his ministry to bow. His declaration that he had been "called to office by the voice of the people, to whom I conceive myself accountable," had been met with indignant scorn by his fellow-ministers. "When the gentleman talks of being responsible to the people," retorted Lord Granville, the Lord Carteret of earlier days, "he talks the language of the house of commons, and forgets that at this board he is only responsible to the king." But his appeal was heard by the people at large. When

the dismissed statesman went to Guildhall the Londoners hung on his carriage-wheels, hugged his footmen, and even kissed his horses. Their break with Pitt was, in fact, the death-blow of the whigs. In betraying him to the king they had only put themselves in George's power; and so great was the unpopularity of the ministry that the king was able to deliver his longed-for stroke at a party that he hated even more than Pitt. Newcastle found he had freed himself from the great statesman only to be driven from office by a series of studied mortifications from his young master; and the more powerful of his whig colleagues followed him into retirement. George saw himself triumphant over the two great forces which had hampered the free action of the crown, "the power which arose," in Burke's words, "from popularity, and the power which arose from political connection;" and the rise of Lord Bute to the post of first minister marked the triumph of the king.

1479. Bute took office simply as an agent of the king's will; and the first resolve of George the Third was to end the war. In the spring of 1762 Frederick, who still held his ground stubbornly against fate, was brought to the brink of ruin by a withdrawal of the English subsidies; it was, in fact, only his dogged resolution and a sudden change in the policy of Russia which followed on the death of his enemy, the Czarina Elizabeth, that enabled him at last to retire from the struggle in the treaty of Hubertsberg without the loss of an inch of territory. George and Lord Bute had already purchased peace

at a very different price. With a shameless indifference to the national honor, they not only deserted Frederick, but they offered to negotiate a peace for him on the basis of a cession of Silesia to Maria Theresa and East Prussia to the Czarina. The issue of the strife with Spain saved England from humiliation such as this. Pitt's policy of instant attack had been justified by a Spanish declaration of war three weeks after his fall; and the year 1762 saw triumphs which vindicated his confidence in the issue of the new struggle. Martinique, the strongest and wealthiest of the French West Indian possessions, was conquered at the opening of the year, and its conquest was followed by those of Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. In the summer the reduction of Havana brought with it the gain of the rich Spanish colony of Cuba. The Philippines, the wealthiest of the Spanish colonies in the Pacific, yielded to a British fleet. It was these losses that brought about the peace of Paris in September, 1762. So eager was Bute to end the war that he bought peace by restoring all that the last year's triumphs had given him. In Europe he contented himself with the recovery of Minorca, while he restored Martinique to France, and Cuba and the Philippines to Spain. The real gains of Britain were in India and America. In the first the French abandoned all right to any military settlement. From the second they wholly withdrew. To England they gave up Canada, Nova Scotia, and Louisiana as far as the Mississippi, while they resigned the rest of that province to Spain in compen-

sation for its surrender of Florida to the British crown.

1480. We have already seen how mighty a change in the aspect of the world, and, above all, in the aspect of Britain, was marked by this momentous treaty. But no sense of its great issues influenced the young king in pressing for its conclusion. His eye was fixed not so much on Europe or the British empire as on the petty game of politics which he was playing with the whigs. The anxiety which he showed for peace abroad sprang mainly from his belief that peace was needful for success in his struggle for power at home. So long as the war lasted, Pitt's return to office and the union of the whigs under his guidance was an hourly danger. But with peace the king's hands were free. He could count on the dissensions of the whigs, on the new-born loyalty of the tories, on the influence of the crown patronage which he had taken into his own hands. But what he counted on most of all was the character of the house of commons. So long as matters went quietly, so long as no gust of popular passion or enthusiasm forced its members to bow for a while to outer opinion, he saw that "management" could make the house a mere organ of his will. George had discovered—to use Lord Bute's words—"that the forms of a free and the ends of an arbitrary government were things not altogether incompatible." At a time when it had become all-powerful in the state, the house of commons had ceased in any real and effective sense to be a representative body at all; and its isolation from the general opinion of the country

left it at ordinary moments amenable only to selfish influences. The whigs had managed it by bribery and borough-jobbing, and George, in his turn, seized bribery and borough-jobbing as a base of the power he proposed to give to the crown. The royal revenue was employed to buy seats and to buy votes. Day by day the young sovereign scrutinized the voting-list of the two houses, and distributed rewards and punishments as members voted according to his will or no. Promotion in the civil service, preferment in the church, rank in the army, were reserved for "the king's friends." Pensions and court places were used to influence debates. Bribery was employed on a scale never known before. Under Bute's ministry an office was opened at the treasury for the purchase of members, and £25,000 are said to have been spent in a single day.

1481. The result of these measures was soon seen in the tone of the parliament. Till now it had bowed beneath the greatness of Pitt; but, in the teeth of his denunciation, the provisions of the peace of Paris were approved by a majority of five to one. It was seen still more in the vigor with which George and his minister prepared to carry out the plans over which they had brooded for the regulation of America. The American question was, indeed, forced on them, as they pleaded, by the state of the revenue. Pitt had waged war with characteristic profusion, and he had defrayed the cost of the war by enormous loans. The public debt now stood at £140,000,000. The first need, therefore, which met Bute after the conclusion of the peace of Paris, was that of making

provision for the new burdens which the nation had incurred; and as these had been partly incurred in the defense of the American colonies, it was the general opinion of Englishmen that the colonies should bear a share of them. In this opinion Bute and the king concurred. But their plans went further than mere taxation. The amount, indeed, which was expected to be raised as revenue by these changes, at most £200,000, was far too small to give much relief to the financial pressure at home. But this revenue furnished an easy pretext for wider changes. Plans for the regulation of the government of the colonies had been suggested from time to time by subordinate ministers, but they had been set aside alike by the prudence of Walpole and the generosity of Pitt. The appointment of Charles Townshend to the presidency of the board of trade, however, was a sign that Bute had adopted a policy not only of taxation, but of restraint. The new minister declared himself resolved on a rigorous execution of the navigation laws, laws by which a monopoly of American trade was secured to the mother-country; on the raising of a revenue within the colonies for the discharge of the debt; and, above all, on impressing upon the colonists a sense of their dependence upon Britain. The direct trade between America and the French or Spanish West Indian Islands had hitherto been fettered by prohibitory duties, but these had been easily evaded by a general system of smuggling. The duties were now reduced, but the reduced duties were rigorously exacted, and a considerable naval force was dispatched to the American coast by Gren-

ville, who stood at the head of the admiralty board, with a view of suppressing the clandestine trade with the foreigner. The revenue which was expected from this measure was to be supplemented by an internal stamp-tax, a tax on all legal documents issued within the colonies, the plan of which seems to have originated with Bute's secretary, Jenkinson, afterward the first Lord Liverpool. That resistance was expected was seen in a significant step which was taken by the ministry at the end of the war. Though the defeat of the French had left the colonies without an enemy save the Indians, a force of 10,000 men was still kept quartered on their inhabitants, and a scheme was broached for an extension of the province of Canada over the district round the lakes, which would have turned the western lands into a military settlement, governed at the will of the crown, and have furnished a base of warlike operations, if such were needed, against the settled colonies on the Atlantic.

1482. Had Bute's power lasted it is probable that these measures would have brought about the struggle between England and America long before it actually began. Fortunately for the two countries the minister found himself from the first the object of a sudden and universal hatred. The great majority which had rejected Pitt's motion against the peace had filled the court with exultation. "Now indeed," cried the princess dowager, "my son is king." But the victory was hardly won when king and minister found themselves battling with a storm of popular ill-will such as never since the overthrow of the

Stuarts assailed the throne. Violent and reckless as it was, the storm only marked a fresh advance in the re-awakening of public opinion. The bulk of the higher classes, who had till now stood apart from government, were coming gradually in to the side of the crown. But the mass of the people was only puzzled and galled by the turn of events. It felt itself called again to political activity, but it saw nothing to change its hatred and distrust of parliament and the crown. On the contrary it saw them in greater union than of old. The house of commons was more corrupt than ever, and it was the slave of the king. The king still called himself a whig, yet he was reviving a system of absolutism which whiggism, to do it justice, had long made impossible. His minister was a mere favorite and in Englishmen's eyes a foreigner. The masses saw all this, but they saw no way of mending it. They knew little of their own strength, and they had no means of influencing the government they hated save by sheer violence. They came, therefore, to the front with their old national and religious bigotry, their long-nursed dislike of the Hanoverian court, their long-nursed habits of violence and faction, their long-nursed hatred of parliament, but with no means of expressing them save riot and uproar.

1483. It was this temper of the masses which was seized and turned to his purpose by John Wilkes. Wilkes was a worthless profligate; but he had a remarkable faculty of enlisting popular sympathy on his side; and by a singular irony of fortune he became in the end the chief instrument in bringing

about three of the greatest advances which our constitution has made. He woke the nation to a sense of the need for parliamentary reform by his defense of the rights of constituencies against the despotism of the house of commons. He took the lead in a struggle which put an end to the secrecy of parliamentary proceedings. He was the first to establish the right of the press to discuss public affairs. But in his attack upon the ministry of Lord Bute he served simply as an organ of the general excitement and discontent. The bulk of the tories were on fire to gratify their old grudge against the crown and its ministers. The body of the whigs, and the commercial classes who backed them, were startled and angered by the dismissal of Pitt, and by the revolt of the crown against the whig system. The nation, as a whole, was uneasy and alarmed at the sudden break-up of political tranquillity, and by the sense of a coming struggle between opponents of whom as yet neither had fully its sympathies. There were mobs, riots, bonfires in the streets, and disturbances which culminated—in a rough spirit of punning upon the name of the minister—in the solemn burning of a jack-boot. The journals, which were now becoming numerous, made themselves organs for this outburst of popular hatred; and it was in the North-Britain that Wilkes took a lead in the movement by denouncing the cabinet and the peace with peculiar bitterness, by playing on the popular jealousy of foreigners and Scotchmen, and by venturing to denounce the hated minister by name.

1484. Ignorant and brutal as was the movement

which Wilkes headed, it was a revival of public opinion; and though the time was to come when the influence of opinion would be exercised more wisely, even now it told for good. It was the attack of Wilkes which, more than all else, determined Bute to withdraw from office in 1763 as a means of allaying the storm of popular indignation. But the king was made of more stubborn stuff than his minister. If he suffered his favorite to resign, he still regarded him as the real head of administration; for the ministry which Bute left behind him consisted simply of the more courtly of his colleagues, and was, in fact, formed under his direction. George Grenville was its nominal chief, but the measures of the cabinet were still secretly dictated by the favorite. The formation of the Grenville ministry, indeed, was laughed at as a joke. Charles Townshend and the Duke of Bedford, the two ablest of the whigs who had remained with Bute after Newcastle's dismissal, refused to join it; and its one man of ability was Lord Shelburne, a young Irishman, who had served with credit at Minden, and had been rewarded by a post at court which brought him into terms of intimacy with the young sovereign and Bute. Dislike of the whig oligarchy and of the war had thrown Shelburne strongly into the opposition to Pitt, and his diplomatic talents were of service in securing recruits for his party, as his eloquence had been useful in advocating the peace; but it was not till he himself retired from office that Bute obtained for his supporter the presidency of the board of trade. As yet however, Shelburne's powers were little known, and

he added nothing to the strength of the ministry. It was, in fact, only the disunion of its opponents which allowed it to hold its ground. Townshend and Bedford remained apart from the main body of the whigs, and both sections held aloof from Pitt. George had counted on the divisions of the opposition in forming such a ministry; and he counted on the weakness of the ministry to make it the creature of his will.

1485. But Grenville had no mind to be a puppet either of the king or of Bute. Narrow and pedantic as he was, severed by sheer jealousy and ambition from his kinsman Pitt and the bulk of the whigs, his temper was too proud to stoop to the position which George designed for him. The conflicts between the king and his minister soon became so bitter that in August, 1763, George appealed in despair to Pitt to form a ministry. Never had Pitt shown a nobler patriotism or a grander self-command than in the reception he gave to this appeal. He set aside all resentment at his own expulsion from office by Newcastle and the whigs, and made the return to office of the whole party, with the exception of Bedford, a condition of his own. His aim, in other words, was to restore constitutional government by a reconstruction of the ministry which had won the triumphs of the Seven Years' war. But it was the destruction of this ministry and the erection of a kingly government in its place on which George prided himself most. To restore it was, in his belief, to restore the tyranny under which the whigs had so long held the crown. "Rather than submit," he cried, "to the

terms proposed by Mr. Pitt, I would die in the room I now stand in." The result left Grenville as powerful as he had been weak. Bute retired into the country and ceased to exercise any political influence. Shelburne, the one statesman in the ministry and who had borne a chief part in the negotiations for the formation of a new cabinet, resigned to follow Pitt. On the other hand, Bedford, irritated by Pitt's exclusion of him from his proposed ministry, joined Grenville with his whole party, and the ministry thus became strong and compact.

1486. Grenville himself was ploddingly industrious and not without financial ability. But his mind was narrow and pedantic in its tone; and honest as was his belief in his own whig creed, he saw nothing beyond legal forms. He was resolute to withstand the people as he had withstood the crown. His one standard of conduct was the approval of parliament; his one aim to enforce the supremacy of parliament over subject as over king. With such an aim as this, it was inevitable that Grenville should strike fiercely at the new force of opinion which had just shown its power in the fall of Bute. He was resolved to see public opinion only in the voice of parliament; and his resolve led at once to a contest with Wilkes as with the press. It was in the press that the nation was finding a court of appeal from the houses of parliament. The popularity of the North-Briton made Wilkes the representative of the new journalism, as he was the representative of that mass of general sentiment of which it was beginning to be the mouthpiece; and the fall of Bute had shown

how real a power lay behind the agitator's diatribes. But Grenville was of stouter stuff than the court favorite, and his administration was hardly reformed when he struck at the growing opposition to parliament by a blow at its leader. In "No. 45" of the *North-Briton* Wilkes had censured the speech from the throne at the opening of parliament, and a "general warrant" by the secretary of state was issued against the "authors, printers, and publishers of this seditious libel." Under this warrant forty-nine persons were seized for a time; and, in spite of his privilege as a member of parliament, Wilkes himself was sent to the Tower. The arrest, however, was so utterly illegal that he was at once released by the court of common pleas; but he was immediately prosecuted for libel. The national indignation at the harshness of these proceedings passed into graver disapproval when parliament took advantage of the case to set itself up as a judicial tribunal for the trial of its own assailant. While the paper which formed the subject for prosecution was still before the courts of justice, it was condemned by the house of commons as a "false, scandalous, and seditious libel." The house of lords at the same time voted a pamphlet found among Wilkes's papers to be blasphemous, and advised a prosecution. Though Pitt at once denounced the course of the two houses as unconstitutional, his protest, like that of Shelburne in the lords, proved utterly ineffectual; and Wilkes, who fled in terror to France, was expelled at the opening of 1764 from the house of commons. Rapid and successful blows such as these seem to have shown to how friv-

olous an assailant Bute had yielded. But if Wilkes fled over the channel, Grenville found he had still England to deal with. The assumption of an arbitrary judicial power by both houses, and the system of terror which the minister put in force against the press by issuing 200 injunctions against different journals, roused a storm of indignation throughout the country. Every street resounded with cries of "Wilkes and Liberty!" Every shutter through the town was chalked with "No 45;" the old bonfires and tumults broke out with fresh violence; and the common council of London refused to thank the sheriffs for dispersing the mob. It was soon clear that opinion had been imbibittered rather than silenced by the blow at Wilkes.

1487. The same narrowness of view, the same honesty of purpose, the same obstinacy of temper were shown by Grenville in a yet more important struggle, a struggle with the American colonies. The plans of Bute for their taxation and restraint had fallen to the ground on his retirement and that of Townshend from office. Lord Shelburne succeeded Townshend at the board of trade, and, young as he was, Shelburne was too sound a statesman to suffer these plans to be revived. But the resignation of Shelburne in 1763, after the failure of Pitt to form a united ministry, again re-opened the question. Grenville had fully concurred in a part at least of Bute's designs; and, now that he found himself at the head of a strong administration, he again turned his attention to the colonies. On one important side his policy wholly differed from that of Townshend

or Bute. With Bute as with the king, the question of deriving a revenue from America was chiefly important as one which would bring the claims of independent taxation and legislation put forward by the colonies to an issue, and in the end—as it was hoped—bring about a reconstruction of their democratic institutions and a closer union of the colonies under British rule. Grenville's aim was strictly financial. His conservative and constitutional temper made him averse from any sweeping changes in the institutions of the colonies. He put aside as roughly as Shelburne the projects which had been suggested for the suppression of colonial charters, the giving power in the colonies to military officers, or the payment of crown officers in America by the English treasury. All he desired was that the colonies should contribute what he looked on as their just share toward the relief of the burdens left by the war; and it was with a view to this that he proceeded to carry out the financial plans which had been devised for the purpose of raising both an external and an internal revenue from America.

1488. If such a policy was more honest, it was at the same time more absurd than that of Bute. Bute had, at any rate, aimed at a great revolution in the whole system of colonial government. Grenville aimed simply at collecting a couple of hundred thousand pounds, and he knew that even this wretched sum must be immensely lessened unless his plans were cordially accepted by the colonists. He knew, too, that there was small hope of such an acceptance. On the contrary, they at once met with

a dogged opposition; and, though the shape which that opposition took was a legal and technical one, it really opened up the whole question of the relation of the colonies to the mother-country. Proud as England was of her imperial position, she had as yet failed to grasp the difference between an empire and a nation. A nation is an aggregate of individual citizens, bound together in a common and equal relation to the state which they form. An empire is an aggregate of political bodies, bound together by a common relation to a central state, but whose relations to it may vary from the closest dependency to the loosest adhesion. To Grenville and the bulk of his fellow-countrymen the colonies were as completely English soil as England itself, nor did they see any difference in political rights or in their relation to the imperial legislature between an Englishman of Massachusetts and a man of Kent. What rights their charters gave the colonies they looked on as not strictly political but municipal rights; they were not states, but corporations; and, as corporate bodies, whatever privileges might have been given them, they were as completely the creatures and subjects of the English crown as the corporate body of a borough or of a trading company. Their very existence, in fact, rested in a like way on the will of the crown; on a breach of the conditions under which they were granted their charters were revocable and their privileges ceased, their legislatures and the rights of their legislatures came to an end as completely as the common council of a borough that had forfeited its franchise or the rights of that com-

mon council. It was true that, save in matters of trade and navigation, the imperial parliament or the imperial crown had as yet left them mainly to their own self-government; above all, that it had not subjected them to the burden of taxation which was borne by other Englishmen at home. But it had more than once asserted its right to tax the colonies; it had again and again refused assent to acts of their legislature which denied such a right; and from the very nature of things, they held it impossible that such a right could exist. No bounds could be fixed for the supremacy of the king in parliament over every subject of the crown, and the colonist of America was as absolutely a subject as the ordinary Englishman. On mere grounds of law Grenville was undoubtedly right in his assertion of such a view as this; for the law had grown up under purely national conditions, and without a consciousness of the new political world to which it was now to be applied. What the colonists had to urge against it was really the fact of such a world. They were Englishmen, but they were Englishmen parted from England by 3,000 miles of sea. They could not, if they would, share the common political life of men at home; nature had imposed on them their own political life; what charters had done was not to create but to recognize a state of things which sprang from the very circumstances under which the colonies had originated and grown into being. Nor could any canceling of charters cancel those circumstances. No act of parliament could annihilate the Atlantic. The political status of the man of Massachusetts could not be iden-

tical with that of the man of Kent, because that of the Kentish man rested on his right of being represented in parliament and thus sharing in a work of self-government, while the other from sheer distance could not exercise such a right. The pretense of equality was, in effect, the assertion of inequality; for it was to subject the colonist to the burdens of Englishmen without giving him any effective share in the right of self-government which Englishmen purchased by supporting those burdens. But the wrong was even greater than this. The Kentish man really took his share in governing, through his representative in parliament, the empire to which the colonist belonged. If the colonist had no such share, he became the subject of the Kentish man. The pretense of political identity had ended in the establishment not only of serfdom, but of the most odious form of serfdom—a subjection to one's fellow-subjects.

1489. The only alternative for so impossible a relation was the recognition of such relations as actually existed. While its laws remained national, England had grown from a nation into an empire. Whatever theorists might allege, the colonies were in fact political bodies with a distinct life of their own, whose connection with the mother-country had in the last hundred years taken a definite and peculiar form. Their administration in its higher parts was in the hands of the mother-country. Their legislation on all internal affairs, though lightly supervised by the mother-country, was practically in their own hands. They exercised without interference the

right of self-taxation, while the mother-country exercised with as little interference the right of monopolizing their trade. Against this monopoly of their trade not a voice was as yet raised among the colonists. They justly looked on it as an enormous contribution to the wealth of Britain, which might fairly be taken in place of any direct supplies, and which, while it asserted the sovereignty of the mother-country, left their local freedom untouched. The harshness of such a monopoly had, indeed, been somewhat mitigated by a system of contraband trade which had grown up between American ports and the adjacent Spanish islands—a trade so necessary for the colonies, and in the end so beneficial to British commerce itself, that statesmen like Walpole had winked at its development. The pedantry of Grenville, however, saw in it only an infringement of British monopoly; and one of his first steps was to suppress this contraband trade by a rigid enforcement of the navigation laws. Harsh and unwise as these measures seemed, the colonists owned their legality; and their resentment only showed itself in a pledge to use no British manufactures till the restrictions were relaxed. But such a stroke was a mere measure of retaliation, whose pressure was pretty sure in the end to effect its aim; and even in their moment of irritation the colonists uttered no protest against the monopoly of their trade. Their position, indeed, was strictly conservative; what they claimed was a continuance of the existing connection; and, had their claim been admitted, they would probably have drifted quietly into such a re-

lation to the crown as that of our actual colonies in Canada and Australasia.

1490. What the issue of such a policy might have been as America grew to a population and wealth beyond those of the mother-country, it is hard to guess. But no such policy was to be tried. The next scheme of the minister—his proposal to introduce internal taxation within the bounds of the colonies themselves by reviving the project of an excise or stamp duty which Walpole's good sense had rejected—was of another order from his schemes for suppressing the contraband traffic. Unlike the system of the navigation acts, it was a gigantic change in the whole actual relations of England and its colonies. They met it, therefore, in another spirit. Taxation and representation, they asserted, went hand in hand. America had no representatives in the British parliament. The representatives of the colonists met in their own colonial assemblies, and these were willing to grant supplies of a larger amount than a stamp-tax would produce. Massachusetts—first as ever in her protest—marked accurately the positions she took. "Prohibitions of trade are neither equitable nor just; but the power of taxing is the grand banner of British liberty. If that is once broken down, all is lost." The distinction was accepted by the assembly of every colony; and it was with their protest and offer that they dispatched Benjamin Franklin, who had risen from his position of a working printer in Philadelphia to high repute among scientific discoverers, as their agent to England. In England, Franklin found few who recog-

nized the distinction which the colonists had drawn; it was, indeed, incompatible with the universal belief in the omnipotence of the imperial parliament. But there were many who held that such taxation was unadvisable, that the control of trade was what a country really gained from its colonies, that it was no work of a statesman to introduce radical changes into relations so delicate as those of a mother-country and its dependencies, and that, boundless as was the power of parliament in theory, "it should voluntarily set bounds to the exercise of its power." It had the right to tax Ireland, but it never used it. The same self-restraint might be extended to America, and the more that the colonists were in the main willing to tax themselves for the general defense. Unluckily Franklin could give no assurance as to a union for the purpose of such taxation, and without such an assurance Grenville had no mind to change his plans. In February, 1765, the stamp-act was passed through both houses with less opposition than a turnpike bill.

1491. At this critical moment Pitt was absent from the house of commons. "When the resolution was taken to tax America, I was ill and in bed," he said a few months later. "If I could have endured to be carried in my bed, so great was the agitation of my mind for the consequences, I would have solicited some kind hand to have laid me down on this floor, to have borne my testimony against it." He was soon, however, called to a position where his protest might have been turned to action. The stamp-act was hardly passed when an insult offered

to the princess dowager, by the exclusion of her name from a regency act, brought to a head the quarrel which had long been growing between the ministry and the king. George again offered power to William Pitt, and so great was his anxiety to free himself from Grenville's dictation that he consented absolutely to Pitt's terms. He waived his objection to that general return of the whole whig party to office which Pitt had laid down in 1763 as a condition of his own. He consented to his demands for a change of policy in America, for the abolition of general warrants, and the formation of a Protestant system of German alliances as a means of counteracting the family compact of the house of Bourbon. The formation of the new ministry seemed secured, when the refusal of Earl Temple to join it brought Pitt's efforts abruptly to an end. Temple was Pitt's brother-in-law, and Pitt was not only bound to him by strong family ties, but he found in him his only parliamentary support. The great commoner had not a single follower of his own in the house of commons, nor a single seat in it at his disposal. What following he seemed to have was simply that of the Grenvilles; and it was the support of his brothers-in-law, Lord Temple and George Grenville, which had enabled him in great part to hold his own against the whig connection in the ministry of 1757. But George Grenville had parted from him at its close, and now Lord Temple drew to his brother rather than to Pitt. His refusal to join the cabinet left Pitt absolutely alone so far as parliamentary strength went, and he felt himself too weak when thus de-

serted to hold his ground in any ministerial combination with the whigs. Disappointed in two successive efforts to form a ministry by the same obstacle, he returned to his seat in Somersetshire, while the king turned for help to the main body of the whigs.

1492. The age and incapacity of the Duke of Newcastle had placed the Marquis of Rockingham at the head of this section of the party, after it had been driven from office to make way for the supremacy of Bute. Thinned as it was by the desertion of Grenville and Townshend, as well as of the Bedford faction, it still claimed an exclusive right to the name of the whigs. Rockingham was honest of purpose, he was free from all taint of the corruption of men like Newcastle, and he was inclined to a pure and lofty view of the nature and end of government. But he was young, timid, and of small abilities, and he shared to the full the dislike of the great whig nobles to Pitt and the popular sympathies on which Pitt's power rested. The weakness of the ministry which he formed in July, 1765, was seen in its slowness to deal with American affairs. Rockingham looked on the stamp-act as inexpedient; but he held firmly against Pitt and Shelburne the right of parliament to tax and legislate for the colonies, and it was probably through this difference of sentiment that Pitt refused to join his ministry on its formation. For six months he made no effort to repeal the obnoxious acts, and in fact suffered preparations to go on for enforcing them. News, however, soon came from America

which made this attitude impossible. Vigorously as he had struggled against the acts, Franklin had seen no other course for the colonies, when they were passed, but that of submission. But submission was the last thing the colonists dreamed of. Everywhere through New England riots broke out on the news of the arrival of the stamped paper; and the frightened collectors resigned their posts. Northern and southern states were drawn together by the new danger. "Virginia," it was proudly said afterward, "rang the alarm-bell;" its assembly was the first to formally deny the right of the British parliament to meddle with internal taxation, and to demand the repeal of the acts. Massachusetts not only adopted the denial and the demand as its own, but proposed a congress of delegates from all the colonial assemblies to provide for common and united action; and in October, 1765, this congress met to repeat the protest and petition of Virginia.

1493. The congress was the beginning of American union. "There ought to be no New Englandman, no New Yorker, known on this continent," said one of its members, "but all of us Americans." The news of its assembly reached England at the end of the year, and perplexed the ministry, two of whose members now declared themselves in favor of repealing the acts. But Rockingham would promise at most no more than suspension; and when the houses met in the spring of 1766, no voice but Shelburne's was raised in the peers for repeal. In the commons, however, the news at once called Pitt to the front. As a minister, he had long since rejected

a similar scheme for taxing the colonies. He had been ill and absent from parliament when the stamp-act was passed. But he adopted to the full the constitutional claim of America. He gloried in a resistance which was denounced in parliament as rebellion. "In my opinion," he said, "this kingdom has no right to lay a tax on the colonies. . . . America is obstinate! America is almost in open rebellion! Sir, I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people so dead to all the feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest." "He spoke," said a looker-on, "like a man inspired;" and he ended by a demand for the absolute, total, and immediate repeal of the acts. It is from this moment that the bitter hatred of George the Third to Pitt may be dated. In an outburst of resentment the king called him a trumpet of sedition, and openly wished for his death. But the general desire that he should return to office was quickened by the sense of power which spoke in his words, and now that the first bitterness of finding himself alone had passed away, Pitt was willing to join the whigs. Negotiations were opened for this purpose; but they at once broke down. Weak as they felt themselves, Rockingham and his colleagues now shrank from Pitt, as on the formation of their ministry Pitt had shrunk from them. Personal feeling no doubt played its part; for in any united administration Pitt must necessarily take the lead, and Rockingham was in no mood to give up his supremacy. But graver political reasons, as we have seen, co-operated with

this jealousy and distrust; and the blind sense which the whigs had long had of a radical difference between their policy and that of Pitt was now defined for them by the keenest political thinker of the day.

1494. At this moment Rockingham was in great measure guided by the counsels of his secretary, Edmund Burke. Burke had come to London in 1750 as a poor and unknown Irish adventurer. But the learning which at once won him the friendship of Johnson, and the imaginative power which enabled him to give his learning a living shape, soon promised him a philosophical and literary career. Instinct, however, drew Burke not to literature but to politics. He became secretary to Lord Rockingham, and in 1765 entered parliament under his patronage. His speech on the repeal of the stamp-acts at once lifted him into fame. The heavy Quaker-like figure, the scratch wig, the round spectacles, the cumbrous roll of paper which loaded Burke's pocket, gave little promise of a great orator, and less of the characteristics of his oratory—its passionate ardor, its poetic fancy, its amazing prodigality of resources; the dazzling succession in which irony, pathos, invective, tenderness, the most brilliant word-pictures, the coolest argument, followed each other. It was an eloquence, indeed, of a wholly new order in English experience. Walpole's clearness of statement, Pitt's appeals to emotion, were exchanged for the impassioned expression of a distinct philosophy of politics. "I have learned more from him than from all the books I ever read," Fox cried at a later time, with a burst of generous admira-

tion. The philosophical cast of Burke's reasoning was unaccompanied by any philosophical coldness of tone or phrase. The groundwork, indeed, of his nature was poetic. His ideas, if conceived by the reason, took shape and color from the splendor and fire of his imagination. A nation was to him a great living society, so complex in its relations, and whose institutions were so interwoven with glorious events in the past, that to touch it rudely was a sacrilege. Its constitution was no artificial scheme of government, but an exquisite balance of social forces which was in itself a natural outcome of its history and development. His temper was in this way conservative, but his conservatism sprang not from a love of inaction, but from a sense of the value of social order, and from an imaginative reverence for all that existed. Every institution was hallowed to him by the clear insight with which he discerned its relations to the past and its subtle connection with the social fabric around it. To touch even an anomaly seemed to Burke to be risking the ruin of a complex structure of national order which it had cost centuries to build up. "The equilibrium of the constitution," he said, "has something so delicate about it that the least displacement may destroy it." "It is a difficult and dangerous matter even to touch so complicated a machine."

1495. Perhaps the readiest refutation of such a theory was to be found in its influence on Burke's practical dealing with politics. In the great question, indeed, which fronted him as he entered parliament, it served him well. No man has ever seen

with deeper insight the working of those natural forces which build up communities, or which group communities into empires; and in the actual state of the American colonies, in their actual relation to the mother-country, he saw a result of such forces which only madmen and pedants would disturb. To enter upon "grounds of government," to remodel this great structure of empire on a theoretical basis, seemed to him a work for "metaphysicians," and not for statesmen. What statesmen had to do was to take this structure as it was, and by cautious and delicate adjustment to accommodate from time to time its general shape and the relations of its various parts to the varying circumstances of their natural development. Nothing, in other words, could be truer than Burke's political philosophy when the actual state of things was good in itself, and its preservation a recognition of the harmony of political institutions with political facts. But nothing could be more unwise than this philosophy, when he applied it to a state of things which in itself was evil, and which was, in fact, a defiance of the natural growth and adjustment of political power. It was thus that he applied it to politics at home. He looked on the revolution of 1688 as the final establishment of English institutions. His aim was to keep England as the revolution had left it, and under the rule of the great nobles who were faithful to the revolution. Such a conviction left him hostile to all movement whatever. He gave his passionate adhesion to the inaction of the whigs. He made an idol of Lord Rockingham, an honest man, but the weakest of

party leaders. He strove to check the corruption of parliament by a bill for civil retrenchment, but he took the lead in defeating all plans for its reform. Though he was one of the few men in England who understood the value of free industry, he struggled bitterly against all proposals to give freedom to Irish trade, and against the commercial treaty which the younger Pitt concluded with France. His work seemed to be that of investing with a gorgeous poetry the policy of timid content which the whigs believed they inherited from Sir Robert Walpole; and the very intensity of his trust in the natural development of a people rendered him incapable of understanding the good that might come from particular or from special reforms.

1496. It was this temper of Burke's mind which estranged him from Pitt. His political sagacity had discerned that the true basis of the whig party must henceforth be formed in a combination of that "power drawn from popularity" which was embodied in Pitt with the power which the whig families drew from political "connection." But with Pitt's popular tendencies Burke had no real sympathy. He looked on his eloquence as mere rant; he believed his character to be hollow, selfish, and insincere. Above all, he saw in him with a true foreboding the representative of forces before which the actual method of government must go down. The popularity of Pitt in the face of his parliamentary isolation was a sign that the house of commons was no real representative of the English people. Burke foresaw that Pitt was drifting inevitably to a

demand for a reform of the house which should make it representative in fact as in name. The full issues of such a reform, the changes which it would bring with it, the displacement of political power which it would involve, Burke alone of the men of his day understood. But he understood them only to shrink from them with horror, and to shrink with almost as great a horror from the man who was leading England on in the path of change.

1497. At this crisis, then, the temper of Burke squared with the temper of the whig party and of Rockingham; and the difference between Pitt's tendencies and their own came to the front on the question of dealing with the troubles in America. Pitt was not only for a repeal of the stamp-acts, but for an open and ungrudging acknowledgment of the claim to a partial independence which had been made by the colonists. His genius saw that, whatever were the legal rights of the mother-country, the time had come when the union between England and its children across the Atlantic must rest rather on sentiment than on law. Such a view was wholly unintelligible to the mass of the whigs or the ministry. They were willing, rather than heighten American discontent, to repeal the stamp-acts; but they looked on the supremacy of England and of the English parliament over all English dependencies as a principle absolutely beyond question. From the union, therefore, which Pitt offered, Rockingham and his fellow-ministers stood aloof. They were driven, whether they would or no, to a practical acknowledgment of the policy which he demanded;

but they resolved that the repeal of the stamp-acts should be accompanied by a formal repudiation of the principles of colonial freedom which Pitt had laid down. A declaratory act was first brought in, which asserted the supreme power of parliament over the colonies, "in all cases whatsoever." The declaration was intended, no doubt, to reassure the followers of the ministry as well as their opponents, for, in the assertion of the omnipotence of the two houses to which they belonged, whig and tory were at one. But it served also as a public declaration of the difference which severed the whigs from the great commoner. In a full house Pitt found but two supporters in his fierce attack upon the declaratory bill, which was supported by Burke in a speech which at once gave him rank as an orator; while Pitt's lieutenant, Shelburne, found but four supporters in a similar attack in the lords. The passing of the declaratory act was followed by the introduction of a bill for the repeal of the stamp-acts; and in spite of the resistance of the king's friends, a resistance instigated by George himself, the bill was carried in February, 1766, by a large majority.

1498. As the members left the house of commons, George Grenville, whose resistance had been fierce and dogged, was hooted by the crowd which waited to learn the issue without. Before Pitt the multitude reverently uncovered their heads and followed him home with blessings. It was the noblest hour of his life. For the moment, indeed, he had "saved England" more truly than even at the crisis of the Seven Years' war. His voice had forced on the

ministry and the king a measure which averted, though but for a while, the fatal struggle between England and her colonies. Lonely as he was, the ministry which had rejected his offers of aid found itself unable to stand against the general sense that the first man in the country should be its ruler; and bitter as was the king's hatred of him, Rockingham's resignation in the summer of 1766 forced George to call Pitt into office. His acceptance of the king's call, and the measures which he took to construct a ministry, showed a new resolve in the great statesman. He had determined to break finally with the political tradition which hampered him, and to set aside even the dread of parliamentary weakness which had fettered him three years before. Temple's refusal of aid, save on terms of equality which were wholly inadmissible, was passed by, though it left Pitt without a party in the house of commons. In the same temper he set at defiance the merely parliamentary organization of the whigs by excluding Newcastle, while he showed his wish to unite the party as a whole by his offer of posts to nearly all the members of the late administration. Though Rockingham stood coldly aside, some of his fellow-ministers accepted Pitt's offers, and they were reinforced by Lords Shelburne and Camden, the young Duke of Grafton, and the few friends who still clung to the great commoner. Such a ministry, however, rested for power not on parliament but on public opinion. It was, in effect, an appeal from parliament to the people; and it was an appeal which made such a reform in parliament as would bring it into

unison with public opinion a mere question of time. Whatever may have been Pitt's ultimate designs, however, no word of such a reform was uttered by any one. On the contrary, Pitt stooped to strengthen his parliamentary support by admitting some even of the "king's friends" to a share in the administration. But its life lay really in Pitt himself, in his immense popularity, and in the command which his eloquence gave him over the house of commons. His popularity, indeed, was soon roughly shaken; for the ministry was hardly formed when it was announced that its leader had accepted the earldom of Chatham. The step removed him to the house of lords, and for a while ruined the public confidence which his reputation for unselfishness had aided him to win. But it was from no vulgar ambition that Pitt laid down his title of the great commoner. The nervous disorganization which had shown itself three years before in his despair upon Temple's desertion had never ceased to hang around him, and it had been only at rare intervals that he had forced himself from his retirement to appear in the house of commons. It was the consciousness of coming weakness that made him shun the storms of debate. But in the cabinet he showed all his old energy. The most jealous of his fellow-ministers owned his supremacy. At the close of one of his earliest councils Charles Townshend acknowledged to a colleague, "Lord Chatham has just shown to us what inferior animals we are!" Plans were at once set on foot for the better government of Ireland, for the transfer of India from the company to the crown,

and for the formation of an alliance with Prussia and Russia to balance the family compact of the house of Bourbon. The alliance was foiled for the moment by the coldness of Frederick of Prussia. The first steps toward Indian reform were only taken by the ministry under severe pressure from Pitt. Petty jealousies, too, brought about the withdrawal of some of the whigs, and the hostility of Rockingham was shown by the fierce attacks of Burke in the house of commons. But secession and invective had little effect on the ministry. "The session," wrote Horace Walpole to a friend at the close of 1776, "has ended triumphantly for the great earl;" and when Chatham withdrew to Bath, to mature his plans for the coming year, his power remained unshaken.

CHAPTER II.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF AMERICA.

1767—1782.

1499. THE Chatham ministry marked a new phase in the relation of public opinion to the government of the state. In 1766, as in 1756, Pitt had been called into office by "the voice of the people" at large. But in his former ministry the influence he drew from popularity could only make itself effective through an alliance with the influence which was drawn from political connection; and when the two elements of the administration became opposed, the support of

the nation gave Pitt little strength of resistance against the whigs. Nor had the young king had much better fortune as yet in his efforts to break their rule. He had severed them, indeed, from Pitt; and he had dexterously broken up the great party into jealous factions. But, broken as it was, even its factions remained too strong for the king. His one effort at independence under Bute hardly lasted a year, and he was as helpless in the hands of Grenville as in the hands of Rockingham. His bribery, his patronage, his parliamentary "friends," his perfidy, and his lies, had done much to render good government impossible and to steep public life in deeper corruption, but they had done little to further the triumph of the crown over the great houses. Of the one power, indeed, which could break the whig rule, the power of public opinion, George was more bitterly jealous than even of the whigs themselves. But, in spite of his jealousy, the tide of opinion steadily rose. In wise and in unwise ways the country at large showed its new interest in national policy, its new resolve to have a share in the direction of it. It showed no love for the king or the king's schemes. But it retained all its old disgust for the whigs and for the parliament. It clung to Pitt closer than ever, and in spite of his isolation from all party support, raised him daily into a mightier power. It was the sense that a new England was thus growing up about him, that a new basis was forming itself for political action, which at last roused the great commoner to the bold enterprise of breaking through the bonds of "connection."

altogether. For the first time since the revolution a minister told the peers in their own house that he defied their combinations.

1500. The ministry of 1766, in fact, was itself such a defiance; for it was an attempt to found political power not on the support of the whigs as a party, but on the support of national opinion. But as parliament was then constituted, it was only through Chatham himself that opinion could tell even on the administration he formed; and six months after he had taken office Chatham was no more than a name. The dread which had driven him from the stormy agitation of the lower house to the quiet of the house of peers now became a certainty. As winter died into the spring of 1767 his nervous disorganization grew into a painful and overwhelming illness which almost wholly withdrew him from public affairs; and when parliament met again he was unable either to come to town or to confer with his colleagues. It was in vain that they prayed him for a single word of counsel. Chatham remained utterly silent; and the ministry which his guidance had alone held together at once fell into confusion. The earl's plans were suffered to drop. His colleagues lost all cohesion, and each acted as he willed. Townshend, a brilliant but shallow rhetorician whom Pitt had been driven reluctantly to make his chancellor of the exchequer, after angering the house of commons by proposals for an increase of the land-tax, strove to win back popularity among the squires by undertaking to raise a revenue from America. That a member of a ministry which bore Pitt's name should have

proposed to re-open the question of colonial taxation within a year of the repeal of the stamp-acts was strange enough to the colonists; and they were yet more astonished when, on its neglect to make provision for compensating those who had suffered from the recent outbreak in due conformity to an act of the British Parliament, the assembly of New York was suspended, and when Townshend redeemed his pledge by laying duties on various objects brought into American ports. But these measures were the result of levity and disorganization rather than of any purpose to re-open the quarrel. Pitt's colleagues had as yet no design to reverse his policy. The one aim of the ministry which bore his name, and which during his retirement looked to the Duke of Grafton as its actual head, was simply to exist. But in the face of Chatham's continued withdrawal, of Townshend's death in 1767, and of the increasing hostility of the Rockingham whigs, even existence was difficult; and Grafton saw himself forced to a union with the faction which was gathered under the Duke of Bedford, and to the appointment of a tory noble as secretary of state.

1501. Such measures, however, only showed how far the ministry had drifted from the ground on which Pitt took his stand in its formation; and the very force on which he had relied turned at once against it. The elections for the new parliament which met in 1768 were more corrupt than any that had as yet been witnessed; and even the stoutest opponents of reform shrank aghast from the open bribery of constituencies and the prodigal barter of seats.

How bitter the indignation of the country had grown was seen in its fresh backing of Wilkes. Wilkes had remained in France since his outlawry ; but he seized on the opening afforded by the elections to return and offer himself as a member for the new parliament. To the surprise and dismay of the new ministers he was returned for Middlesex, a county the large number of whose voters made its choice a real expression of public opinion. The choice of Wilkes at such a moment was, in effect, a public condemnation of the house of commons and the ministerial system. The ministry, however, and the house alike shrank from a fresh struggle with the agitator. But the king was eager for the contest. After ten years of struggle and disappointment George had all but reached his aim. The two forces which had as yet worsted him were both of them paralyzed. The whigs were fatally divided, and discredited in the eyes of the country by their antagonism to Pitt. Pitt, on the other hand, was suddenly removed from the stage. The ministry was without support in the country ; and for parliamentary support it was forced to lean more and more on the men who looked for direction to the king himself. At a moment when all hope of exerting any influence seemed crushed by the return of Chatham to power, George found his influence predominant as it had never been before. One force of opposition alone remained in the public discontent ; and at this he struck more fiercely than ever. "I think it highly expedient to apprise you," he wrote to Lord North, "that the expulsion of Mr. Wilkes appears to be very essential,

and must be effected." The ministers and the house of commons bowed to his will. By his non-appearance in court when charged with libel, Wilkes had become an outlaw, and he was now thrown into prison on his outlawry. Dangerous riots broke out in London and over the whole country at the news of his arrest, and continued throughout the rest of the year. In the midst of these tumults the ministry itself was torn with internal discord. The adherents of Chatham found their position in it an intolerable one; and Lord Shelburne announced his purpose of resigning office. The announcement was followed in the autumn by the resignation of Chatham himself. Though still prostrated by disease, the earl was sufficiently restored to grasp the actual position of the cabinet which traded on his name, and in October, 1768, he withdrew formally from the ministry.

1502. The withdrawal of Chatham, however, if it shook the ministry, only rendered it still more dependent on the king; and, in spite of its reluctance, George forced it to plunge into a decisive struggle with the public opinion which was declaring itself in tumult and riot against the system of government. The triumph of Wilkes had been driven home by the election of a nominee of the great agitator as his colleague on a fresh vacancy in the representation of Middlesex. The government met the blow by a show of vigor, and by calling on the magistrates of Surrey to disperse the mobs; a summons which ended in conflicts between the crowd and the soldiers, in which some of the rioters were slain. Wilkes at once published the letter of the secretary of state,

with comments on it as a cause of bloodshed; and the ministry accepted the step as a challenge to combat. If his comments were libelous, the libel was cognizable in the ordinary courts of law. But no sooner had parliament assembled in 1769 than the house of commons was called to take the matter into its own hands. Witnesses were examined at its bar; the forms of a trial were gone through; and, as Wilkes persisted in his charge, he was expelled as a libeler. Unluckily, the course which had been adopted put the house itself on trial before the constituencies. No sooner was the new writ issued than Wilkes again presented himself as a candidate, and was again elected by the shire of Middlesex. Violent and oppressive as the course of the house of commons had been, it had, as yet, acted within its strict right, for no one questioned its possession of a right of expulsion. But the defiance of Middlesex led it now to go further. It resolved "that Mr. Wilkes, having been in this session of parliament expelled the house, was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in the present parliament;" and it issued a writ for a fresh election. Middlesex answered this insolent claim to limit the free choice of a constituency by again returning Wilkes; and the house was driven by its anger to a fresh and more outrageous usurpation. It again expelled the member for Middlesex; and, on his return for the third time by an immense majority, it voted that the candidate whom he had defeated—Col. Luttrell—ought to have been returned, and was the legal representative of Middlesex. The commons had not only

limited at their own arbitrary discretion the free election of the constituency, but they had transferred its rights to themselves by seating Luttrell as a member in defiance of the deliberate choice of Wilkes by the freeholders of Middlesex. The country at once rose indignantly against this violation of constitutional law. Wilkes was elected an alderman of London; and the mayor, aldermen, and livery petitioned the king to dissolve the parliament. A remonstrance from London and Westminster mooted a far larger question. It said boldly that "there is a time when it is clearly demonstrable that men cease to be representatives. That time is now arrived. The house of commons do not represent the people." Meanwhile, a writer who styled himself Junius attacked the government in letters, which, rancorous and unscrupulous as was their tone, gave a new power to the literature of the press by their clearness and terseness of statement, the finish of their style, and the terrible vigor of their invective.

1503. The storm, however, beat idly on the obstinacy of the king. The printer of the bold letters was prosecuted, and the petitions and remonstrances of London were haughtily rejected. The issue of the struggle verified the forebodings of Burke. If, as Middlesex declared and as the strife itself proved, the house of commons had ceased to represent the English people, it was inevitable that men should look forward to measures that would make it representative. At the beginning of 1770 a cessation of the disease which had long held him prostrate enabled Chatham to re-appear in the house of lords,

He at once denounced the usurpations of the commons, and brought in a bill to declare them illegal. But his genius made him the first to see that remedies of this sort were inadequate to meet evils which really sprang from the fact that the house of commons no longer represented the people of England; and he mooted a plan for its reform by an increase of the county members, who then formed the most independent portion of the house. Further he could not go, for even in the proposals he made he stood almost alone. The tories and the king's friends were not likely to welcome proposals which would lessen the king's influence. On the other hand, the whigs, under Lord Rockingham, had no sympathy with parliamentary reform. As early as 1769, in his first political publication, their one philosophic thinker—Edmund Burke—had met a proposal to enlarge the number of constituents by a counter-proposal to lessen them. “It would be more in the spirit of our constitution, and more agreeable to the fashion of our best laws,” he said, “by lessening the number to add to the weight and independency of our voters.” Nor did the whigs shrink with less haughty disdain from the popular agitation in which public opinion was forced to express itself, and which Chatham, while censuring its extravagance, as deliberately encouraged. It is from the quarrel between Wilkes and the house of commons that we may date the influence of public meetings on English politics. The gatherings of the Middlesex electors in his support were preludes to the great meetings of Yorkshire freeholders in which the question of parliamentary

reform rose into importance; and it was in the movement for reform, and the establishment of corresponding committees throughout the country for the purpose of promoting it, that the power of political agitation first made itself felt. Political societies and clubs took their part in this quickening and organization of public opinion; and the spread of discussion, as well as the influence which now began to be exercised by the appearance of vast numbers of men in support of any political movement, proved that parliament, whether it would or no, must soon reckon with the sentiments of the people at large.

1504. But an agent far more effective than popular agitation was preparing to bring the force of public opinion to bear directly on parliament itself. We have seen how much of the corruption of the house of commons sprang from the secrecy of parliamentary proceedings; but this secrecy was the harder to preserve as the nation woke to a greater interest in its own affairs. From the accession of the Georges imperfect reports of the more important discussions began to be published under the title of "The Senate of Lilliput," and with feigned names or simple initials to denote the speakers. The best known reports of this kind were those contributed by Samuel Johnson to the *Gentleman's Magazine*. Obtained by stealth and often merely recalled by memory, such reports were naturally inaccurate; and their inaccuracy was eagerly seized on as a pretext for enforcing the rules which guarded the secrecy of proceedings in parliament. In 1771 the commons issued a proclamation forbidding the publication of debates; and

six printers, who set it at defiance, were summoned to the bar of the house. One who refused to appear was arrested by its messenger; but the arrest brought the house into conflict with the magistrates of London. The magistrates set aside its proclamation as without legal force, released the printers, and sent the messenger to prison for an unlawful arrest. The house sent the lord mayor to the Tower, but the cheers of the crowds which followed him on his way told that public opinion was again with the press, and the attempt to hinder its publication of parliamentary proceedings dropped silently on his release at the next prorogation. Few changes of equal importance have been so quietly brought about. Not only was the responsibility of members to their constituents made constant and effective by the publication of their proceedings, but the nation itself was called in to assist in the deliberations of its representatives. A new and wider interest in its own affairs was roused in the people at large, and a new political education was given to it through the discussion of every subject of national importance in the houses and the press. Stimulated and molded into shape by free discussion, encouraged and made conscious of its strength by public meetings, and gathered up and represented on all its sides by the journals of the day, public opinion became a force in practical statesmanship, influenced the course of debates, and controlled, in a closer and more constant way than even parliament itself had been able to do, the actions of the government. The importance of its new position gave a weight to the press which it had never had

before. The first great English journals date from this time. With the *Morning Chronicle*, the *Morning Post*, the *Morning Herald*, and the *Times*, all of which appeared in the interval between the opening years of the American war and the beginning of the war with the French revolution, journalism took a new tone of responsibility and intelligence. The hacks of Grub street were superseded by publicists of a high moral temper and literary excellence; and philosophers like Coleridge or statesmen like Canning turned to influence public opinion through the columns of the press.

1505. But great as the influence of opinion was destined to become, it was feebly felt as yet; and George the Third was able to set Chatham's policy disdainfully aside, and to plunge into a contest far more disastrous than his contest with the press. In all the proceedings of the last few years, what had galled him most had been the act which averted a war between England and her colonies. To the king the Americans were already "rebels," and the great statesman whose eloquence had made their claims irresistible was a "trumpet of sedition." George deplored in his correspondence with his ministers the repeal of the stamp-acts. "All men feel," he wrote, "that the fatal compliance in 1766 has increased the pretensions of the Americans to absolute independence." But in England generally the question was regarded as settled, while in America the news of the repeal had been received with universal joy, and taken as a close of the strife. On both sides, however, there remained a pride and irritability which

only wise handling could have allayed; and in the present state of English politics wise handling was impossible. Only a few months, indeed, passed before the quarrel was again re-opened; for no sooner had the illness of Lord Chatham removed him from any real share in public affairs than the wretched administration which bore his name suspended the assembly of New York on its refusal to provide quarters for English troops, and resolved to assert British sovereignty by levying import duties of trivial amount at American ports. The assembly of Massachusetts was dissolved on a trifling quarrel with its governor, and Boston was occupied for a time by British soldiers. It was without a thought of any effectual struggle, however, that the cabinet had entered on this course of vexation; and when the remonstrances of the legislatures of Massachusetts and Virginia, coupled with a fall in the funds, warned the ministers of its danger, they hastened to withdraw from it. In 1769 the troops were recalled, and all duties, save one, abandoned. But with a fatal obstinacy the king insisted on retaining the duty on tea as an assertion of the supremacy of the mother-country. Its retention was enough to prevent any thorough restoration of good feeling. A series of petty quarrels went on in almost every colony between the popular assemblies and the governors appointed by the crown, and the colonists persisted in their agreement to import nothing from the mother-country. As yet, however, there was no prospect of serious strife. In America the influence of George Washington allayed the irritation of Virginia; while

Massachusetts contented itself with quarreling with its governor, and refusing to buy tea so long as the duty was levied.

1506. The temper of the colonists was in the main that of the bulk of English statesmen. Even George Grenville, though approving the retention of the duty in question, abandoned all dream of further taxation. But the king was now supreme. The reappearance and attack of Chatham at the opening of 1770 had completed the ruin of the ministry. Those of his adherents who still clung to it, Lord Camden, the chancellor, Lord Granby, the commander-in-chief, Dunning, the solicitor-general, resigned their posts. In a few days they were followed by the Duke of Grafton, who since Chatham's resignation had been nominally the head of the administration. All that remained of it were the Bedford faction and the dependents of the king; but George did not hesitate to form these into a ministry, and to place at its head the former chancellor of the exchequer, Lord North, a man of some administrative ability, but unconnected with any political party, steadily opposed to any recognition of public opinion, and of an easy and indolent temper which yielded against his better knowledge to the stubborn doggedness of the king. The instinct of the country at once warned it of the results of such a change; and the city of London put itself formally at the head of the public discontent. In solemn addresses it called on George the Third to dismiss his ministers and to dissolve the parliament; and its action was supported by petitions to the same effect from the greater counties. In the following

year it fought, as we have seen, a battle with the house of commons which established the freedom of the press. But the efforts of the country failed before the paralysis of political action which resulted from the position of the whigs and the corruption of parliament. The deaths of Grenville and Bedford broke up two of the whig factions. Rockingham with the rest of the party held aloof from the popular agitation, and drew more and more away from Chatham as he favored it. The parliament remained steady to the king, and the king clung more and more to the ministry. The ministry was, in fact, a mere cloak for the direction of public affairs by George himself. "Not only did he direct the minister," a careful observer tells us, "in all important matters of foreign and domestic policy, but he instructed him as to the management of debates in parliament, suggested what motions should be made or opposed, and how measures should be carried. He reserved for himself all the patronage, he arranged the whole cast of administration, settled the relative places and pretensions of ministers of state, law officers, and members of the household, nominated and promoted the English and Scotch judges, appointed and translated bishops and deans, and dispensed other preferments in the church. He disposed of military governments, regiments, and commissions; and himself ordered the marching of troops. He gave and refused titles, honors, and pensions." All this immense patronage was persistently used for the creation and maintenance in both houses of parliament of a majority directed by the king him-

self; and its weight was seen in the steady action of such a majority. It was seen yet more in the subjection to which the ministry that bore North's name was reduced. George was, in fact, the minister through the years of its existence; and the shame of the darkest hour of English history lies wholly at his door.

1507. His fixed purpose was to seize on the first opportunity of undoing the "fatal compliance of 1766." A trivial riot gave him at last the handle he wanted. In December, 1773, the arrival of some English ships laden with tea kindled fresh irritation in Boston, where the non-importation agreement was strictly enforced; and a mob in the disguise of Indians boarded the vessels and flung their contents into the sea. The outrage was deplored alike by the friends of America in England and by its own leading statesmen; and both Washington and Chatham were prepared to support the government in its looked-for demand of redress. But the thought of the king was not of redress but of repression, and he set roughly aside the more conciliatory proposals of Lord North and his fellow-ministers. They had already rejected as "frivolous and vexatious" a petition of the assembly of Massachusetts for the dismissal of two public officers whose letters home advised the withdrawal of free institutions from the colonies. They now seized on the riot as a pretext for rigorous measures. A bill introduced into parliament in the beginning of 1774 punished Boston by closing its port against all commerce. Another punished the state of Massachusetts by withdrawing the

liberties it had enjoyed ever since the Pilgrim Fathers landed on its soil. Its charter was altered. The choice of its council was transferred from the people to the crown, and the nomination of its judges was transferred to the governor. In the governor, too, by a provision more outrageous than even these, was vested the right of sending all persons charged with a share in the late disturbances to England for trial. To enforce these measures of repression troops were sent to America, and Gen. Gage, the commander-in-chief there, was appointed governor of Massachusetts. The king's exultation at the prospect before him was unbounded. "The die," he wrote triumphantly to his minister, "is cast. The colonies must either triumph or submit." Four regiments would be enough to bring the Americans to their senses. They would only be "lions while we are lambs." "If we take the resolute part," he decided solemnly, "they will undoubtedly be very meek."

1508. Unluckily the blow at Massachusetts was received with anything but meekness. The jealousies between colony and colony were hushed by a sense that the liberties of all were in danger. If the British parliament could cancel the charter of Massachusetts and ruin the trade of Boston, it could cancel the charter of every colony and ruin the trade of every port from the St. Lawrence to the coast of Georgia. All, therefore, adopted the cause of Massachusetts; and all their legislatures save that of Georgia sent delegates to a congress which assembled on the 4th of September at Philadelphia. Massachu-

setts took a yet bolder course. Not one of its citizens would act under the new laws. Its assembly met in defiance of the governor, called out the militia of the state, and provided arms and ammunition for it. But there was still room for reconciliation. The resolutions of the congress had been moderate, for Virginia was the wealthiest and most influential among the states who sent delegates, and, though resolute to resist the new measures of the government, Virginia still clung to the mother-country. At home the merchants of London and Bristol pleaded loudly for reconciliation; and in January, 1775, Chatham again came forward to avert a strife he had once before succeeded in preventing. With characteristic largeness of feeling he set aside all half-measures or proposals of compromise. "It is not canceling a piece of parchment," he insisted, "that can win back America: you must respect her fears and her resentments." The bill which he introduced in concert with Franklin provided for the repeal of the late acts and for the security of the colonial charters, abandoned the claim of taxation, and ordered the recall of the troops. A colonial assembly was directed to meet and provide means by which America might contribute toward the payment of the public debt.

1509. Chatham's measure was contemptuously rejected by the lords, as was a similar measure of Burke's by the house of commons, and a petition of the city of London in favor of the colonies by the king himself. With the rejection of these efforts for conciliation began the great struggle which ended eight years later in the severance of the American

colonies from the British crown. The congress of delegates from the colonial legislatures at once voted measures for general defense, ordered the levy of an army, and set George Washington at its head. No nobler figure ever stood in the forefront of a nation's life. Washington was grave and courteous in address; his manners were simple and unpretending; his silence and the serene calmness of his temper spoke of a perfect self-mastery. But there was little in his outer bearing to reveal the grandeur of soul which lifts his figure, with all the simple majesty of an ancient statue, out of the smaller passions, the meaner impulses of the world around him. What recommended him for command was simply his weight among his fellow-land-owners of Virginia, and the experience of war which he had gained by service in border contests with the French and the Indians, as well as in Braddock's luckless expedition against Fort Duquesne. It was only as the weary fight went on that the colonists discovered, however slowly and imperfectly, the greatness of their leader; his clear judgment, his heroic endurance, his silence under difficulties, his calmness in the hour of danger or defeat; the patience with which he waited, the quickness and hardness with which he struck, the lofty and serene sense of duty that never swerved from its task through resentment or jealousy; that never, through war or peace, felt the touch of a meaner ambition; that knew no aim save that of guarding the freedom of his fellow-countrymen, and no personal longing save that of returning to his own fireside when their freedom was secured. It was almost un-

consciously that men learned to cling to Washington with a trust and faith such as few other men have won, and to regard him with a reverence which still hushes us in presence of his memory. But even America hardly recognized his real greatness while he lived. It was only when death set its seal on him that the voice of those whom he had served so long proclaimed him "the man first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his fellow-countrymen."

1510. Washington more than any of his fellow-colonists represented the clinging of the Virginian land-owners to the mother country, and his acceptance of a military command proved that even the most moderate among the colonists had no hope now save in arms. The struggle opened with a skirmish between a party of English troops and a detachment of militia at Lexington on the 19th of April, 1775; and in a few days 20,000 colonists appeared before Boston. The congress re-assembled, declared the states they represented "The United Colonies of America," and undertook the work of government. Meanwhile 10,000 fresh English troops landed at Boston. But the provincial militia, in number almost double that of the British force which prepared to attack them, seized a neck of ground which joins Boston to the mainland; and though on the 17th of June they were driven from the heights of Bunker's Hill which commanded the town, it was only after a desperate struggle in which their bravery put an end forever to the taunts of cowardice which had been leveled against the colonists. "Are the Yankees cowards?" shouted the men of Massachusetts as the

first English attack rolled back baffled down the hill-side. But a far truer courage was shown in the stubborn endurance with which Washington's raw militiamen, who gradually dwindled from 16,000 to 10,000, ill-fed, ill-armed, and with but forty-five rounds of ammunition to each man, cooped up through the winter a force of 10,000 veterans in the lines of Boston. The spring of 1776 saw them force these troops to withdraw from the city to New York, where the whole British army, largely reinforced by mercenaries from Germany, was concentrated under General Howe. Meanwhile a raid of the American General Arnold nearly drove the British troops from Canada; and though his attempt broke down before Quebec, it showed that all hope of reconciliation was over. The colonies of the south, the last to join in the struggle, had, in fact, expelled their governors at the close of 1775; at the opening of the next year Massachusetts instructed its delegates to support a complete repudiation of the king's government by the colonies; while the American ports were thrown open to the world in defiance of the navigation acts. These decisive steps were followed by the great act with which American history begins, the adoption on the 4th of July, 1776, by the delegates in congress, after a fierce resistance from those of Pennsylvania and South Carolina, and in spite of the abstention of those of New York, of a declaration of independence. "We," ran its solemn words, "the representatives of the United States of America in congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our in-

tentions, solemnly publish and declare that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states."

1511. But the earlier successes of the colonists were soon followed by suffering and defeat. Howe, an active general, with a fine army at his back, cleared Long Island in August by a victory at Brooklyn; and Washington, whose force was weakened by withdrawals and defeat, and disheartened by the loyal tone of the state in which it was encamped, was forced in the autumn of 1776 to evacuate New York and New Jersey, and to fall back on the Hudson and then on the Delaware. The congress prepared to fly from Philadelphia, and a general despair showed itself in cries of peace. But a well-managed surprise and a daring march on the rear of Howe's army restored the spirits of Washington's men, and forced the English general in his turn to fall back on New York. England, however, was now roused to more serious efforts; and the campaign of 1777 opened with a combined attempt for the suppression of the revolt. An army which had assembled in Canada under General Burgoyne marched in June by way of the lakes to seize the line of the Hudson. Howe, meanwhile, sailed up the Chesapeake and advanced on Philadelphia, the temporary capital of the United States and the seat of the congress. The rout of his little army of 7,000 men at Brandywine forced Washington to abandon Philadelphia, and, after a bold but unsuccessful attack on his victors, to retire into winter quarters on the banks of the Schuylkill, where the unconquerable

resolve with which he nerved his handful of beaten and half-starved troops to face Howe's army in their camp at Valley Forge is the noblest of his triumphs. But in the north the war had taken another color. Burgoyne's movement had been planned in view of a junction with at least a part of Howe's army from New York; a junction which would have enabled him to seize the line of the Hudson and thus cut off New England from her sister-provinces. But Howe was held fast by Washington's resistance and unable to send a man to the north; while the spirit of New England, which had grown dull as the war rolled away from its borders, quickened again at the news of invasion and of the outrages committed by the Indians employed among the English troops. Its militia hurried from town and homestead to a camp with which General Gates had barred the road to Albany; and after a fruitless attack on the American lines, Burgoyne saw himself surrounded on the heights of Saratoga. On the 17th of October his whole force was compelled to surrender.

1512. The news of this calamity gave force to the words with which Chatham at the very time of the surrender was pressing for peace. "You cannot conquer America," he cried when men were glorying in Howe's successes over Washington. "If I were an American as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms—never, never, never!" Then, in a burst of indignant eloquence, he thundered against an outrage which was at that moment nerving New England to its rally against Burgoyne, the use of the

Indian with his scalping-knife as an ally of England against her children. The proposals which Chatham brought forward might perhaps in his hands even yet have drawn America and the mother-country together. His plan was one of absolute conciliation. He looked forward to a federal union between the settlements and Great Britain which would have left the colonies absolutely their own masters in all matters of internal government, and linked only by ties of affection and loyalty to the general body of the empire. But the plan met with the same scornful rejection as his previous proposals. Its rejection was at once followed by the news of Saratoga, and by the yet more fatal news that the disaster had roused the Bourbon courts to avenge the humiliation of the Seven Years' war. Crippled and impoverished as she was at its close, France could do nothing to break the world-power which was rising in front of her; but in the very moment of her defeat, the foresight of Choiseul had seen in a future struggle between England and her colonies a chance of ruining the great fabric which Pitt's triumphs had built up. Nor was Pitt blind to the steady resolve of France to renew the fight. In every attempt which he had made to construct a ministry he had laid down, as the corner-stone of his foreign policy, a renewal of that alliance with the Protestant states of north Germany against the house of Bourbon which could alone save England from the danger of the family compact. But his efforts had been foiled alike by the resistance of the king, the timid peacefulness of the whigs, and at last by the distrust of England which

had been rooted in the mind of Frederick the Great through the treachery of Lord Bute.

1513. The wisdom of his policy was now brought home by the coming of the danger he had foreseen when the foresight of Choiseul was justified by the outbreak of strife between England and America. Even then for a while France looked idly on. Her king, Louis the Sixteenth, was averse from war; her treasury was empty; her government scared by the growth of new movements toward freedom about it; and, fearful of endangering the monarchy by the encouragement these would receive from a union with the revolted colonies, still doubted whether America had any real power of resisting Britain. It was to no purpose that, from the moment when they declared themselves independent, the United States called on France for aid; or that Franklin pressed their appeal on its government. A year, in fact, passed without any decisive resolution to give aid to the colonists. But the steady drift of French policy and the passion of the French people pressed heavier every day on the hesitation of their government; and the news of Saratoga forced its hand. The American envoys at last succeeded in forming an alliance; and in February, 1778, a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded between France and America. Lord North strove to meet the blow by fresh offers of conciliation, and by a pledge to renounce forever the right of direct taxation over the colonies; but he felt that such offers were fruitless, that the time for conciliation was past, while all hope of reducing America by force of arms had disap-

peared. In utter despair he pressed his resignation on the king. But George was as obstinate for war as ever; and the country, stung to the quick by the attack of France, backed passionately the obstinacy of the king. But, unlike George the Third, it instinctively felt that, if a hope still remained of retaining the friendship of the colonies and of baffling the efforts of the Bourbons, it lay in Lord Chatham; and in spite of the king's resistance the voice of the whole country called him back to power. The danger, indeed, which had scared Lord North into resignation, and before which a large party of the whigs now advocated the acknowledgment of American independence, only woke Chatham to his old daring and fire. He had revolted from a war against Englishmen. But all his pride in English greatness, all his confidence in English power, woke afresh at the challenge of France. His genius saw, indeed, in the new danger a means of escape from the old. He would have withdrawn every soldier from America, and flung the whole force of Britain into the conflict with France. He believed that in the splendor of triumphs over her older enemy, England might be brought to terms of amity which would win back the colonies, and that the English blood of the colonists themselves would be quickened to a fresh union with the mother-country by her struggle against a power from which she had so lately rescued them. Till such a trial had been made, with all the advantages that the magic of his name could give it in England and America alike, he would not bow to a need that must wreck the great empire his hand had built

up. Even at this hour there was a chance of success for such a policy; but on the eve of Chatham's return to office this chance was shattered by the hand of death. Broken with age and disease, the earl was borne to the house of lords on the 7th of April to utter in a few broken words his protest against the proposal to surrender America. "I rejoice," he murmured, "that I am still alive to lift up my voice against the dismemberment of this ancient and noble monarchy. His majesty succeeded to an empire as great in extent as its reputation was unsullied. Seventeen years ago this people was the terror of the world." He listened impatiently to the reply of the Duke of Richmond, and again rose to his feet. But he had hardly risen when he pressed his hand upon his heart, and falling back in a swoon was borne home to die.

1514. How well founded was Chatham's faith in the power of Britain was seen in the strife that opened. From the hour of his death England entered on a conflict with enemies whose circle gradually widened till she stood single-handed against the world. At the close of 1778 the family compact bore its full fruit; Spain joined the league of France and America against her, and in the next year the joint fleets of the two powers rode the masters of the channel. They even threatened a descent on the English coast. But, dead as Chatham was, his cry woke a new life in England. "Shall we fall prostrate," he exclaimed with his last breath, "before the house of Bourbon?" and the divisions which had broken the nation in its struggle with American

liberty was hushed in the presence of this danger to its own existence. The weakness of the ministry was compensated by the energy of England itself. For three years, from 1779 to 1782, General Elliott held against famine and bombardment from a French and Spanish army the rock-fortress of Gibraltar. Although a quarrel over the right of search banded Holland and the courts of the north in an armed neutrality against her, and added the Dutch fleet to the number of her assailants, England held her own at sea. In her eastern dependency, where France sought a counterpoise to the power of Britain in that of the Mahrattas, freebooters of Hindoo blood whose tribes had for a century past carried their raids over India from the hills of the western coast and founded sovereignties in Guzerat, Malwa, and Tanjore, the tenacity and resource of Warren Hastings, the first governor-general of British India, wrested victory from failure and defeat. Though the wide schemes of conquest which he formed were for the moment frustrated, the annexation of Benares, the extension of British rule along the Ganges, the reduction of Oude to virtual dependence, the appearance of English armies in Central India, and the defeat of the Sultan of Mysore laid the foundation of an Indian empire which his genius was bold enough to foresee. Even in America the fortune of the war seemed for a while to turn. After Burgoyne's surrender the English generals had withdrawn from Pennsylvania, and bent all their efforts on the southern states, where a strong royalist party still existed. The capture of Charleston and the successes of Lord

Cornwallis in 1780 were rendered fruitless by the obstinate resistance of General Greene; but the United States remained weakened by bankruptcy and unnerved by hopes of aid from France.

1515. Hardly a year, however, had passed when the face of the war in America was changed by a terrible disaster. Foiled in an attempt on North Carolina by the refusal of his fellow-general, Sir Henry Clinton, to assist him, Cornwallis fell back in 1781 on Virginia, and intrenched himself in the lines of Yorktown. A sudden march of Washington brought him to the front of the English troops at a moment when the French fleet held the sea, and the British army was driven by famine in October to a surrender as humiliating as that of Saratoga. The news fell like a thunderbolt on the wretched minister, who had until now suppressed at his master's order his own conviction of the uselessness of further bloodshed. Opening his arms and pacing wildly about the room, Lord North exclaimed, "It is all over," and resigned. At this moment, indeed, the country seemed on the brink of ruin. Humiliating as it was, England could have borne fifty such calamities as the surrender at Yorktown. But in the very crisis of the struggle with America she found herself confronted with a danger nearer home. The revolt of one great dependency brought with it a threatened revolt from another. In Ireland, as in the colonies, England had shrunk from carrying out either a national or an imperial policy. She might have recognized Ireland as a free nationality, and bound it to herself by federal bonds; or she

might have absorbed it, as she had absorbed Scotland, into the general mass of her own national life. With a perverse ingenuity she had not only refrained from taking either of these courses, but she had deliberately adopted the worst features of both. Ireland was absolutely subject to Britain, but she formed no part of it; she shared neither in its liberty nor its wealth. But, on the other hand, she was allowed no national existence of her own. While all the outer seeming of national life was left, while Ireland possessed in name an army, a parliament, a magistracy, the mass of the Irish people was as strange to all this life as the savages of Polynesia. Every Catholic Irishman—and there were five Irish Catholics to every Irish Protestant—was treated as a stranger and a foreigner in his own country. The house of lords, the house of commons, the magistracy, all corporate offices in towns, all ranks in the army, the bench, the bar, the whole administration of government or justice, were closed against Catholics. The very right of voting for their representatives in parliament was denied them. Few Catholic land-owners had been left by the sweeping confiscations which had followed the successive revolts of the island, and oppressive laws forced even these few with scant exceptions to profess Protestantism. Necessity, indeed, had brought about a practical toleration of their religion and their worship; but in all social and political matters the native Catholics, in other words, the immense majority of the people of Ireland, were simply hewers of wood and drawers of water for Protestant masters, for masters who still

looked on themselves as mere settlers, who boasted of their Scotch or English extraction, and who regarded the name of "Irishman" as an insult.

1516. But small as was this Protestant body, one-half of it fared little better, as far as power was concerned, than the Catholics. The Presbyterians, who formed the bulk of the Ulster settlers, were shut out by law from all civil, military, and municipal offices. The administration and justice of the country were thus kept rigidly in the hands of members of the established church, a body which comprised about a twelfth of the population of the island, while its government was practically monopolized by a few great Protestant land-owners. The rotten boroughs which had originally been created to make the Irish parliament dependent on the crown, had by this time fallen under the influence of the adjacent landlords, whose command of these made them masters of the house of commons while they themselves formed in person the house of peers. To such a length had this system been carried that at the time of the union more than sixty seats were in the hands of three families alone—those of the Hills, the Ponsonbys, and the Beresfords. One-half of the house of commons, in fact, was returned by a small group of nobles, who were recognized as "parliamentary undertakers," and who undertook to "manage" parliament on their own terms. Irish politics were for these men a mere means of public plunder; they were glutted with pensions, preferments, and bribes in hard cash in return for their services; they were the advisers of every lord-lieutenant, and the practi-

cal governors of the country. The results were what might have been expected. For more than a century Ireland was the worst governed country in Europe. That its government was not even worse than it was, was due to its connection with England and the subordination of its parliament to the English privy council. The Irish parliament had no power of originating legislative or financial measures, and could only say "yes" or "no" to acts laid before it by the privy council in England. The English parliament, too, claimed the right of binding Ireland as well as England by its enactments, and one of its statutes transferred the appellate jurisdiction of the Irish peerage to the English house of lords. Galling as these restrictions were to the plundering aristocracy of Ireland, they formed a useful check on its tyranny. But, as if to compensate for the benefits of this protection, England did her best from the time of William the Third to annihilate Irish commerce and to ruin Irish agriculture. Statutes passed by the jealousy of English land-owners forbade the export of Irish cattle or sheep to English ports. The export of wool was forbidden lest it might interfere with the profits of English wool-growers. Poverty was thus added to the curse of misgovernment; and poverty deepened with the rapid growth of the native population, a growth due in great part to the physical misery and moral degradation of their lives, till famine turned the country into a hell.

1517. The bitter lesson of the last conquest, however, long sufficed to check all dreams of revolt among the native Irish; and the outbreaks which

sprang from time to time out of the general misery and discontent were purely local in their character, and were roughly repressed by the ruling class. When political revolt at last threatened English supremacy over Ireland, the threat came from the ruling class itself. Some timid efforts made by the English government at the accession of George the Third to control its tyranny were resented by a refusal of money bills, and by a cry for the removal of the checks imposed on the independence of the Irish parliament. But it was not till the American war that this cry became a political danger. The threat of a French invasion and the want of any regular force to oppose it compelled the government to call on Ireland to provide for its own defense, and in answer to its call 40,000 volunteers appeared in arms in 1779. The force was wholly a Protestant one, commanded by Protestant officers, and it was turned to account by the Protestant oligarchy. Threats of an armed revolt backed the eloquence of two parliamentary leaders, Grattan and Flood, in their demand for the repeal of Poyning's act, which took all power of initiative legislation from the Irish parliament, and for the recognition of the Irish house of lords as an ultimate court of appeal. But the volunteers were forced to bid for the support of the native Catholics, who looked with indifference on these quarrels of their masters, by claiming for them a relaxation of the penal laws against the exercise of their religion, and of some of their most oppressive disabilities. So real was the danger that England was forced to give way. The

first demands were, in effect, a claim for national independence. But there were no means of resisting them, for England was without a soldier to oppose the volunteers, while she was pressed hard by the league of Europe and America against her. In the face of such a rising close at home, it became plain even to the most dogged of tories that it was impossible to continue a strife across 3,000 miles of sea, and to deal with the attitude of Ireland became even a more pressing need of the ministry which followed that of Lord North than the need of dealing with America.

1518. The blow which had shattered the attempt of England to wield an autocratic power over her colonies had shattered the attempt of its king to establish an autocratic power over England itself, The ministry which bore the name of Lord North had been a mere screen for the administration of George the Third, and its ruin was the ruin of the system he had striven to build up. Never again was the crown to possess such a power as he had wielded during the past ten years. For the moment, however, there was nothing to mark so decisive a change; and both to the king and his opponents it must have seemed only a new turn in the political game which they were playing when in March, 1782, the whigs returned to office. Though the tories and "king's friends" had now grown to a compact body of 150 members, who still followed Lord North, the whigs were superior to their rivals in numbers and political character, now that the return of the Bedford and Grenville sections to the general body of the

party during its long and steady opposition to the war had restored much of its old cohesion. Rockingham was still its head; and on Rockingham fell the double task of satisfying Ireland and of putting an end, at any cost, to the war with the United States. The task involved in both quarters a humiliating surrender; for neither Ireland nor America would be satisfied save by a full concession of their claims. It needed the bitter stress of necessity to induce the English parliament to follow Rockingham's counsels, but the need was too urgent to suffer their rejection. The houses, therefore, abandoned by a formal statute the judicial and legislative supremacy they had till then asserted over the parliament of Ireland; and from this moment England and Ireland were simply held together by the fact that the sovereign of the one island was also the sovereign of the other. The grant of independence to the one great dependency made it easier to recognize the freedom of the other. Rockingham, in fact, took office with the purpose of winning peace by a full acknowledgment of the independence of the United States, and negotiations were soon entered into for that purpose.

1519. But America was bound by its league with the Bourbon courts to make no peace save one common to its allies, and from its allies peace was hard to win without concessions which would have stripped from England all that remained of her older greatness. With the revolt of Ireland and the surrender of Cornwallis the hopes of her enemies rose high. Spain refused to suspend hostilities at any

other price than the surrender of Gibraltar; while France proposed that England should give up all her Indian conquests save Bengal. The triumph of the Bourbons, indeed, seemed secure. If terms like these were accepted the world-empire of Britain was at an end. Stripped of her colonies in America, stripped of her rule in India, matched on the very ocean by rival fleets, England sank back into a European state, into the England of the first Georges. And yet there seemed little chance of her holding out against the demands of such a league as fronted her at a moment when her military power was paralyzed by the attitude of Ireland. But the true basis of her world-power lay on the sea. It was by her command of the sea that such an empire could alone be possible; nor was it possible so long as she commanded the sea for all the armies of the Bourbon powers to rob her of it. And at this moment the command of the seas again became her own. On the 16th of January, 1780, Admiral Rodney, the greatest of English seamen save Nelson and Blake, encountered the Spanish fleet off Cape St. Vincent, and only four of its vessels escaped to Cadiz. At the opening of 1782, the triumphs of the French admiral, De Grasse, called him to the West Indies; and on the 12th of April a maneuver, which he was the first to introduce, broke his opponent's line, and drove the French fleet shattered from the Atlantic. With Rodney's last victory the struggle of the Bourbons was really over, for no means remained of attacking their enemy save at Gibraltar, and here a last attack of the joint force gathered

against it was repulsed by the heroism of Elliott. Nor would America wait any longer for the satisfaction of her allies. In November her commissioners signed the preliminaries of a peace in which Britain reserved to herself on the American continent only Canada and the island of Newfoundland; and acknowledged without reserve the independence of the United States.

1520. The action of America ended the war; and the treaty of peace with the United States was a prelude to treaties of peace with the Bourbon powers. Their actual gains were insignificant. France, indeed, won nothing in the treaties with which the war ended; Spain gained only Florida and Minorca. Nor could they feel, even in this hour of their triumph, that the end at which they aimed had been fully reached. In half their great effort against the world-power of Britain they had utterly failed. She had even won ground in India. In America itself she still retained the northern dominion of Canada. Her West Indian islands remained intact. Above all, she had asserted more nobly than ever her command of the sea, and with it the possibility of building up a fresh power in such lands as Cook had called her to. But at the close of the war there was less thought of what she had retained than of what she had lost. She was parted from her American colonies; and at the moment such a parting seemed to be the knell of her greatness. In wealth, in population, the American colonies far surpassed all that remained of her empire; and the American colonies were irrecoverably gone. It is no wonder that in

the first shock of such a loss England looked on herself as on the verge of ruin, or that the Bourbon courts believed her position as a world-power to be practically at an end. How utterly groundless such a conception was the coming years were to show. The energies of England were, in fact, spurred to new efforts by the crisis in her fortunes. The industrial development which followed the war gave her a material supremacy such as she had never known before, and the rapid growth of wealth which this industry brought with it raised her again into a mother of nations as her settlers built up in the waters of the Pacific colonies as great as those which she had lost on the coast of America. But if the Bourbons overrated their triumph in one way, they immensely underrated it in another. Whatever might be the importance of American independence in the history of England, it was of unequalled moment in the history of the world. If it crippled for a while the supremacy of the English nation, it founded a supremacy of the English race. From the hour of American independence the life of the English people has flowed not in one current, but in two; and while the older has shown little signs of lessening, the younger has fast risen to a greatness which has changed the face of the world. In 1783 America was a nation of 3,000,000 of inhabitants, scattered thinly along the coast of the Atlantic ocean. It is now a nation of 40,000,000, stretching over the whole continent, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In wealth and material energy, as in numbers, it far surpasses the mother-country from

which it sprang. It is already the main branch of the English people; and in the days that are at hand the main current of that people's history must run along the channel, not of the Thames or the Mersey, but of the Hudson and the Mississippi. But, distinct as these currents are, every year proves more clearly that in spirit the English people is one. The distance that parted England from America lessens every day. The ties that unite them grow every day stronger. The social and political differences that threatened a hundred years ago to form an impassable barrier between them grow every day less. Against this silent and inevitable drift of things the spirit of narrow isolation on either side the Atlantic struggles in vain. It is possible that the two branches of the English people will remain forever separate political existences. It is likely enough that the older of them may again break in twain, and that the English people in the Pacific may assert as distinct a national life as the two English peoples on either side the Atlantic. But the spirit, the influence, of all these branches will remain one. And in thus remaining one, before half a century is over, it will change the face of the world. As 200,000,000 of Englishmen fill the valley of the Mississippi, as 50,000,000 of Englishmen assert their lordship over Australasia, this vast power will tell through Britain on the old world of Europe, whose nations will have shrunk into insignificance before it. What the issues of such a world-wide change may be, not even the wildest dreamer would dare to dream. But one issue is inevitable. In the cen-

turies that lie before us, the primacy of the world will lie with the English people. English institutions, English speech, English thought, will become the main features of the political, the social, and the intellectual life of mankind.

CHAPTER III.

INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND.

1782—1792.

1521. THAT in the creation of the United States the world had reached one of the turning-points in its history seems at the time to have entered into the thought of not a single European statesman. What startled men most at the moment was the discovery that England herself was far from being ruined by the greatness of her defeat. She rose from it, indeed, stronger and more vigorous than ever. Never had she shown a mightier energy than in the struggle against France which followed only ten years after her loss of America, nor did she ever stand higher among the nations than on the day of Waterloo. Her internal development was as imposing as her outer grandeur. Weary and disgraceful, indeed, as was the strife with the colonies, the years of its progress were years of as mighty a revolution for the mother-country as for its child. The England that is about us dates from the American war. It was then that the moral, the philanthropic, the religious ideas which have molded English society into its

present shape first broke the spiritual torpor of the eighteenth century. It was then that, with the wider diffusion of intelligence, our literature woke to a nobler and larger life which fitted it to become the mouthpiece of every national emotion. It was then that, by a change unparalleled in history, the country laid aside her older agricultural character to develop industrial forces which made her at a single bound the workshop of the world. Amid the turmoil of the early years of George the Third, Brindley was silently covering England with canals, and Watt as silently perfecting his invention of the steam-engine. It was amid the strife with America that Adam Smith regenerated our economical, Gibbon our historical, and Burke our political literature; and peace was hardly declared when the appearance of Crabbe, Cowper, and Burns heralded a new birth of our poetry.

1522. No names so illustrious as these marked the more silent but even deeper change in the religious temper of the country. It dates, as we have seen, from the work of the Wesleys, but the Methodists themselves were the least result of the Methodist revival. Its action upon the church broke the lethargy of the clergy; and the "Evangelical" movement, which found representatives like Newton and Cecil within the pale of the establishment, made the fox-hunting parson and the absentee rector at last impossible. In Walpole's day the English clergy were the idlest and the most lifeless in the world. In our own time no body of religious ministers surpasses them in piety, in philanthropic energy, or in popular regard.

But the movement was far from being limited to the Methodists or the clergy. In the nation at large appeared a new moral enthusiasm which, rigid and pedantic as it often seemed, was still healthy in its social tone, and whose power showed itself in a gradual disappearance of the profligacy which had disgraced the upper classes, and the foulness which had infested literature ever since the restoration. A yet nobler result of the religious revival was the steady attempt, which has never ceased from that day to this, to remedy the guilt, the ignorance, the physical suffering, the social degradation, of the profligate and the poor. It was not till the Wesleyan impulse had done its work that this philanthropic impulse began. The Sunday-schools established by Mr. Raikes, of Gloucester, at the close of the century were the beginnings of popular education. By writings and by her own personal example Hannah More drew the sympathy of England to the poverty and crime of the agricultural laborer. A passionate impulse of human sympathy with the wronged and afflicted raised hospitals, endowed charities, built churches, sent missionaries to the heathen, supported Burke in his plea for the Hindoo, and Clarkson and Wilberforce in their crusade against the iniquity of the slave-trade.

1523. It is only the moral chivalry of his labors that, among a crowd of philanthropists, draws us most to the work and character of John Howard. The sympathy which all were feeling for the sufferings of mankind Howard felt for the sufferings of the worst and most hapless of men. With wonderful

ardor and perseverance he devoted himself to the cause of the debtor, the felon, and the murderer. An appointment to the office of high sheriff of Bedfordshire, in 1774, drew his attention to the state of the prisons which were placed under his care; and from that time the quiet country gentleman, whose only occupation had been reading his Bible and studying his thermometer, became the most energetic and zealous of reformers. Before a year was over he had personally visited almost every English jail, and in nearly all of them he found frightful abuses which had been noticed half a century before, but which had been left unredressed by parliament. Jailers who bought their places were paid by fees, and suffered to extort what they could. Even when acquitted, men were dragged back to their cells for want of funds to discharge the sums they owed to their keepers. Debtors and felons were huddled together in the prisons which Howard found crowded by the legislation of the day. No separation was preserved between different sexes, no criminal discipline was enforced. Every jail was a chaos of cruelty and the foulest immorality, from which the prisoner could only escape by sheer starvation or through the jail-fever that festered without ceasing in these haunts of misery. Howard saw everything with his own eyes; he tested every suffering by his own experience. In one prison he found a cell so narrow and noisome that the poor wretch who inhabited it begged as a mercy for hanging. Howard shut himself up in the cell and bore its darkness and foulness till nature could bear no more. It was by

work of this sort and by the faithful pictures of such scenes which it enabled him to give that he brought about their reform. The book in which he recorded his terrible experience and the plans which he submitted for the reformation of criminals made him the father, so far as England is concerned, of prison discipline. But his labors were far from being confined to England. In journey after journey he visited the jails of Holland and Germany, till his longing to discover some means of checking the fatal progress of the plague led him to examine the lazarettos of Europe and the East. He was still engaged in this work of charity when he was seized by a malignant fever at Cherson in southern Russia, and "laid quietly in the earth," as he desired.

1524. In Howard's later labors the new sentiment of humanity had carried him far beyond the bounds of national sympathy; and forces at once of pity and religion told more and more in begetting a consciousness of the common brotherhood of man. Even at the close of the American war this feeling had become strong enough to color our political life. It told on the attitude of England toward its great dependency of India. Discussions over rival plans of Indian administration diffused a sense of national responsibility for its good government, and there was a general resolve that the security against injustice and misrule, which was enjoyed by the poorest Englishman, should be enjoyed by the poorest Hindoo. It was this resolve which expressed itself in 1786 in the trial of Warren Hastings. Hastings returned from India at the close of the war with the hope

of rewards as great as those of Clive. He had saved all that Clive had won. He had laid the foundation of a vast empire in the East. He had shown rare powers of administration, and the foresight, courage, and temperance which mark the born ruler of men. But with him came rumors of tyranny and wrong. Even those who admitted the wisdom and glory of his rule shrank from its terrible ruthlessness. He was charged with having sold, for a vast sum, the services of British troops to crush the free tribes of the Rohillas, with having wrung half a million by extortion from the Rajah of Benares, with having extorted by torture and starvation more than a million from the Princesses of Oude. He was accused of having kept his hold upon power by measures as unscrupulous, and with having murdered a native who opposed him by an abuse of the forms of English law. On almost all these charges the cooler judgment of later inquirers has acquitted Warren Hastings of guilt. Personally, there can be little doubt that he had done much to secure to the new subjects of Britain a just and peaceable government. What was hardest and most pitiless in his rule had been simply a carrying out of the system of administration which was native to India and which he found existing there. But such a system was alien from the new humanity of Englishmen; and few dared to vindicate Hastings when Burke, in words of passionate earnestness, moved for his impeachment.

1525. The great trial lingered on for years; and in the long-run Hastings secured an acquittal. But the end at which the impeachment aimed had really been

won. The attention, the sympathy, of Englishmen had been drawn across distant seas to a race utterly strange to them; and the peasant of Cornwall or Cumberland had learned how to thrill at the suffering of a peasant of Bengal. And even while the trial was going on a yet wider extension of English sympathy made itself felt. The hero-seamen of Elizabeth had not blushed to make gain out of kidnapping negroes and selling them into slavery. One of the profits which England bought by the triumphs of Marlborough was a right to a monopoly of the slave-trade between Africa and the Spanish dominions; and it was England that had planted slavery in her American colonies and her West Indian islands. Half the wealth of Liverpool, in fact, was drawn from the traffic of its merchants in human flesh. The horrors and iniquity of the trade, the ruin and degradation of Africa which it brought about, the oppression of the negro himself, had till now moved no pity among Englishmen. But as the spirit of humanity told on the people this apathy suddenly disappeared. Philanthropy allied itself with the new religious movement in an attack on the slave-trade. At the close of the American war its evils began to be felt so widely and deeply that the question forced itself into politics. "After a conversation in the open air at the root of an old tree, just above the steep descent into the Vale of Keston," with the younger Pitt, his friend William Wilberforce, whose position as a representative of the evangelical party gave weight to his advocacy of such a cause, resolved to bring in a bill for the abolition of the slave-trade.

The bill which he brought forward in 1788 fell before the opposition of the Liverpool slave-merchants and the general indifference of the house of commons. But the movement gathered fresh strength in the country with every year; in spite of the absorption of England in the struggle with the French revolution, it succeeded at last in forcing on parliament the abolition of the traffic in slaves; and this abolition was followed a few years later by the abolition of slavery itself.

1526. Time was to show how wide were the issues to which this religious development and the sentiment of humanity which it generated were to tend. But at the moment they told less directly and immediately on the political and social life of England than an industrial revolution which accompanied them. Though England already stood in the first rank of commercial states at the accession of George the Third, her industrial life at home was mainly agricultural. The growth of her manufactures was steady, but it continued to be slow; they gave employment as yet to but a small part of the population, and added in no great degree to the national wealth. The wool-trade remained the largest as it was the oldest of them; it had gradually established itself in Norfolk, the West Riding of Yorkshire, and the counties of the south-west; while the manufacture of cotton was still almost limited to Manchester and Bolton, and, though winning on its rival, remained so unimportant that, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the export of cotton goods hardly reached the value of £50,000 a year. There was the same

slow and steady progress in the linen-trade of Belfast and Dundee, and the silks of Spitalfields. But as yet textile manufactures contributed little to the national resources ; nor did these resources owe much to the working of our minerals. The coal-trade was small, and limited by the cost of carriage as well as by ignorance of any mode of employing coal in iron-smelting. On the other hand, the scarcity of wood, which was used for that purpose, limited the production of iron. In 1750 only eighteen thousand tons were produced in England; and four-fifths of its iron goods were imported from Sweden. Nor did there seem any likelihood of a rapid change. Skilled labor was scarce; and the processes of manufacture were too rude to allow any large increase of production. It was only where a stream gave force to turn a mill-wheel that the wool-worker could establish his factory; and cotton was yet spun by hand in the cottages, the "spinsters" of the family sitting with their distaffs round the weaver's hand-loom.

1527. But even had the processes of production become more efficient, they would have been rendered useless by the inefficiency of the means of distribution. The older main roads, which had lasted fairly through the middle ages, had broken down in later times before the growth of traffic and increase of wagons and carriages. The new lines of trade lay often along mere country lanes which had never been more than horse-tracks, and to drive heavy wains through lanes like these was all but impossible. Much of the woolen-trade,

therefore, had to be carried on by means of long trains of pack-horses; and in most cases the cost of carriage added heavily to the price of production. In the case of yet heavier goods, such as coal, distribution was almost impracticable, save along the greater rivers or in districts accessible from the sea. But at the moment when England was just plunging into the Seven Years' war, the enterprise of a duke and a millwright solved this problem of carriage, and started the country on a mighty course of industry which was to change both its social and its political character. Francis Duke of Bridgewater was a shy, dreamy man, whom a disappointment in love drove to a life of isolation on his estates in the north. He was the possessor of collieries at Worsley, whose value depended on their finding a market at the neighboring town of Manchester; and it was to bring his coal to this market that he resolved to drive a canal from the mine to the river Irwell. With singular good luck he found the means of carrying out his design in a self-taught mechanic, James Brindley. But in Brindley's mind the scheme widened far beyond the plans of the duke. Canals, as he conceived them, were no longer to serve as mere adjuncts to rivers; on the contrary, "rivers were only meant," he said, "to feed canals;" and, instead of ending in the Irwell, he carried the duke's canal by an aqueduct across that river to Manchester itself. What Brindley had discovered was, in fact, the water-road—a means of carrying heavy goods with the least resistance and, therefore, the least cost from the point of production to the point of

sale; and England at once seized on his discovery to free itself from the bondage in which it had been held. From the year 1767, when Brindley completed his enterprise, a network of such water-roads was flung over the country; and before the movement had spent its force Great Britain alone was traversed in every direction by 3,000 miles of navigable canals.

1528. To English trade the canal opened up the richest of all markets, the market of England itself. Every part of the country was practically thrown open to the manufacturer; and the impulse which was given by this facility of carriage was at once felt in a vast development of production. But such a development would have been impossible had not the discovery of this new mode of distribution been accompanied by the discovery of a new productive force. In the coal which lay beneath her soil England possessed a store of force which had hitherto remained almost useless. But its effects were now to make themselves felt. The first instance of the power of coal was shown in utilizing the stores of iron which had lain side by side with it in the northern counties, but which had lain there unworked through the scarcity of wood, which was looked upon as the only fuel by which it could be smelted. In the middle of the eighteenth century a process for smelting iron with coal turned out to be effective; and the whole aspect of the iron-trade was at once revolutionized. In fifty years the annual production of iron in Great Britain rose from under 20,000 to more than 170,000 tons. During the fifty years that followed it rose to 6,000,000 of tons. Iron was to

become the working material of the modern world, and it is its production of iron which, more than all else, has placed England at the head of industrial Europe. But iron was not the only metal which coal drew from the soil to swell the national wealth. The increase in its production was rivaled by that of lead, copper, and tin; and the "mining districts" soon gathered a population which raised them into social as well as economical importance.

1529. But it was not in its direct application to metallurgy that coal was destined to produce its most amazing effects. What was needed to turn England into a manufacturing country was some means of transforming the force stored up in coal into a labor force; and it was this transformation which was now brought about through the agency of steam. Engines in which steam was used as a means of draining mines had long been in use; but the power relied on was mainly that of the weight of the air pressing on a piston beneath which a vacuum had been created by the condensation of steam; and the economical use of such engines was checked by the waste of fuel which resulted from the cooling of the cylinder at each condensation, and from the expenditure of heat in again raising it to its old temperature before a fresh stroke of the piston was possible. Both these obstacles were removed by the ingenuity of James Watt. Watt was a working engineer at Glasgow, whose mind had for some time been bent on the improvement of the steam-engine; but it was not till the spring of 1765, amid the political turmoil which characterized the early reign of George the Third,

that as he strolled on a Sunday afternoon across the green of Glasgow the means of effecting it burst on him. "I had gone," he says, "to take a walk on a fine Sabbath afternoon. I had entered the green by the gate at the foot of Charlotte street, and had passed the old washing-house. I was thinking upon the engine at the time, and had got as far as the herd's house when the idea came into my mind that, as steam was an elastic body, it would rush into a vacuum, and if a communication were made between the cylinder and an exhausted vessel it would rush into it, and might there be condensed without cooling the cylinder. I had not walked farther than the Golf-house when the whole thing was arranged in my mind." The employment of a separate condenser, with the entire discarding of any other force in its action save that of steam itself, changed the whole conditions of the steam-engine. On the eve of the American war, in 1776, its use passed beyond the mere draining of mines; and it was rapidly adopted as a motive force for all kinds of manufacturing industry.

1530. The almost unlimited supply of labor-power in the steam-engine came at a time when the existing supply of manual labor was proving utterly inadequate to cope with the demands of the manufacturer. This was especially the case in textile fabrics. In its earlier stages the manufacture of cotton had been retarded by the difficulty with which the weavers obtained a sufficient supply of cotton yarn from the spinsters; and this difficulty became yet greater when the invention of the fly-shuttle enabled one weaver

to do in a single day what had hitherto been the work of two. The difficulty was solved by a Blackburn weaver, John Hargreaves, who noticed that his wife's spindle, which had been accidentally upset, continued to revolve in an upright position on the floor, while the thread was still spinning in her hand. The hint led him to connect a number of spindles with a single wheel, and thus to enable one spinster to do the work of eight. Hargreaves's invention only spurred the wits of a barber's assistant, Richard Arkwright, to a yet greater improvement in the construction of a machine for spinning by rollers revolving at different rates of speed; and this in its turn was improved and developed in the "mule" of a Bolton weaver, Samuel Crompton. The result of these inventions was to reverse the difficulty which hampered the trade, for the supply of yarn became so rapid and unlimited as to outrun the power of the hand-loom weaver to consume it; but a few years after the close of the American war this difficulty was met by the discovery of the power-loom, which replaced the weaver by machinery. Ingenious, however, as these inventions were, they would have remained comparatively useless had it not been for the revelation of a new and inexhaustible labor-force in the steam-engine. It was the combination of such a force with such means of applying it that enabled Britain during the terrible years of her struggle with France and Napoleon to all but monopolize the woollen and cotton trades, and raised her into the greatest manufacturing country that the world had seen.

1531. How mighty a force this industrial revolu-

tion was to exert on English politics and English society time was to show. By the transfer of wealth and population from southern to northern England, and from the country to the town, it was in the next fifty years to set on foot a revolution in both, the results of which have still to be disclosed. Of such a revolution no English statesman as yet had a glimpse; but already the growth of industrial energy and industrial wealth was telling on the conditions of English statesmanship. The manufacturer and the merchant were coming fast to the front; and their temper was more menacing to the monopoly of political power by the whigs and the landed aristocracy whom the whigs represented than the temper of the king himself. Already public opinion was finding in them a new concentration and weight; and it was certain that, as the representatives of public opinion, they would at last demand a share in the work of government. Such a demand might have been delayed for a while had they been content with the way in which England was governed. But they were far from being content with it. To no class, indeed, could the selfishness, the corruption, the factiousness, and the administrative inefficiency of the ruling order be more utterly odious. Their tone was moral, and they were influenced more and more by the religious and philanthropic movement about them. As men of business, they revolted against the waste and mismanagement which seemed to have become normal in every department of government. Their patriotism, their pride in England's greatness, alienated them from men who looked upon political

eminence as a means of personal gain. Above all, their personal energy, their consciousness of wealth and power, and to some extent the natural jealousy of the trader against the country gentleman, urged them to press for an overthrow of the existing monopoly, and for a fairer distribution of political influence. But such a pressure could only bring them into conflict with the whigs whom the fall of Lord North had recalled to office. Though the tories had now grown to a compact body of 150 members, the whigs still remained superior to their rivals in numbers and ability as well as in distinctness of political aim; for the return of the Bedford section to the general body of the party, as well as its steady opposition to the American war, had restored much of their early cohesion. But this reunion only strengthened their aristocratic and exclusive tendencies, and widened the breach which was steadily opening on questions such as parliamentary reform between the bulk of the whigs and the small fragment of their party which remained true to the more popular sympathies of Chatham.

1532. Lord Shelburne stood at the head of the Chatham party, and it was re-inforced at this moment by the entry into parliament of the second and youngest son of Chatham himself. William Pitt had hardly reached his twenty-second year; but he left college with the learning of a ripe scholar, and his ready and sonorous eloquence had been matured by his father's teaching. "He will be one of the first men in parliament," said a member to Charles Fox, the whig leader in the commons, after Pitt's earliest

speech in that house. "He is so already," replied Fox. Young as he was, the haughty self-esteem of the new statesman breathed in every movement of his tall, spare figure, in the hard lines of a countenance which none but his closer friends saw lighted by a smile, in his cold and repulsive address, his invariable gravity of demeanor, and his habitual air of command. But none knew how great the qualities were which lay beneath this haughty exterior; nor had any one guessed how soon this "boy," as his rivals mockingly styled him, was to crush every opponent and to hold England at his will. There was only a smile of wonder when he refused any of the minor posts which were offered him in the Rockingham administration, and the wonder passed into angry sarcasms as soon as it was known that he claimed, if he took office at all, to be at once admitted to the cabinet. But Pitt had no desire to take office under Rockingham. He was the inheritor of that side of his father's policy which was most distasteful to the whigs. To him, as to Chatham, the main lesson of the war was the need of putting an end to those abuses in the composition of parliament by which George the Third had been enabled to plunge the country into it. A thorough reform of the house of commons was the only effectual means of doing this, and Pitt brought forward a bill founded on his father's plans for that purpose. But though a more liberal section of the whigs, with Charles Fox at their head, were wavering round to a wish for reform, the great bulk of the party could not nerve themselves to the sacrifice of property and influence

which such a reform would involve. Rockingham remained hostile to reform, and Burke, whose influence still told much upon Rockingham, was yet more hostile than his chief. Pitt's bill, therefore, was thrown out. In its stead, the ministry endeavored to weaken the means of corrupt influence which the king had unscrupulously used by disqualifying persons holding government contracts from sitting in parliament, by depriving revenue officers of the elective franchise (a measure which diminished the weight of the crown in seventy boroughs), and, above all, by a bill for the reduction of the civil establishment, of the pension-list, and of the secret-service fund, which was brought in by Burke. These measures were, to a great extent, effectual in diminishing the influence of the crown over parliament, and they are memorable as marking the date when the direct bribery of members absolutely ceased. But they were utterly inoperative in rendering the house of commons really representative of, or responsible to, the people of England.

1533. The jealousy which the mass of the whigs entertained of the followers of Chatham and their plans was more plainly shown, however, on the death of Lord Rockingham in July. Shelburne, who had hitherto served as secretary of state, was called by the king to the head of the ministry, a post to which his eminent talents and the ability which he was showing in the negotiations for the peace clearly gave him a title. But Shelburne had been hampered in these negotiations by the jealousy of Charles Fox, who, as joint secretary of state with him, claimed,

in spite of usage, a share in conducting them and who persisted, without a show of reason, in believing himself to have been unfairly treated. It was on personal grounds, therefore, that Fox refused to serve under Shelburne; but the refusal of Burke and the bulk of Rockingham's followers was based on more than personal grounds. It sprang from a rooted distrust of the more popular tendencies of which Shelburne was justly regarded as the representative. To Pitt, on the other hand, these tendencies were the chief ground of confidence in the new ministry, and, young as he was, he at once entered office as chancellor of the exchequer. But his tenure of this post was a brief one. The Shelburne ministry, in fact, only lasted long enough to conclude the final peace with the United States on the base of their independence; for, in the opening of 1783, it was overthrown by the most unscrupulous coalition known in our history, a union of the whig followers of Fox united with the tories who still clung to Lord North. In parliament, such a coalition was irresistible, and the resignation of Shelburne at once made way for an administration in which both the triumphant parties were represented. But the effect on England at large was very different. Whatever new credit the whigs had gained with the country during their long exclusion from office had been due to their steady denunciation of the policy and temper of Lord North's administration. That they should take office hand in hand with men whom they had for years denounced as the worst of ministers, shocked even their most loyal adherents; and the shock was the

greater that a new seriousness in politics, a longing for a deeper and more earnest treatment of political questions, was making mere faction intolerable to Englishmen. But behind all this was the sense that something more than mere faction had really brought the two parties together. It was their common dread of the popular tendencies which Shelburne's ministry represented, their common hatred of parliamentary reform, which hushed for the moment the bitter hostility between the followers of Rockingham and the followers of North. Yet never had the need of representative reform been more clearly shown than by a coalition which proved how powerless was the force of public opinion to check even the most shameless faction in parliament, how completely the lessening of royal influence by the measures of Burke and Rockingham had tended to the profit, not of the people, but of the borough-mongers who usurped its representation. The turn of public opinion was quick in disclosing itself. Fox was the most popular of the whigs, but he was hooted from the platform when he addressed his constituents at Westminster. Pitt, on the other hand, whose attacks on the new union rose to a lofty and indignant eloquence, was lifted by it into an almost solitary greatness.

1534. But in parliament Pitt was as powerless as he was influential in the country. His renewed proposal of parliamentary reform, though he set aside the disfranchisement of rotten-boroughs as a violation of private property, and limited himself to the disfranchisement of boroughs convicted of corruption, and to the addition of one hundred members

to the county representation, was rejected by a majority of two to one. Secure in their parliamentary majority, and heedless of the power of public opinion outside the walls of the house of commons, the new ministers entered boldly on a greater task than had as yet taxed the constructive genius of English statesmen. To leave such a dominion as Warren Hastings had built up in India to the control of a mere company of traders was clearly impossible; and Fox proposed to transfer its political government from the directors of the company to a board of seven commissioners. The appointment of the seven was vested in the first instance in parliament, and afterward in the crown; their office was to be held for five years, but they were removable on address from either house of parliament. The proposal was at once met with a storm of opposition. The scheme, indeed, was an injudicious one; for the new commissioners would have been destitute of that practical knowledge of India which belonged to the company, while the want of any immediate link between them and the actual ministry of the crown would have prevented parliament from exercising an effective control over their acts. But the real faults of this India bill were hardly noticed in the popular outcry against it. It had challenged the hostility of powerful influences. The merchant-class was galled by the blow leveled at the greatest merchant-body in the realm; corporations trembled at the canceling of a charter; the king viewed the measure as a mere means of transferring the patronage of India to the whigs. But it might have defied the opposi-

tion of corporations and the king had it not had to meet the bitter hostility of the nation at large. With the nation, the faults of the bill lay not in this detail or that, but in the character of the ministry which proposed it. To give the rule and patronage of India over to the existing house of commons was to give a new and immense power to a body which misused, in the grossest way, the power it possessed. It was the sense of this popular feeling which encouraged the king to exert his personal influence to defeat the measure in the lords, and on its defeat to order his ministers to deliver up the seals. The unpopularity of Shelburne stood in the way of his resumption of office, and in December, 1783, Pitt accepted the post of first lord of the treasury. His position would at once have been untenable had the country gone with its nominal representatives. He was defeated again and again by large majorities in the commons; but the majorities dwindled as a shower of addresses from every quarter, from the tory university of Oxford as from the whig corporation of London, proved that public opinion went with the minister and not with the house. It was the general sense of this that justified Pitt in the firmness with which, in the teeth of addresses for his removal from office, he delayed the dissolution of parliament for five months, and gained time for that ripening of the national sentiment on which he counted for success. When the election of 1784 came the struggle was at once at an end. The public feeling took a strength which broke through the corrupt influences that commonly governed its representation. Every great constitu-

ency, the counties and the large towns, returned supporters of Pitt. Of the majority which had defeated him in the commons, 160 members were unseated. Fox hardly retained his seat for Westminster, Burke lost his seat for Bristol, and only a fragment of the whig party was saved by its command of nomination-boroughs. ¶

1535. When parliament came together after the overthrow of the coalition, the minister of twenty-five was master of England as no minister had been before. Even George the Third yielded to his sway, partly through gratitude for the triumph he had won for him, partly from a sense of the madness which was soon to strike him down, but still more from a gradual discovery that the triumph which he had won over his political rivals had been won, not to the profit of the crown, but of the nation at large. The whigs, it was true, were broken, unpopular, and without a policy; while the tories, whom the coalition had disgusted with Lord North, as it had estranged Fox from their opponents, clung to the minister who had "saved the king." But it was the support of a new political power that really gave his strength to the young minister. The sudden rise of English industry was pushing the manufacturer to the front; and the manufacturer pinned his faith to the first in William Pitt. All that the trading classes loved in Chatham, his nobleness of temper, his consciousness of power, his patriotism, his sympathy with a wider world than the world within the parliament-house, they saw in his son. He had little, indeed, of the poetic and imaginative side of

Chatham's genius, of his quick perception of what was just and what was possible, his far-reaching conceptions of national policy, his outlook into the future of the world. Pitt's flowing and sonorous commonplaces rang hollow beside the broken phrases which still make his father's eloquence a living thing to Englishmen. On the other hand, he possessed some qualities in which Chatham was utterly wanting. His temper, though naturally ardent and sensitive, had been schooled in a proud self-command. His simplicity and good taste freed him from his father's ostentation and extravagance. Diffuse and commonplace as his speeches seem to the reader, they were adapted as much by their very qualities of diffuseness and commonplace as by their lucidity and good sense to the intelligence of the classes whom Pitt felt to be his real audience. In his love of peace, his immense industry, his dispatch of business, his skill in debate, his knowledge of finance, he recalled Sir Robert Walpole; but he had virtues which Walpole never possessed, and he was free from Walpole's worst defects. He was careless of personal gain. He was too proud to rule by corruption. His lofty self-esteem left no room for any jealousy of subordinates. He was generous in his appreciation of youthful merits; and the "boys" he gathered round him, such as Canning and Lord Wellesley, rewarded his generosity by a devotion which death left untouched. With Walpole's cynical inaction Pitt had no sympathy whatever. His policy from the first was a policy of active reform, and he faced every one of the problems, financial,

constitutional, religious, from which Walpole had shrunk. Above all, he had none of Walpole's scorn of his fellow-men. The noblest feature in his mind was its wide humanity. His love for England was as deep and personal as his father's love, but of the sympathy with English passion and English prejudice which had been at once his father's weakness and strength he had not a trace. When Fox taunted him with forgetting Chatham's jealousy of France and his faith that she was the natural foe of England, Pitt answered nobly that "to suppose any nation can be unalterably the enemy of another is weak and childish."

1536. The temper of the time and the larger sympathy of man with man which especially marks the eighteenth century as a turning-point in the history of the human race was everywhere bringing to the front a new order of statesmen, such as Turgot and Joseph the Second, whose characteristics were a love of mankind, and a belief that as the happiness of the individual can only be secured by the general happiness of the community to which he belongs, so the welfare of individual nations can only be secured by the general welfare of the world. Of these Pitt was one. But he rose high above the rest in the consummate knowledge and the practical force which he brought to the realization of his aims. His strength lay in finance; and he came forward at a time when the growth of English wealth made a knowledge of finance essential to a great minister. The progress of the nation was wonderful. Population more than doubled during the eighteenth century, and the ad-

vance of wealth was even greater than that of population. Though the war had added £100,000,000 to the national debt, the burden was hardly felt. The loss of America only increased the commerce with that country, and industry, as we have seen, had begun that great career which was to make England the workshop of the world. To deal wisely with such a growth required a knowledge of the laws of wealth which would have been impossible at an earlier time. But it had become possible in the day of Pitt. If books are to be measured by the effect which they have produced on the fortunes of mankind, the "*Wealth of Nations*" must rank among the greatest of books. Its author was Adam Smith, an Oxford scholar and a professor at Glasgow. Labor, he contended, was the one source of wealth, and it was by freedom of labor, by suffering the worker to pursue his own interest in his own way, that the public wealth would best be promoted. Any attempt to force labor into artificial channels, to shape by laws the course of commerce, to promote special branches of industry in particular countries, or to fix the character of the intercourse between one country and another, is not only a wrong to the worker or the merchant, but actually hurtful to the wealth of a state. The book was published in 1776, at the opening of the American war, and studied by Pitt during his career as an undergraduate at Cambridge. From that time he owned Adam Smith as his master; and he had hardly become minister before he took the principles of the "*Wealth of Nations*" as the groundwork of his policy.

1537. It was thus that the ten earlier years of Pitt's rule marked a new point of departure in English statesmanship. He was the first English minister who really grasped the part which industry was to play in promoting the welfare of the world. He was not only a peace minister and a financier, as Walpole had been, but a statesman who saw that the best security for peace lay in the freedom and widening of commercial intercourse between nations; that public economy not only lessened the general burdens, but left additional capital in the hands of industry; and that finance might be turned from a mere means of raising revenue into a powerful engine of political and social improvement. That little was done by Pitt himself to carry these principles into effect was partly owing to the mass of ignorance and prejudice with which he had to contend, and, still more, to the sudden break of his plans through the French revolution. His power rested, above all, on the trading classes, and these were still persuaded that wealth meant gold and silver, and that commerce was best furthered by jealous monopolies. It was only by patience and dexterity that the mob of merchants and country squires who backed him in the house of commons could be brought to acquiesce in the changes he proposed. How small his power was when it struggled with the prejudices around him was seen in the failure of the first great measure he brought forward. The question of parliamentary reform which had been mooted during the American war had been coming steadily to the front. Chatham had advocated an increase of

county members, who were then the most independent part of the lower house. The Duke of Richmond talked of universal suffrage, equal electoral districts, and annual parliaments. Wilkes anticipated the reform bill of a later time by proposing to disfranchise the rotten-boroughs, and to give members in their stead to the counties and to the more populous and wealthy towns. William Pitt had made the question his own by bringing forward a motion for reform on his first entry into the house, and one of his earliest measures as minister was to bring in a bill in 1785 which, while providing for the gradual extinction of all decayed boroughs, disfranchised thirty-six at once, and transferred their members to counties. He brought the king to abstain from opposition, and strove to buy off the borough-mongers, as the holders of rotten-boroughs were called, by offering to compensate them for the seats they lost at their market value. But the bulk of his own party joined the bulk of the whigs in a steady resistance to the bill, while it received no effective support from the general opinion of the people without. The more glaring abuses, indeed, within parliament itself, the abuses which stirred Chatham and Wilkes to action, had in great part disappeared. The bribery of members had ceased. Burke's bill of economical reform had just dealt a fatal blow at the influence which the king exercised by suppressing a host of useless offices, household appointments, judicial and diplomatic charges, which were maintained for the purposes of corruption. But what was probably the most fatal obstacle to any pressure for reform was

the triumph of public opinion to which Pitt owed his power. The utter overthrow of the coalition, the complete victory of public opinion, had done much to diminish the sense of any real danger from the opposition which parliament had shown till now to the voice of the nation. England, then as now, was indifferent to all but practical grievances; and the nation cared little for anomalies in the form of representation so long as it felt itself represented. "Terribly disappointed and beat," as Wilberforce tells us Pitt was by the rejection of his measure, the temper of the house and of the people was too plain to be mistaken, and, though his opinion remained unaltered, he never brought it forward again.

1538. The failure of his constitutional reform was more than compensated by the triumphs of his finance. When he entered office public credit was at its lowest ebb. The debt had been doubled by the American war, yet large sums still remained unfunded, while the revenue was reduced by a vast system of smuggling which turned every coast-town into a nest of robbers. The deficiency in the revenue was met for the moment by new taxes, but the time which was thus gained served to change the whole face of public affairs. The first of Pitt's financial measures—his plan for gradually paying off the debt by a sinking fund—was undoubtedly an error; but it had a happy effect in restoring public confidence. He met the smuggler by a reduction of custom-duties which made his trade unprofitable. He revived Walpole's plan of an excise. Meanwhile the public expenses were reduced, and commission

after commission was appointed to introduce economy into every department of the public service. The rapid development of the national industry which we have already noted no doubt aided the success of these measures. Credit was restored. The smuggling trade was greatly reduced. In two years there was a surplus of a million, and though duty after duty was removed the revenue rose steadily with every remission of taxation. Meanwhile Pitt was showing the political value of the new finance in a wider field. Ireland, then as now, was England's difficulty. The tyrannous misgovernment under which she had groaned ever since the battle of the Boyne was producing its natural fruit; the miserable land was torn with political faction, religious feuds, and peasant conspiracies; and so threatening had the attitude of the Protestant party which ruled it become during the American war that they had forced the English parliament to relinquish its control over their parliament in Dublin. Pitt saw that much at least of the misery and disloyalty of Ireland sprang from its poverty. The population had grown rapidly, while culture remained stationary and commerce perished. And of this poverty much was the direct result of unjust law. Ireland was a grazing country, but to protect the interest of English graziers the import of its cattle into England was forbidden. To protect the interests of English clothiers and weavers, its manufactures were loaded with duties. To redress this wrong was the first financial effort of Pitt, and the bill which he introduced in 1785 did away with every obstacle to free-

dom of trade between England and Ireland. It was a measure which, as he held, would "draw what remained of the shattered empire together," and repair in part the loss of America by creating a loyal and prosperous Ireland; and struggling almost alone in face of a fierce opposition from the whigs and the Manchester merchants, he dragged it through the English parliament, though only to see it flung aside by the Protestant faction under Grattan which then ruled the parliament of Ireland. But the defeat only spurred him to a greater effort elsewhere. If Ireland was England's difficulty, France had been looked upon as England's natural enemy. We have seen how nobly Pitt rebuked prejudices such as this; but he knew that nothing could so effectively dispel it as increased intercourse between nation and nation. In 1787, therefore, he concluded a treaty of commerce with France, which enabled subjects of both countries to reside and travel in either without license or passport, did away with all prohibition of trade on either side, and reduced every import duty.

1539. The immediate result of this treaty was a great increase of trade between France and England; and brief as its course was fated to be, it at once set Pitt on a higher level than any rival statesman of his time. But the spirit of humanity which breathed through his policy had to wrestle with difficulties both at home and abroad. No measure secured a warmer support from the young minister than the bill for the suppression of the slave-trade; but in 1788 it was defeated by the vigorous opposition of the trading classes and the prejudice of the people

at large. His efforts to sap the enmity of nation against nation by a freer intercourse encountered a foe even more fatal than English prejudice in the very movement of which his measures formed a part. Across the channel this movement was growing into a revolution which was to change the face of the world. That such a revolution must one day come, every observer who had compared the state of Europe with that of England had long seen to be inevitable. So far as England was concerned, the Puritan resistance of the seventeenth century had in the end succeeded in checking the general tendency of the time to religious and political despotism. Since the revolution of 1688, freedom of conscience and the people's right to govern itself through its representatives in parliament had been practically established. Social equality had begun long before. Every man, from the highest to the lowest, was subject to, and protected by, the same law. The English aristocracy, though exercising a powerful influence on government, were possessed of few social privileges, and hindered from forming a separate class in the nation by the legal and social tradition which counted all save the eldest son of a noble house as commoners. No impassable line parted the gentry from the commercial classes, and these again possessed no privileges which could part them from the lower classes of the community. Public opinion, the general sense of educated Englishmen, had established itself after a short struggle as the dominant element in English government. But in all the other great states of Europe the wars of religion had left only the

name of freedom. Government tended to a pure despotism. Privilege was supreme in religion, in politics, in society. Society itself rested on a rigid division of classes from one another, which refused to the people at large any equal rights of justice or of industry.

1540. We have already seen how alien such a conception of national life was from the ideas which the wide diffusion of intelligence during the eighteenth century was spreading throughout Europe; and in almost every country some enlightened rulers were striving by administrative reforms to satisfy in some sort the sense of wrong which was felt around them. The attempts of sovereigns like Frederick the Great in Prussia and Joseph the Second in Austria and the Netherlands were rivaled by the efforts of statesmen such as Turgot in France. It was in France, indeed, that the contrast between the actual state of society and the new ideas of public right was felt most keenly. Nowhere had the victory of the crown been more complete. The aristocracy had been robbed of all share in public affairs; it enjoyed social privileges and exemption from any contribution to the public burdens without that sense of public duty which a governing class to some degree always possesses. Guilds and monopolies fettered the industry of the trader and the merchant, and cut them off from the working classes, as the value attached to noble blood cut off both from the aristocracy. If its political position, indeed, were compared with that of most of the countries round it, France stood high. Its government was less oppressive and more influenced by

public opinion, its general wealth was larger and more evenly diffused, there was a better administration of justice, and greater security for public order. Poor as its peasantry seemed to English eyes, they were far above the peasants of Germany or Spain. Its middle class was the quickest and most intelligent in Europe. Under Louis the Fifteenth opinion was practically free, though powerless to influence the government of the country; and a literary class had sprung up which devoted itself with wonderful brilliancy and activity to popularizing the ideas of social and political justice which it learned from English writers, and in the case of Montesquieu and Voltaire from personal contact with English life. The moral conceptions of the time, its love of mankind, its sense of human brotherhood, its hatred of oppression, its pity for the guilty and the poor, its longing after a higher and nobler standard of life and action, were expressed by a crowd of writers, and above all by Rousseau, with a fire and eloquence which carried them to the heart of the people. But this new force of intelligence only jostled roughly with the social forms with which it found itself in contact. The philosopher denounced the tyranny of the priesthood. The peasant grumbled at the lord's right to judge him in his courts and to exact feudal services from him. The merchant was galled by the trading restrictions and the heavy taxation. The country gentry rebelled against their exclusion from public life and from the government of the country. Its powerlessness to bring about any change at home turned all this new energy into sympathy with a strug-

gle against tyranny abroad. Public opinion forced France to ally itself with America in its contest for liberty, and French volunteers under the Marquis de Lafayette joined Washington's army. But while the American war spread more widely throughout the nation the craving for freedom, it brought on the government financial embarrassments from which it could only free itself by an appeal to the country at large. Louis the Sixteenth resolved to summon the states-general, which had not met since the time of Richelieu, and to appeal to the nobles to waive their immunity from taxation. His resolve at once stirred into vigorous life every impulse and desire which had been seething in the minds of the people; and the states-general no sooner met at Versailles in May, 1789, than the fabric of despotism and privilege began to crumble. A rising in Paris destroyed the Bastille, and the capture of this fortress was taken for the dawn of a new era of constitutional freedom in France and through Europe. Even in England men thrilled with a strange joy at the tidings of its fall. "How much is this the greatest event that ever happened in the world," Fox cried with a burst of enthusiasm, "and how much the best!"

1541. Pitt regarded the approach of France to sentiments of liberty which had long been familiar to England with greater coolness, but with no distrust. For the moment, indeed, his attention was distracted by an attack of madness which visited George the Third in 1788, and by the claim of a right to the regency which was at once advanced by the Prince of Wales. The prince belonged to the whig party; and

Fox, who was traveling in Italy, hurried home to support his claim in full belief that the prince's regency would be followed by his own return to power. Pitt successfully resisted the claim on the constitutional ground that, in such a case, the right to choose a temporary regent, under what limitations it would, lay with parliament; and a bill which conferred the regency on the prince, in accordance with this view, was already passing the houses when the recovery of the king put an end to the long dispute. Foreign difficulties, too, absorbed Pitt's attention. Russia had risen into greatness under Catharine the Second; and Catharine had resolved from the first on the annexation of Poland, the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the setting up of a Russian throne at Constantinople. In her first aim she was baffled, for the moment, by Frederick the Great. She had already made herself virtually mistress of the whole of Poland, her armies occupied the kingdom, and she had seated a nominee of her own on its throne, when Frederick, in union with the Emperor Joseph the Second, forced her to admit Germany to a share of the spoil. If the Polish partition of 1773 brought the Russian frontier westward to the upper waters of the Dwina and the Dnieper, it gave Galicia to Maria Theresa and West Prussia to Frederick himself. Foiled in her first aim, she waited for the realization of her second till the alliance between the two German powers was at an end through the resistance of Prussia to Joseph's schemes for the annexation of Bavaria, and till the death of Frederick removed her most watchful foe. Then, in 1788, Joseph and the

empress joined hands for a partition of the Turkish empire. But Prussia was still watchful, and England was no longer fettered, as in 1773, by troubles with America. The friendship established by Chatham between the two countries, which had been suspended by Bute's treachery, and all but destroyed during the northern league of neutral powers, had been restored by Pitt through his co-operation with the successor of Frederick the Great in the restoration of the Dutch Stadtholderate. Its political weight was now seen in an alliance of England, Prussia, and Holland, in 1789, for the preservation of the Turkish empire. A great European struggle seemed at hand. In such a struggle the sympathy and aid of France was of the highest importance; and it was only as weakening her in face of such a crisis that Pitt looked on the revolution with any fear. But with the treaty the danger passed away. In the spring of 1790 Joseph died broken-hearted at the failure of his plans and the revolt of the Netherlands against his innovations; Austria practically withdrew from the war with the Turks; and the young minister could give free expression to the sympathy with which the French movement inspired him.

1542. In France, indeed, things were moving fast. By breaking down the division between its separate orders, the states-general became a national assembly, which abolished the privileges of the provincial parliaments, of the nobles, and the church. In October, 1789, the mob of Paris marched on Versailles and forced both king and assembly to return with them

to the capital; and a constitution hastily put together was accepted by Louis the Sixteenth in the stead of his old despotic power. To Pitt the tumult and disorder with which these great changes were wrought seemed transient matters. In January, 1790, he still believed that "the present convulsions in France must, sooner or later, culminate in general harmony and regular order," and that, when her own freedom was established, "France would stand forth as one of the most brilliant powers of Europe." But the coolness and good-will with which Pitt looked on the revolution was far from being universal in the nation at large. The cautious good sense of the bulk of Englishmen, their love of order and law, their distaste for violent changes and for abstract theories, as well as their reverence for the past, were rousing throughout the country a dislike of the revolutionary changes which were hurrying on across the channel; and both the political sense and the political prejudice of the nation were being fired by the warnings of Edmund Burke. The fall of the Bastille, though it kindled enthusiasm in Fox, roused in Burke only distrust. "Whenever a separation is made between liberty and justice," he wrote a few weeks later, "neither is safe." The night of the 4th of August, when the privileges of every class were abolished, filled him with horror. He saw, and rightly saw, in it the critical moment which revealed the character of the revolution, and his part was taken at once. "The French," he cried in January, while Pitt was foretelling a glorious future for the new constitution,—*"the French have shown them-*

elves the ablest architects of ruin who have hitherto existed in the world. In a short space of time they have pulled to the ground their army, their navy, their commerce, their arts, and their manufactures."

1543. But in parliament Burke stood alone. The Whigs, though distrustfully, followed Fox in his applause of the revolution. The Tories, yet more distrustfully, followed Pitt; and Pitt warmly expressed his sympathy with the constitutional government which was ruling France. At this moment, indeed, the more revolutionary party in that country gave a signal proof of its friendship for England. Irritated by an English settlement in Nootka Sound in California, Spain appealed to France for aid in accordance with the family compact; and the French ministry, with a party at its back which believed things had gone far enough, resolved on a war as the best means of checking the progress of the revolution and restoring the power of the crown. The revolutionary party naturally opposed this design; and after a bitter struggle the right of declaring war, save with the sanction of the assembly, was taken from the king. With this vote all danger of hostilities passed away. "The French government," Pitt asserted, "was bent on cultivating the most unbounded friendship for Great Britain," and he saw no reason for its revolutionary changes why Britain should not return the friendship of France. What told even more on his temper toward that country was a conviction that nothing but the joint action of France and England would, in the end, arrest the troubles of Eastern Europe. His intervention foiled for the

moment a fresh effort of Prussia to rob Poland of Dantzic and Thorn. But though Russia was still pressing Turkey hard, a Russian war was so unpopular in England that a hostile vote in parliament forced Pitt to discontinue his armaments; and a fresh union of Austria and Prussia, which promised at this juncture to bring about a close of the Turkish struggle, promised also a fresh attack on the independence of Poland. To prevent a new partition without the co-operation of France was impossible; and in the existing state of things Pitt saw nothing to hinder the continuance of a friendship which would make such a co-operation inevitable.

1544. But while Pitt was pleading for friendship between the two countries, Burke was resolved to make friendship impossible. In parliament, as we have seen, he stood alone. He had long ceased, in fact, to have any hold over the house of commons. The eloquence which had vied with that of Chatham during the discussions on the stamp-act had become distasteful to the bulk of its members. The length of his speeches, the profound and philosophical character of his argument, the splendor and often the extravagance of his illustrations, his passionate earnestness, his want of temper and discretion, wearied and perplexed the squires and merchants about him. He was known nowadays as "the dinner-bell of the house," so rapidly did its benches thin at his rising. For a time his energies found scope in the impeachment of Hastings; and the grandeur of his appeals to the justice of England hushed detraction. But with the close of the im-

peachment his repute had again fallen; and the approach of old age—for he was now past sixty—seemed to counsel retirement from an assembly where he stood unpopular and alone. But age and disappointment and loneliness were forgotten as Burke saw rising across the channel the embodiment of all that he hated—a revolution founded on scorn of the past, and threatening with ruin the whole social fabric which the past had reared; the ordered structure of classes and ranks crumbling before a doctrine of social equality; a state rudely demolished and reconstituted; a church and a nobility swept away in a night. Against the enthusiasm of what he rightly saw to be a new political religion he resolved to rouse the enthusiasm of the old. He was at once a great orator and a great writer; and, now that the house was deaf to his voice, he appealed to the country by his pen. The “*Reflections on the French Revolution*,” which he published in October, 1790, not only denounced the acts of rashness and violence which sullied the great change that France had wrought, but the very principles from which the change had sprung. Burke’s deep sense of the need of social order, of the value of that continuity in human affairs “without which men would become like flies in a summer,” blinded him to all but the faith in mere rebellion and the yet sillier faith in mere novelty which disguised a real nobleness of aim and temper even in the most ardent of the revolutionists. He would see no abuses in the past, now that it had fallen, or anything but the ruin of society in the future. He preached a crusade against men

whom he regarded as the foes of religion and civilization, and called on the armies of Europe to put down a revolution whose principles threatened every state with destruction.

1545. The great obstacle to such a crusade was Pitt; and one of the grandest outbursts of the "Reflections" closed with a bitter taunt at the minister. "The age of chivalry," Burke cried, "is gone; that of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded, and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever." But neither taunt nor invective moved Pitt from his course. At the moment when the "Reflections" appeared he gave a fresh assurance to France of his resolve to have nothing to do with any crusade against the revolution. "This country," he wrote, "means to persevere in the neutrality hitherto scrupulously observed with respect to the internal dissensions of France; and from which it will never depart unless the conduct held there makes it indispensable as an act of self-defense." So far, indeed, was he from sharing the reactionary panic which was spreading around him that he chose this time for supporting Fox in his libel act, a measure which, by transferring the decision on what was libelous in any publication from the judge to the jury, completed the freedom of the press; and himself passed in 1791 a bill which, though little noticed among the storms of the time, was one of the noblest of his achievements. He boldly put aside the dread which had been roused by the American war, that the gift of self-government to our colonies would serve only as a step toward their secession from the mother-country, and

established a house of assembly and a council in the two Canadas. "I am convinced," said Fox, who gave the measure his hearty support, "that the only method of retaining distant colonies with advantage is to enable them to govern themselves;" and the policy of the one statesman as well as the foresight of the other have been justified by the later history of our dependencies. Nor had Burke better success with his own party. Fox remained an ardent lover of the revolution, and answered a fresh attack of Burke upon it with more than usual warmth. Till now, a close affection had bound the two men together; but no sooner had this defense been uttered than the fanaticism of Burke declared their union to be over. "There is no loss of friendship," Fox exclaimed, with a sudden burst of tears. "There is!" Burke repeated; "I know the price of my conduct. My friendship is at an end."

1546. Within the walls of parliament, however, Burke as yet stood utterly alone. His "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," in June, 1791, failed to detach a follower from Fox; while Pitt boldly counseled him rather to praise the English constitution than to rail at the French. "I have made many enemies and few friends," Burke wrote ally to the French princes who had fled from their country and were gathering in arms at Coblenz, "by the part I have taken." But the opinion of the people was slowly drifting to his side; and a sale of 1000 copies showed that the "Reflections" echoed the general sentiment of Englishmen. At this moment, indeed, the mood of England was singularly

unfavorable to any fair appreciation of the revolution across the channel. Her temper was, above all, industrial. Men who were working hard and fast growing rich, who had the narrow and practical turn of men of business, looked angrily at this sudden disturbance of order, this restless and vague activity, these rhetorical appeals to human feeling, these abstract and often empty theories. In England it was a time of political content and social well-being, of steady, economic progress, as well as of a powerful religious revival; and an insular lack of imaginative interest in other races hindered men from seeing that every element of this content, of this order, of this peaceful and harmonious progress, of this reconciliation of society and religion, was wanting abroad. The sympathy which the first outbreak of the revolution had roused among Englishmen grew cooler, in fact, with every step which the revolution took. While the declaration of the rights of man roused France to a frenzy of enthusiasm, it was set aside as a dream by the practical islanders who based their rights on precedent and not on theory. The abolition of all social privileges on the 12th of August, the most characteristic step in the French revolution, was met with grave disapproval by a people more alien from social equality than any people in Europe. Every incident in the struggle between the French people and their king widened the breach of feeling. The anarchy of the country, the want of political sense in its assembly, the paltry declamation of its clubs, the exaggerated sentiment, the universal suspicion, the suspensio

of every security for personal freedom, the arrests, the murders, the overthrow of the church, the ruin of the crown, were watched with an ever-growing severity by a nation whose chief instinct was one of order, whose bent was to practical politics, whose temper was sober and trustful, whose passionate love of personal liberty was only equaled by its passionate abhorrence of bloodshed in civil strife, and whose ecclesiastical and political institutions were newly endeared to it by a fresh revival of religious feeling, and by the constitutional attitude of its government for 100 years.

1547. Sympathy, in fact, was soon limited to a few groups of reformers who gathered in "constitutional clubs," and whose reckless language quickened the national reaction. But in spite of Burke's appeals and the cries of the nobles who had fled from France and longed only to march against their country, Europe held back from any attack on the revolution, and Pitt preserved his attitude of neutrality, though with a greater appearance of reserve. So anxious, in fact, did the aspect of affairs in the East make him for the restoration of tranquillity in France that he foiled a plan which its emigrant nobles had formed for a descent on the French coast, and declared formally at Vienna that England would remain absolutely neutral should hostilities arise between France and the emperor. But the emperor was as anxious to avoid a French war as Pitt himself. Though Catharine, now her strife with Turkey was over, wished to plunge the two German powers into a struggle with the revolution which would

leave her free to annex Poland single-handed, neither Leopold nor Prussia would tie their hands by such a contest. The flight of Louis the Sixteenth from Paris, in June, 1791, brought Europe for a moment to the verge of war; but he was intercepted and brought back; and for a while the danger seemed to incline the revolutionists in France to greater moderation. Louis, too, not only accepted the constitution, but pleaded earnestly with the emperor against any armed intervention as certain to bring ruin to his throne. In their conference at Pillnitz, therefore, in August, Leopold and the King of Prussia contented themselves with a vague declaration inviting the European powers to co-operate in restoring a sound form of government in France; availed themselves of England's neutrality to refuse all military aid to the French princes; and dealt simply with the affairs of Poland. But the peace they desired soon became impossible. The constitutional royalists in France availed themselves of the irritation caused by the declaration of Pillnitz to revive the cry for a war which, as they hoped, would give strength to the throne. The more violent revolutionists, or Jacobins, on the other hand, abandoned their advocacy of peace. Under the influence of the "Girondists"—the deputies from the south of France, whose aim was a republic, and who saw in a great national struggle a means of overthrowing the monarchy—they decided, in spite of the opposition of their leader, Robespierre, on a contest with the emperor. Both parties united to demand the breaking up of an army which the emi-

grant princes had formed on the Rhine; and though Leopold before his death assented to this demand, France declared war against his successor, Francis, in April, 1792.

CHAPTER IV.

ENGLAND AND REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE.

1792—1801.

1548. THAT the war with Germany would widen into a vast European struggle, a struggle in which the peoples would rise against their oppressors, and the freedom which France had won diffuse itself over the world, no French revolutionist doubted for an hour. Nor did they doubt that, in this struggle, England would join them. It was from England that they had drawn those principles of political and social liberty which they believed themselves to be putting into practice. It was to England that they looked, above all, for approbation and sympathy, and on the aid of England that they confidently counted in their struggle with a despotic and priest-ridden Europe. Absorbed in the mighty events about them, and utterly ignorant of the real set of English feeling or the real meaning of Pitt's policy, they were astonished and indignant at his firm refusal of their alliance and his resolve to stand apart from the struggle. It was in vain that Pitt strove to allay this irritation by demanding only that Holland should remain untouched, and promising neutrality even though Belgium should

be occupied by a French army, or that he strengthened these pledges by a reduction of military forces, and by bringing forward in 1792 a peace-budget which rested on a large remission of taxation. To the revolutionists at Paris the attitude of England remained unintelligible and irritating. Instead of the aid they had counted on, they found but a cold neutrality. In place of the sympathy on which they reckoned they saw, now that they looked coolly across the channel, a reserve passing into disapproval. The pen of Burke was denouncing the revolution as the very negation of those principles on which English liberty rested. The priests and nobles who had fled from the new France were finding pity and welcome on English shores. And now that France flung herself on an armed Europe to win freedom for its peoples from their kings, England stood coldly apart. To men frenzied with a passionate enthusiasm, and frenzied yet more with a sudden terror at the dangers they were encountering, such an attitude of neutrality in such a quarter seemed like a stab in the back.

1549. But that this attitude was that of the English people as a whole was incredible to the French enthusiasts. Conscious as no Englishman could be conscious of the great evils they had overthrown, of the great benefits they had won for their country, they saw in the attitude of England only the sympathy of an aristocracy with the aristocracy they had struck down. The cries for a parliamentary reform which reached them across the channel became in their ears cries of a people as powerless and oppressed as the people of France had been. They still clung

to the hope of England's aid in the emancipation of Europe from despotism and superstition, but they came now to believe that England must itself be emancipated before such an aid could be given. Their first work, therefore, they held to be the bringing about a revolution in England which might free the people from the aristocracy and the aristocratic government which held it down. But this was far from being all the work they looked to accomplishing. The aristocracy which oppressed the people at home oppressed, as they believed, great peoples beyond the bounds of England itself. It was subjecting to its sway nation after nation in India. Its rule over Ireland was a masterpiece of tyranny. To rouse India, to rouse Ireland to a struggle which should shake off the English yoke, became necessary steps to the establishment of freedom in England itself. From the moment, therefore, that the opposition between the two countries declared itself, French agents were busy "sowing the revolution" in each quarter. In Ireland they entered into communication with the United Irishmen. In India they appeared at the courts of the native princes, and above all at the court of Mysore. Meanwhile in England itself they strove, through a number of associations which had formed themselves under the name of constitutional clubs, to rouse the same spirit which they had roused in France; and the French envoy, Chauvelin, protested warmly against a proclamation which denounced this correspondence as seditious.

1550. Such a course could only knit men of all

parties together in a common resentment; and the effect of these revolutionary efforts on the friends of the revolution was seen in a declaration which they wrested from Fox that at such a moment even the discussion of parliamentary reform was inexpedient. A far worse result was the new strength they gave to its foes. Burke was still working hard in writings, whose extravagance of style was forgotten in their intensity of feeling, to spread alarm throughout Europe. He had from the first encouraged the emigrant princes to take arms, and sent his son to join them at Coblenz. "Be alarmists," he wrote to them; "diffuse terror!" But the royalist terror which he sowed would have been of little moment had it not roused a revolutionary terror in France itself. At the threat of war against the emperor, the two German courts had drawn together, and, reluctantly abandoning all hope of peace with France, gathered 80,000 men under the Duke of Brunswick, and advanced slowly in August, 1792, on the Meuse. France, though she had forced on the struggle, was really almost defenseless; her forces in Belgium broke at the first shock of arms into shameful rout; and the panic, as it spread from the soldiery to the nation at large, took violent and horrible forms. At the first news of Brunswick's advance, the mob of Paris broke into the Tuileries on the 10th of August, and at its demand Louis, who had taken refuge in the assembly, was suspended from his office and imprisoned in the Temple. In the following September, while Gen. Dumouriez by boldness and adroit negotiations was arresting the progress of the allies in the

defiles of the Argonne, bodies of paid murderers butchered the royalist prisoners who crowded the jails of Paris, with a view of influencing the elections to a new convention which met to proclaim the abolition of royalty. The retreat of the Prussian army, whose numbers had been reduced by disease till an advance on Paris became impossible, and a brilliant victory won by Dumouriez at Jemappes which laid the Netherlands at his feet, turned the panic of the French into a wild self-confidence. In November the convention decreed that France offered the aid of her soldiers to all nations who would strive for freedom. "All governments are our enemies," cried its president; "all peoples are our allies." In the teeth of treaties signed only two years before, and of the stipulation made by England when it pledged itself to neutrality, the French government resolved to attack Holland, and ordered its generals to enforce by arms the opening of the Scheldt.

1551. To do this was to force England into war. Public opinion was already pressing every day harder upon Pitt. The horror of the massacres of September, the hideous despotism of the Parisian mob, did more to estrange England from the revolution than all the eloquence of Burke. But even while withdrawing our minister from Paris on the imprisonment of the king, to whose court he had been commissioned, Pitt clung stubbornly to a policy of peace. His hope was to bring the war to an end through English mediation, and to "leave France, which I believe is the best way, to arrange its own internal affairs as it can." No hour of Pitt's life is so great as the hour

when he stood lonely and passionless before the growth of national passion, and refused to bow to the gathering cry for war. Even the news of the September massacres could only force from him a hope that France might abstain from any war of conquest, and might escape from its social anarchy. In October the French agent in England reported that Pitt was about to recognize the republic. At the opening of November he still pressed on Holland a steady neutrality. It was France, and not England, which at last wrenched peace from his grasp. The decree of the convention and the attack on the Dutch left him no choice but war, for it was impossible for England to endure a French fleet at Antwerp, or to desert allies like the United Provinces. But even in December the news of the approaching partition of Poland nerved him to a last struggle for peace; he offered to aid Austria in acquiring Bavaria if she would make terms with France, and pledged himself to France to abstain from war if that power would cease from violating the independence of her neighbor states. But desperately as Pitt struggled for peace, his struggle was in vain. Across the channel his moderation was only taken for fear, while in England the general mourning which followed on the news of the French king's execution showed the growing ardor for the contest. The rejection of his last offers, indeed, made a contest inevitable. Both sides ceased from diplomatic communications, and in February, 1793, France issued her declaration of war.

1552. From that moment Pitt's power was at an end. His pride, his immovable firmness, and the

general confidence of the nation still kept him at the head of affairs; but he could do little save drift along with a tide of popular feeling which he never fully understood. Around him the country broke out in a fit of passion and panic which rivaled the passion and panic over sea. The confidence of France in its illusions as to opinion in England deluded for the moment even Englishmen themselves. The partisans of republicanism were in reality but a few handfuls of men who played at gathering conventions, and at calling themselves citizens and patriots, in childish imitation of what was going on across the channel. But in the mass of Englishmen the dread of these revolutionists passed for the hour into sheer panic. Even the bulk of the whig party believed property and the constitution to be in peril, and forsook Fox when he still proclaimed his faith in France and the revolution. The "old whigs," as they called themselves, with the Duke of Portland, Earls Spencer and Fitzwilliam, and Mr. Wyndham at their head, followed Burke in giving their adhesion to the government. Pitt himself, though little touched by the political reaction which was to constitute the creed of those who represented themselves as "Pittites," was shaken by the dream of social danger which was turning the wisest heads about him. For a moment at least his cool good sense bent to believe in the existence of "thousands of bandits" who were ready to rise against the throne, to plunder every landlord, and to sack London. "Paine is no fool," he said to his niece, who quoted to him a passage from the "Rights of Man" in which

that author had vindicated the principles of the revolution. "He is perhaps right; but if I did what he wants I should have thousands of bandits on my hands to-morrow and London burnt." It was this sense of social danger which alone reconciled him to the war. It would have been impossible, indeed, for Pitt, or for any other English statesman, to have stood idly by while France annexed the Netherlands and marched to annex Holland. He must in any case have fought even had France not forced him to fight by her declaration of war. But, bitter as the need of such a struggle was to him, he accepted it with the less reluctance that war, as he trusted, would check the progress of "French principles" in England itself.

1553. The worst issue of this panic was the series of legislative measures in which it found expression. The habeas corpus act was suspended, a bill against seditious assemblies restricted the liberty of public meeting, and a wider scope was given to the statute of treasons. Prosecution after prosecution was directed against the press; the sermons of some dissenting ministers were indicted as seditious; and the conventions of sympathizers with France were roughly broken up. The worst excesses of this panic were witnessed in Scotland, where young whigs, whose only offense was an advocacy of parliamentary reform, were sentenced to transportation, and where a brutal judge openly expressed his regret that the practice of torture in seditious cases should have fallen into disuse. But the panic soon passed away for sheer want of material to feed on. The blood-

shed and anarchy of the Jacobin rule disgusted the last sympathizers with France. To stanch whigs like Romilly the French, after the massacres of October, seemed a mere "nation of tigers." The good sense of the nation discovered the unreality of the dangers which had driven it to its short-lived frenzy; and when the leaders of the Corresponding Society, a body which expressed sympathy with France, were brought to trial in 1794 on a charge of high treason, their acquittal told that all active terror was over. So far, indeed, was the nation from any danger of social overthrow that, save for occasional riots to which the poor were goaded by sheer want of bread, no social disturbance troubled England during the twenty years of struggle which lay before it. But, though the public terror passed, it left a terrible legacy behind. The blind reaction against all reform which had sprung from the panic lasted on when the panic was forgotten. For nearly a quarter of a century it was hard to get a hearing for any measure which threatened change to an existing institution, beneficial though the change might be. Even the philanthropic movement which so nobly characterized the time found itself checked and hampered by the dread of revolution.

1554. Easy, however, as Pitt found it to deal with "French principles" at home, he found it less easy to deal with French armies abroad. The very excellences of his character, indeed, unfitted him for the conduct of a war. He was at heart a peace minister; he was forced into war by a panic and enthusiasm which he shared in a very small degree; and

he was utterly destitute of his father's gift of entering instinctively into the sympathies and passions around him, and of rousing passions and sympathies in return. At first, indeed, all seemed to go ill for France. When the campaign of 1793 opened she was girt in along her whole frontier by a ring of foes. The forces of the house of Austria, of the empire, and of the King of Prussia, pressed her to the north and the east; those of Spain and Sardinia attacked her in the south; and the accession of England to this league threatened to close the sea against her. The efforts of these foreign foes were seconded, too, by civil war. The peasants of Poitou and Brittany, estranged from the revolution by its attack on the clergy, rose in revolt against the government at Paris; while Marseilles and Lyons were driven into insurrection by the violent leaders who now seized on power in the capital. The campaign opened, therefore, with a series of terrible reverses. In spite of the efforts of Gen. Dumouriez the French were foiled in their attack on Holland, and driven, after a disastrous defeat at Neerwinden, from the Netherlands. At the moment when the Duke of York with 10,000 English troops joined the Austrian army on the northern border of France, a march upon Paris would have crushed the revolution. But the chance was lost. At this moment, indeed, the two German powers were far from wishing honestly for the suppression of the republic and the re-establishment of a strong monarchy in France. Such a restoration would have foiled their projects of aggrandizement in Eastern Europe. The strife on the Rhine had set

Russia free, as Pitt had foreseen, to carry out her schemes of aggression; and Austria and Prussia saw themselves forced, in the interest of a balance of power, to share in her annexations at the cost of Poland. But this new division of Poland would have become impossible had France been enabled, by a restoration of its monarchy, to take up again its natural position in Europe, and to accept the alliance which Pitt would in such a case have offered her. The policy of the German courts, therefore, was to produce an anarchy which left them free for the moment to crush Poland, and which they counted on crushing in its turn at a more convenient time; and the allied armies which might have marched upon Paris were purposely frittered away in sieges in the Netherlands and the Rhine.

1555. Such a policy gave France all that she needed to recover from the shock of her past disasters: it gave her time. Whatever were the crimes and tyranny of her leaders, the country felt in spite of them the value of the revolution, and rallied enthusiastically to its support. The strength of the revolt in LaVendée was broken. The insurrection in the south was drowned in blood. The Spanish invaders were held at bay at the foot of the Pyrenees, and the Piedmontese were driven from Nice and Savoy. At the close of the year a fresh blow fell upon the struggling country in the revolt of Toulon, the naval station of its Mediterranean fleet. The town called for foreign aid against the government at Paris; and Lord Hood entered the port with an English squadron, while a force of 11,000 men, gathered hastily

from every quarter, was dispatched under Gen. O'Hara as a garrison. But the successes against Spain and Savoy freed the hands of France at this critical moment; the town was at once invested, and the seizure of a promontory which commanded the harbor, a step counseled by a young artillery officer, Napoleon Bonaparte, brought about the withdrawal of the garrison and the surrender of Toulon. The success was a prelude of what was to come. At the opening of 1794 a victory at Fleurus, which again made the French masters of the Netherlands, showed that the tide had turned. France was united within by the cessation of the terror and of the tyranny of the Jacobins, while on every border victory followed the gigantic efforts with which she met the coalition against her. The coalition, indeed, was fast breaking up. Spain sued for peace. Prussia, more intent on her gains in the east than on any battle with the revolution on the west, prepared to follow Spain's example by the withdrawal of her armies from the Rhine. It was only by English subsidies that Austria and Sardinia were still kept in the field; and the Rhine provinces were wrested from the first, while the forces of Sardinia were driven back from the Riviera and the maritime Alps into the plain of Piedmont. Before the year ended Holland was lost. Pichegru crossed the Waal in mid-winter with an overwhelming force, and the wretched remnant of 10,000 men who had followed the Duke of York to the Netherlands, thinned by disease and by the hardships of retreat, re-embarked for England.

1556. In one quarter only had the fortune of war

gone against the French republic. The victories of Rodney at the close of the strife with America had concentrated English interest on the fleet. Even during the peace, while the army was sacrificed to financial distress, great efforts were made to preserve the efficiency of the navy; and the recent alarm of war with Russia and Spain had ended in raising it to a strength which it had never reached before. But France was as eager as England herself to dispute the sovereignty of the seas, and almost equal attention had been bestowed on the navy which crowded the great harbors of Toulon and Brest. In force as a number of ships it was equal in effective strength to that of England; and both nations looked with hope to the issue of a contest at sea. No battle marked the first year of the war; but, as it ended, the revolt of Toulon gave a fatal wound to the naval strength of France in the almost total destruction of her Mediterranean fleet. That of the channel, however, remained unhurt; and it was this which Lord Howe at last encountered off Brest in 1794, in the battle which is known by the name of the day on which it was fought—the “First of June.” The number of ships on either side was nearly the same, and the battle was one of sheer hard fighting, unmarked by any display of naval skill. But the result was a decisive victory for England; and the French admiral, weakened by the loss of seven vessels and 3,000 men, again took refuge in Brest.

1557. The success of Lord Howe did somewhat to counteract the discouragement which sprang from the general aspect of the war. At the opening of

1795 the coalition finally gave way. Holland had been detached from it by Pichegru's conquest, and the Batavian republic which he set up there was now an ally of France. In the spring Prussia bought peace at Basle by the cession of her possessions west of the Rhine. Peace with Spain followed in the summer, while Sweden and the Protestant cantons of Switzerland recognized the republic. These terrible blows were hardly met by the success of the Austrian army in relieving Mainz, or by the colonial acquisitions of England. The latter, indeed, were far from being inconsiderable. Most of the West Indian islands which had been held by France now fell into British hands; and the alliance of Holland with the French threw open to English attack the far more valuable settlements of the Dutch. The surrender of Cape Town in September gave England the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, the nucleus of what has since grown into a vast southern settlement which is destined to play a great part in the history of Africa. At the close of the year the island of Ceylon was added to our Indian dependencies. Both of these acquisitions were destined to remain permanently attached to England, though at the moment their value was eclipsed by the conquest of the Dutch colonies in the Pacific, the more famous Spice Islands of the Malaccas and Java. But, important as these gains were in their after-issues, they had no immediate influence on the war. The French armies prepared for the invasion of Italy; while in France itself discord came well-nigh to an end. A descent by a force of French emigrants on the coast of Brit-

tany ended in their massacre at Quiberon and in the final cessation of the war in La Vendée; while the royalist party in Paris was crushed as soon as it rose against the convention by the genius of Napoleon Bonaparte.

1558. But the fresh severities against the ultra-republicans which followed on the establishment of a directory after this success indicated the moderate character of the new government, and Pitt seized on this change in the temper of the French government as giving an opening for peace. The dread of a Jacobin propagandism was now all but at an end. In spite of an outbreak of the London mob, whose cries meant chiefly impatience of dear bread, but which brought about a fresh suspension of the habeas corpus act and the introduction of a bill "for the prosecution of seditious meetings," the fear of any social disturbance or of the spread of "French principles" in England was fast passing away from men's minds. The new constitution which France accepted in 1795 showed that the tendencies of the French themselves were now rather to order than to freedom. The old grounds for the struggle, therefore, had ceased to exist; while the pressure of it grew hourly more intolerable. Pitt himself was sick of the strife. The war, indeed, had hardly begun when he found himself without the means of carrying it on. The English navy was in a high state of efficiency; but the financial distress which followed the American war had brought with it a neglect of the army. The army was not only small, but without proper equipment; and the want of military experience among

its soldiers was only equaled by the incapacity of their leaders. "We have no general," Lord Grenville wrote bitterly, "but some old woman in a red ribbon." Wretched, too, as had been the conduct of the war, its cost was already terrible; for if England was without soldiers she had wealth, and in default of nobler means of combating the revolution Pitt had been forced to use wealth as an engine of war. He became the paymaster of the coalition, and his subsidies kept the allied armies in the field. But the immense loans which these called for, and the quick growth of expenditure, undid all the financial reforms on which the young minister prided himself. Taxation, which had reached its lowest point at the outbreak of the contest, mounted ere a few years were past to a height undreamed of before. The debt rose by leaps and bounds. In three years nearly eighty millions had been added to it, a sum greater than that piled up by the whole war with America, and in the opening of 1796 votes were taken for loans which amounted to twenty-five millions more.

1559. Nor was this wreck of his financial hopes Pitt's only ground for desiring a close of the war. From the first, as we have seen, he had been keenly sensitive to the European dangers which the contest involved; nor had he shown, even in his moment of social panic, the fanatical blindness of men like Burke to the evils which had produced the revolution, or to the good which it had wrought. But he could only listen in silence while the Marquis of Lansdowne, the Lord Shelburne of earlier days and

the successor of Chatham as the advocate of a more liberal policy, met the rhetoric of Burke by cool demonstration of the benefit which the recent change had brought the mass of the French people, and by pointing to the profit which Russia was drawing from the struggle in the west. In their wide-reaching view of European affairs, in their justice to the revolution, Shelburne and Pitt stood alone. Around them men were hardened and blinded by passion. The old hatred between nation and nation, which Pitt had branded as irrational, woke up fiercer than ever at the clash of arms, for with it was blended a resentment that had smoldered in English breasts, ever since the war with America, at the blow which France had dealt England in that hour of her weakness, and a disgust which only slowly grew fainter at her overthrow of every social and political institution that Englishmen held dear. On the dogged temper of the nation at large the failure of the coalition produced little effect. It had no fear of fighting France single-handed, nor could it understand Pitt's suggestion that a time had come for opening negotiations with a view to peace. Public opinion, indeed, went hotly with Burke in his denunciation of all purpose of relaxing England's hostility against the revolution, a denunciation which was embodied in his "*Letters on a Regicide Peace*," the last outcry of that fanaticism which had done so much to plunge the world in blood.

1560. But though Pitt stood all but alone, he was firm in his purpose to bring the war, if he could, to a close. What specially moved him was not the

danger on the continent, whether that danger sprang from French victories or from aggression in the east. It was a danger in the west. Vain as the expectations of the French revolutionists had proved in the case of England, they had better ground for their hopes elsewhere. Even before the outbreak of the war Pitt had shown how keen was his sense of a possible danger from Ireland. In that wretched country the terrible fruits of a century of oppression and wrong were still to reap. From the close of the American war, when her armed volunteers had wrung legislative independence from the Rockingham ministry, Ireland had continued to be England's difficulty. She was now "independent;" but her independence was a mere name for the uncontrolled rule of a few noble families. The victory of the volunteers had been won simply to the profit of "undertakers," who returned a majority of members in the Irish house of commons, while they themselves formed the Irish house of lords. The suspension of any effective control or interference from England left Ireland at these men's mercy, and they soon showed that they meant to keep it for themselves. When the Catholics claimed admission to the franchise or to equal civil rights as a reward for their aid in the late struggle, their claim was rejected. A similar demand of the Presbyterians, who had formed a good half of the volunteers, for the removal of their disabilities was equally set aside. Even Grattan, when he pleaded for a reform which would make the parliament at least a fair representative of the Protestant Englishry, ut-

terly failed. The ruling class found government too profitable to share it with other possessors. It was only by hard bribery that the English viceroys could secure their co-operation in the simplest measures of administration. "If ever there was a country unfit to govern itself," said Lord Hutchinson, "it is Ireland. A corrupt aristocracy, a ferocious commonalty, a distracted government, a divided people!"

1561. The real character of this parliamentary rule was seen in the rejection of Pitt's offer of free trade. In Pitt's eyes the danger of Ireland lay, above all, in the misery of its people. Although the Irish Catholics were held down by the brute force of their Protestant rulers, he saw that their discontent was growing fast into rebellion, and that one secret, at any rate, of their discontent lay in Irish poverty, a poverty increased, if not originally brought about, by the jealous exclusion of Irish products from their natural markets in England itself. One of his first commercial measures, therefore, as we have seen, aimed at putting an end to this exclusion by a bill which established freedom of trade between the two islands. But though he met successfully the fears and jealousies of the English farmers and manufacturers, he was foiled by the factious ignorance of the Irish land-owners, and his bill was rejected by the Irish parliament. So utterly was he discouraged that, for the moment, he ceased from all further attempts to improve the condition of Ireland. But the efforts which the French revolutionists made to excite rebellion among the Irish roused

him to fresh measures of conciliation and good government. The hopes of some reform of the Irish parliament had been fanned by the eloquence of Grattan and by the pressure of the United Irishmen, an association which had sprung up in Ulster, where Protestant dissenters, who were equally excluded with Catholics from any share in political power, formed the strongest part of the population. These hopes, however, were growing every day fainter. To the Irish aristocracy parliamentary reform meant the close of a corrupt rule, which had gone on unchecked since the American war. But to the Irish Catholic it meant far more; it meant his admission, not only to the electoral franchise, but in the end to all the common privileges of citizenship from which he was excluded, his "emancipation," to use the word which now became common, from the yoke of slavery which had pressed on him ever since the battle of the Boyne.

1562. To such an emancipation Pitt was already looking forward. In 1792, a year before the outbreak of war with France, he forced on the Irish parliament measures for the admission of Catholics to the electoral franchise and to civil and military office within the island which promised a new era of religious liberty. But the promise came too late. The hope of conciliation was lost in the fast rising tide of religious and social passion. As the dream of obtaining parliamentary reform died away the United Irishmen of the north drifted into projects of insurrection and a correspondence with France. The news of the French revolution fell with a yet

more terrible effect on the Catholic peasantry, brooding over their misery and their wrongs. Their discontent broke out in social disorder, in the outrages of secret societies of "Defenders" and "Peep o' Day Boys," which spread panic among the ruling classes. It was only by sheer terror and bloodshed that the Protestant land-owners, who banded together in "Orange" societies to meet the secret societies about them, could hold the country down. Outrages on the one side, tyranny on the other, deepened the disorder and panic every day, and the hopes of the reformers grew fainter as the terror rose fast around them. The maddened Protestants scouted all notions of further concessions to men whom they looked upon as on the verge of revolt; and Grattan's motions for reform were defeated by increasing majorities. On the other hand, the entry of the anti-revolutionary whigs into Pitt's ministry revived Grattan's hopes, for Burke and his followers were pledged to a liberal policy toward Ireland; and Lord Fitzwilliam, who came over as a viceroy in 1794, encouraged Grattan to bring in a bill for the entire emancipation of the Catholics at the opening of the next year. Such a step can hardly have been taken without Pitt's assent; but the minister was now swept along by a tide of feeling which he could not control. The Orangemen threatened revolt, the tories in Pitt's own cabinet recoiled from the notion of reform, and Lord Fitzwilliam was not only recalled, but replaced by Lord Camden, an avowed enemy of all change or concession to the Catholics. From that moment the United Irishmen

became a revolutionary society; and one of their leaders, Wolfe Tone, made his way to France in the spring of 1796 to seek aid in a national rising.

1563. It is probable that Tone's errand was known to Pitt; it is certain that Lord Edward Fitzgerald, another of the patriot leaders, who had been summoned to carry on more definite negotiations in Basle, revealed inadvertently as he returned the secret of his hopes to an agent of the English cabinet. Vague as were the offers of the United Irishmen, they had been warmly welcomed by the French government. Masters at home, the directory were anxious to draw off the revolutionary enthusiasm which the French party of order dreaded as much as Burke himself to the channels of foreign conquest. They were already planning that descent of their army in the Alps upon Lombardy which was to give a fatal blow to one of their enemies, Austria; and they welcomed the notion of a French descent upon Ireland and an Irish revolt, which would give as fatal a blow to their other enemy, England. An army of 25,000 men under Gen. Hoche was promised, a fleet was manned, and preparations were being made for the expedition during the summer. But the secret was ill-kept, and the news of such an attempt was, we can hardly doubt, the ground of the obstinacy with which Pitt persisted, in the teeth of the national feeling and of Burke's invectives, in clinging to his purpose of concluding a peace. In October, 1796, Lord Malmesbury was dispatched to Paris, and negotiations were finally opened for that purpose. The terms which Pitt offered were terms

of mutual restitution. France was to evacuate Holland and to restore Belgium to the emperor. England, on the other hand, was to restore the colonies she had won to France, Holland, and Spain. As the English minister had no power of dealing with the territories already ceded by Prussia and other states, such a treaty would have left France, as her eastern border, the line of the Rhine. But even had they desired peace at all, the directors would have scorned it on terms such as these. While Malmesbury was negotiating, indeed, France was roused to new dreams of conquest by the victories of Napoleon Bonaparte. The genius of Carnot, the French minister of war, had planned a joint advance upon Vienna by the French armies of Italy and the Rhine, the one under Bonaparte, the other under Moreau. The plan was only partly successful. Moreau, though he pushed forward through every obstacle to Bavaria, was compelled to fall back by the defeat of a lieutenant; and was only enabled by a masterly retreat through the Black Forest to reach the Rhine. But the disaster of Moreau was more than redeemed by the victories of Bonaparte. With the army which occupied the Riviera and the maritime Alps the young general marched on Piedmont at the opening of the summer, separated its army from the Austrian troops, and forced the King of Sardinia to conclude a humiliating peace. A brilliant victory at the bridge of Lodi brought him to Milan, and drove the Austrians into the Tyrol. Lombardy was in the hands of the French, the duchies south of the Po pillaged, and the pope

driven to purchase an armistice at enormous cost, before the Austrian armies, raised to a force of 50,000 men, again descended from the Tyrol for the relief of Mantua. But a fatal division of their forces by the Lake of Garda enabled Bonaparte to hurl them back broken upon Trent, and to shut up their general, Wurmser, in Mantua with the remnant of his men; while fresh victories at the bridge of Arcola and at Bassano drove back two new Austrian armies who advanced to Wurmser's rescue.

1564. It was the success of Bonaparte which told on the resolve of the directory to reject all terms of peace. After months of dilatory negotiations the offers of Lord Malmesbury were definitely declined, and the English envoy returned home at the end of the year. Every hour of his stay in Paris had raised higher hopes of success against England in the minds of the directory. At the moment of his arrival Spain had been driven to declare war as their ally against Britain; and the Spanish and Dutch fleets were now at the French service for a struggle at sea. The merciless exactions of Bonaparte poured gold into the exhausted treasury; and the energy of Hoche rapidly availed itself of this supply to equip a force for operations in Ireland. At the opening of December he was ready to put to sea with a fleet of more than forty sail and 25,000 men; and the return of Lord Malmesbury was the signal for the dispatch of his expedition from Brest. The fleet at Toulon, which was intended to co-operate with that at Brest, and which had sailed through the straits of Gibraltar for that purpose, was driven into Port l'Orient by an

English squadron; but contrary winds baffled the fleet which was watching Hoche, and his armament slipped away with little hindrance toward the Irish coast. Had it reached Ireland unbroken and under such a general, the island might well have been lost to the English crown. But the winds fought against France, as they had fought against the Armada of Spain; and the ships were parted from one another by a gale which burst on them as they put to sea. Seventeen reached Bantry Bay, but hearing nothing of their leader or of the rest, they sailed back again to Brest, in spite of the entreaties of the soldiers to be suffered to land. Another division reached the Shannon, to be scattered and driven home again by a second storm. Twelve vessels were wrecked or captured, and the frigate in which Hoche had embarked returned to port without having seen any of its companions. The invasion had failed, but the panic which it roused woke passions of cruelty and tyranny which turned Ireland into a hell. Soldiers and yeomanry marched over the country torturing and scourging the "croppies," as the Irish peasantry were termed from their short-cut hair; robbing, ravishing, and murdering at their will. The lightest suspicion, the most unfounded charges, were taken as warrants for bloodshed. So hideous were these outrages that the news of them as it reached England woke a thrill of horror in the minds of even the blindest tories; but by the land-owners who formed the Irish parliament they were sanctioned in a bill of indemnity and protected for the future by an insurrection act. The terror, however, only woke a

universal spirit of revolt. Ireland drank in greedily that hatred of England and of English rule which all the justice and moderation of later government has failed to destroy; and the United Irishmen looked with more passionate longing than ever to France.

1565. Nor had France abandoned the design of invasion, while her victories made such a design every day more formidable. The war was going steadily in her favor. A fresh victory at Rivoli, the surrender of Mantua, and an advance through Styria on Vienna, enabled Bonaparte to wring a peace from England's one ally, Austria. The armistice was concluded in April, 1797, and the final treaty which was signed at Campo Formio in October not only gave France the Ionian Islands, a part of the old territory of Venice (whose Italian possessions passed to the emperor), as well as the Netherlands and the whole left bank of the Rhine, but united Lombardy with the duchies south of the Po and the papal states as far as the Rubicon into a "Cisalpine republic," which was absolutely beneath her control. The withdrawal of Austria left France without an enemy on the continent, and England without an ally. The stress of the war was pressing more heavily on her every day. A mutiny in the fleet was suppressed with difficulty. The news of Hoche's expedition brought about a run for gold which forced on the bank a suspension of specie payments. It was in this darkest hour of the struggle that Burke passed away, protesting to the last against the peace which, in spite of his previous failure, Pitt

was again striving to bring about by fresh negotiations at Lille. Peace seemed more needful than ever to him now that France was free to attack her enemy with the soldiers who had fought at Hohenlinden and Rivoli. Their way, indeed, lay across the sea, and at sea Britain was supreme. But her supremacy was threatened by a coalition of naval forces such as had all but crushed her in the American war. Again the Dutch and Spanish fleets were allied with the fleets of France; and it was necessary to watch Cadiz and the Scheldt as well as Brest and Toulon. A single victory of the three confederates, or even such a command of the channel as they had held for months during the war with America, would enable the directory to throw overwhelming armies not only on the shores of England but on the shores of Ireland, and whatever might be the fate of the one enterprise, there could be little doubt of the success of the other. The danger was real; but it had hardly threatened England when it was dispelled by two great victories. The Spanish fleet, which put out to sea with twenty-seven sail of the line, was met on the 14th of February, 1797, by Admiral Jervis off Cape St. Vincent with a force of but fifteen, and driven back to Cadiz with a loss of four of its finest vessels. Disheartened as they were, however, their numbers still exceeded that of the force which blockaded them; and France counted with confidence on the fleet of Holland, which was ordered to join its own fleet at Brest. The aim of this union was to protect a fresh force in its descent upon Ireland, where the United Irishmen now declared themselves

ready for revolt. But a yet sterner fortune awaited the Dutch than that which had fallen on the Spaniards. Their admiral, De Winter, who had quitted the Texel during a storm with eleven sail of the line and four frigates, fell in on the 11th of October with a far larger fleet under Admiral Duncan off Camperdown. The Hollanders fought with a stubborn courage worthy of their old renown, and it was only when their ships were riddled with shot into mere wrecks that they fell into the hands of the English.

1566. The French project for an expedition to Ireland hung on the junction of the Dutch fleet with that of Brest, and the command of the channel which this junction would have given them. Such a command became impossible after the defeat of Camperdown. But the disappointment of their hopes of foreign aid only drove the adherents of revolt in Ireland to a rising of despair. The union of the national party, which had lasted to some extent from the American war, was now broken up. The Protestants of Ulster still looked for aid to France. The Catholics, on the other hand, were alienated from the French by their attack on religion and the priesthood; and the failure of the French expedition, while it damped the hopes of the Ulstermen, gave force to the demands of the Catholic party for a purely national rising. So fierce was this demand that the leaders of the United Irishmen were forced to fix on the spring of 1798 for the outbreak of an insurrection in which Lord Edward Fitzgerald, who had some military experience, was to take the command. But, while yielding on this point to the Catholic section

of their party, they conciliated the Protestants by renewed appeals for aid to the directory. In spite of its previous failures, France again promised help; and a division was prepared during the winter for service in Ireland. But the passion of the nation was too intense to wait for its arrival. The government, too, acted with a prompt decision in face of the danger; and an arrest of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, with three of their chief leaders, in February, 1798, broke the plans of the insurgents. On the 23d of May, however, the day fixed for the opening of the revolt, the Catholic peasantry of the south rose in arms. Elsewhere their disorderly gatherings were easily dispersed by the yeomanry; but Wexford surrendered to 14,000 insurgents who marched on it, headed by a village priest, and the town at once became the center of a formidable revolt.

1567. Fortunately for the English rule the old religious hatred which had so often wrecked the hopes of Ireland broke out in the instant of this triumph. The Protestant inhabitants of Wexford were driven into the river or flung into prison. Another body of insurgents, frenzied by the cruelties of the royal troops, massacred a hundred Protestants in cold blood. The atrocities of the soldiers and the yeomanry were avenged with a fiendish ruthlessness. Loyalists were lashed and tortured in their turn, and every soldier taken was butchered without mercy. The result of these outrages was fatal to the insurrection. The Ulster Protestants, who formed the strength of the United Irishmen, stood sullenly aloof from rebels who murdered Protestants. The Catho-

lic gentry threw themselves on the side of the government against a rising which threatened the country with massacre and anarchy. Few, in fact, had joined the insurgents in Wexford when Lord Lake appeared before their camp upon Vinegar Hill with a strong force of English troops on the 21st of May. The camp was stormed, and with the dispersion of its defenders the revolt came suddenly to an end. But its suppression came only just in time to prevent greater disasters; for a few weeks after the close of the rebellion the long-expected aid arrived from France. The news of the outbreak had forced the armament which was being equipped in the French ports to put to sea with forces utterly inadequate to the task it had set itself, but fresh aid was promised to follow; and the 900 soldiers who landed in August under Gen. Humbert on the coast of Mayo showed by their first successes how formidable a center they would have given to the revolt had the revolt held its ground. But in the two months which had passed since Vinegar Hill all trace of resistance to the English rule had been trodden out in blood, and Humbert found himself alone in a country exhausted and panic-stricken. He marched, however, boldly on Castlebar, broke a force of yeomanry and volunteers three times his number, and only surrendered when Lord Cornwallis, who had succeeded to the lord-lieutenancy, faced him with 30,000 men.

1568. Of the threefold attack on which the directory had relied for the ruin of England two parts had now broken down. Humbert's surrender and

the failure of the native insurrection left little hope for future attack on the side of Ireland. The naval confederacy which was to rob England of the command of the seas had been foiled by the utter wreck of the Dutch fleet and the imprisonment of the Spanish fleet in Cadiz. But the genius of Bonaparte had seized on the schemes for a rising against the English rule in Hindostan, and widened them into a project of all but world-wide conquest. At this time the strongest and most vigorous of the Indian powers was that of Mysore, at the southern extremity of the peninsula, where a Mussulman state had been built up by the genius of an adventurer, Hyder Ali. In the days when the English were winning their supremacy over the Carnatic, Hyder had been their chief difficulty; and his attack had once brought them to the verge of ruin. The hostility of his son Tippoo was even more bitter; but the victories of Lord Cornwallis had taught the Sultan of Mysore that he was no match for the British power single-handed; and his hopes, like those of the United Irishmen, were fixed upon France. He was striving to get aid from the Afghans and from the Nizam, but what he most counted on for the expulsion of the English from the Carnatic was a force of 30,000 French soldiers. Letters requesting such a force were dispatched by him to France in 1797. Bonaparte had already fixed on Mysore as a basis of operations against the British rule in Hindostan; and after dismissing as impracticable a project suggested to him on his return from Italy after the treaty of Campo Formio for a descent upon England itself, he

laid before the directory a plan for the conquest and occupation of Egypt as a preliminary to a campaign in southern India. Utterly as this plan was foiled in the future, it was far from being the wild dream which it has often been considered. Both the ministry and East Indian directors were roused into anxiety by the first news of Bonaparte's expedition. Lord Wellesley, the governor-general of British India, was warned of a possible attack from the Red Sea. Four thousand soldiers were hurried off to reinforce his army; while the English fleet watched anxiously in the Mediterranean. But so perfect was the secrecy with which the French plans were combined that Bonaparte was able to put to sea in May, 1798, with a force of 30,000 veterans drawn from the army of Italy, and making himself master of Malta as he passed to land near Alexandria at the close of June.

1569. The conquest of Egypt proved as easy and complete as Bonaparte had hoped. The Mamelukes were routed in the battle of the Pyramids; Cairo was occupied; and the French troops pushed rapidly up the valley of the Nile. Their general, meanwhile, showed his genius for government by a masterly organization of the conquered country, by the conciliation of his new subjects, and by measures for the enrollment of native soldiers which would in a short time have placed him at the head of a formidable army. Of his ultimate aim there can be little doubt; for he had hardly landed at Alexandria when he dispatched the news of his arrival and promises of support to Tippoo. All chance, however, of success in

his projects hung on the maintenance of communications with France. With Italy, with the Ionian Islands, with Alexandria in French holding, it was all but impossible to prevent supplies of men and arms from being forwarded to Egypt, so long as the French fleet remained in the waters of the Mediterranean and kept the English force concentrated by the necessity of watching its movements. But the French were hardly masters of Egypt when their fleet ceased to exist. The thirteen men-of-war which had escorted the expedition were found by Admiral Nelson in Aboukir Bay, moored close to the coast in a line guarded at either end by gunboats and batteries. Nelson resolved to thrust his ships between the French and the shore. On the morning of the 1st of August his own flag-ship led the way in this attack; and after a terrible fight of twelve hours, nine of the French vessels were captured and destroyed, two were burned, and 5000 French seamen were killed or made prisoners. "Victory," cried Nelson, "is not a name strong enough for such a scene." Few victories, indeed, in history have produced more effective results than the battle of the Nile. The French flag was swept from the waters of the Mediterranean. All communication between France and Bonaparte's army was cut off; and his hopes of making Egypt a starting-point for the conquest of India fell at a blow. To hold Egypt itself soon became difficult, for a desperate revolt broke out at the news of Nelson's victory in the streets of Cairo, and a Turkish army advanced from Syria to recover the valley of the Nile.

1570. Secure against invasion at home as against rebellion in Ireland, secure, too, against the dangers that threatened her rule in India, and mistress of the seas, England was free in her turn to attack the assailant who had so long threatened her very existence. And in such an attack she was aided at this moment by the temper of the European powers, and by the ceaseless aggressions of France. The treaties of Basle and Campo Formio were far from being accepted by the directory as a final settlement of the relations of France with Europe. Some faint remnant of the older dreams of freeing oppressed people may have lingered in the aid which it gave to the rising of the subject districts of Basle and Vaud against their Bernese masters in the opening of 1798. But mere greed of gold was seen in the plunder of the treasury of Berne, a plunder which served to equip the army that sailed with Bonaparte to the shores of Egypt, and to recruit the exhausted treasury of the directory; and an ambition as reckless as this greed broke out in an attack on the mountain cantons, states whose democratic institutions gave no such excuse for hostility as had been afforded by the aristocracy of Berne. A French decree abolished the Swiss Confederation and the independence of its several states, and established in their place an Helvetic republic modeled on a plan sent from Paris, and placed under the protection of France. The mountain cantons rose against this overthrow of a freedom compared with which the freedom of France was but of yesterday; but desperate as was their struggle they were overwhelmed by numbers, and the men of

Uri, of Unterwalden, and of Schwytz bowed for the first time to a foreign conqueror.

1571. The overthrow of this immemorial house of freedom opened the eyes of the blindest enthusiast to the real character of the French aggressions. Even in the group of young English poets, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Southey, who had clung till now to the dream of the revolution, of a Europe freed and regenerated by the arms of the new republic, all belief in such a dream passed finally away. But the France of the directory would have cared little for this alienation of the peoples had it not been backed by the revived hostility of their kings. What England counted on in her efforts for a revival of the coalition was the resentment of Austria at the aggressions which the directory had ever since the peace of Campo Formio been carrying on in Italy. In the opening of 1798 a French force entered Rome, set up a Roman republic, and carried off Pius VI. a prisoner to Sienna; while the King of Sardinia was driven to admit French garrisons into his fortresses. Austria, however, was still too weak after her defeats to listen to Pitt's advances had Pitt stood alone. But Russia was now about to take a new part in European affairs. Under Catharine the Second this power had availed itself of the war against France in the west to carry out its own projects of conquest in eastern Europe; and as we have seen, Pitt had watched its advance at the opening of the revolution with far greater dread than the movements in France. It was, in fact, the need which the two German states felt of balancing the Russian annexations in

Poland by annexations of their own which had paralyzed their armies on the Rhine and saved France at the moment of her greatest danger in 1793. It is probable that the directory still counted on the persistence of Russia in a similar policy, and believed that Catharine would see in their attack on Egypt and the Turks only a fresh opportunity for conquests on the Danube. But the sudden greatness of France had warned Russia that its policy of selfishness had been carried too far. It had allowed the republic to tower into supremacy over the continent, and if once such a supremacy was firmly established it would prove a fatal obstacle to the Russian advance. France would again, as under the monarchy, aim at the restoration of Poland; she would again bar the way to Constantinople; and her action would be backed by the weight of all western Europe, which had been thrown into the scale by the policy of the very state she defied. To avert such a result it was necessary to restore that balance of the continent by which France and the German powers held one another in check; and with a view to this restoration Russia suddenly declared itself an enemy of France. Catharine's successor, the Czar Paul, set aside the overtures of the directory. A close alliance was formed with Austria, and while an imperial army gathered on the Bavarian frontier Russia troops hurried to the west.

1572. The appearance of this new element in the struggle changed its whole conditions; and it was with renewed hope that Pitt lavished subsidies on the two allies at the close of 1798. But his prepara-

tions for the new strife were far from being limited to efforts abroad. In England he had found fresh resources in an income-tax, from which he anticipated an annual return of £10,000,000. Heavy as the tax was, and it amounted to ten per cent on all incomes above £200 a year, the dogged resolution of the people to fight on was seen in the absence of all opposition to this proposal. What was of even greater importance was to remove all chance of fresh danger from Ireland. Pitt's temper was of too statesmanlike a mold to rest content with the mere suppression of insurrection or with the system of terrorism which for the moment held the country down. His disgust at "the bigoted fury of Irish Protestants" had backed Lord Cornwallis in checking the reprisals of his troops and of the Orangemen; but the hideous cruelty which he was forced to witness brought about a firm resolve to put an end to the farce of "independence" which left Ireland helpless in such hands. The political necessity for a union of the two islands had been brought home to every English statesman by the course of the Irish parliament during the disputes over the regency. While England repelled the claims of the Prince of Wales to the regency as of right, the legislature of Ireland admitted them. As the only union left between the two peoples since the concession of legislative independence was their obedience to a common ruler, such an act might conceivably have ended in their entire severance; and the sense of this danger secured a welcome in England for the proposal which Pitt made at the opening of 1799 to unite the

two parliaments. The opposition of the Irish borough-mongers was naturally stubborn and determined, and when the plan was introduced into the parliament at Dublin it was only saved from rejection by a single vote. But with men like these it was a sheer question of gold; and their assent was bought with a million in money, and with a liberal distribution of pensions and peerages. Base and shameless as were such means, Pitt may fairly plead that they were the only means by which the bill for the union could have been passed. As the matter was finally arranged in June, 1800, 100 Irish members became part of the house of commons at Westminster, and twenty-eight temporal with four spiritual peers, chosen for each parliament by their fellows, took their seats in the house of lords. Commerce between the two countries was freed from all restrictions, and every trading privilege of the one thrown open to the other, while taxation was proportionately distributed between the two peoples.

1573. While the union was being pushed slowly forward, the struggle abroad was passing through strange vicissitudes. At the opening of 1799 the efforts of the new coalition were crowned with success in every quarter. Though Naples had been turned into a Parthenopean republic at the close of the previous year, and the French supremacy extended over the whole peninsula, the descent of an Austrian army from the Tyrol at the end of March, and a victory of the Russian and Austrian forces at Cassano, compelled the French army to evacuate Southern Italy and Lombardy, while a fresh defeat at Novi

flung it back on the maritime Alps. A campaign conducted with more varying success drove the armies which had advanced into Germany back over the Rhine. In Switzerland, however, the stubborn energy of Massena enabled his soldiers to hold their ground against the combined attack of Russian and Austrian forces; and the attempt of a united force of Russians and English to wrest Holland from its French masters was successfully repulsed. Twelve of the 30,000 men who formed this army consisted of English troops; and Sir Ralph Abercromby succeeded in landing at their head, in seizing what remained of the Dutch fleet at the Texel, and in holding Gen. Brune at bay when he advanced with superior forces. But Abercromby was superseded in his command by the Duke of York; and in another month the new leader was glad to conclude a convention by which the safe withdrawal of his troops was secured.

1574. In the East, however, England was more successful. Even had Bonaparte not been baffled in his plans of a descent on southern India from the basis of Egypt by the battle of the Nile, they would have been frustrated by the energy of Lord Wellesley. Mysore was invaded, its capital stormed, and Tippoo slain before a French soldier could have been dispatched to its aid. But, foiled as were his dreams of Indian conquest, the daring genius of the French general plunged into wilder projects. He conceived the design of the conquest of Syria and of the creation of an army among its warlike mountaineers. "With a hundred thousand men on the banks of the Euphrates," he said years afterward, "I might have

gone to Constantinople or India; I might have changed the face of the world." Gaza was taken, Jaffa stormed, and 10,000 French soldiers advanced under their young general on Acre. Acre was the key of Syria, and its reduction was the first step in these immense projects. "Once possessed of Acre," wrote Napoleon, "the army would have gone to Damascus and the Euphrates. The Christians of Syria—the Druses, the Armenians—would have joined us. The provinces of the Ottoman empire were ready for a change, and were only waiting for a man." But Acre was stubbornly held by the Turks, the French battering-train was captured at sea by an English captain, Sir Sidney Smith, whose seamen aided in the defense of the place, and, after a loss of 3,000 men by sword and plague, the besiegers were forced to fall back upon Egypt.

1575. Egypt, indeed, was more than ever their own, for their army had now penetrated to the cataracts of the Nile, and a Turkish force which landed near Alexandria was cut to pieces by Bonaparte in the battle of Aboukir. But the news of defeat at home and the certainty that all wider hopes in the East were at an end induced him, only a month after his victory, to leave his army. With a couple of frigates he set sail for France; and his arrival in Paris was soon followed by a change in the government. The directors were divided among themselves, while the disasters of their administration made them hateful to the country; and a revolution brought about by the soldiery on the 10th of November put an end to their power. In the new system

which followed, three consuls took the place of the directors; but the system only screened the government of a single man, for, under the name of First Consul, Bonaparte became in effect sole ruler of the country. His energy at once changed the whole face of European affairs. The offers of peace which he made to England and Austria were intended to do little more than to shake the coalition and gain breathing-time for the organization of a new force which was gathering in secrecy at Dijon, while Moreau with the army of the Rhine pushed again along the Danube. The first consul crossed the Saint Bernard with his army in the spring of 1800, and on the 14th of June a victory at Marengo left the Austrian army, which had just succeeded in reducing Genoa, helpless in his hands. It was by the surrender of all Lombardy to the Oglio that the defeated general obtained an armistice for his troops; and a similar truce arrested the march of Moreau, who had captured Munich and was pushing on to Vienna. The armistice only added to the difficulties of Bonaparte's opponents, for Russia, as anxious not to establish a German supremacy as she had been to weaken the supremacy of France, had withdrawn from the contest as soon as the coalition seemed to be successful; and Austria was only held back from peace by her acceptance of English subsidies. But though she fought on, the resumption of the war in the autumn failed to reverse the fortune of arms. The Austrians were driven back on Vienna; and on the 2d of December Moreau crushed their army on the Iser in the victory of Hohenlinden. But the

aim of the first consul was only to wrest peace from his enemies by these triumphs; while the expiration of her engagements with England left his opponent free to lay down her arms. In February, 1801, therefore, the continental war was brought suddenly to an end by the peace of Lunéville.

CHAPTER V.

ENGLAND AND NAPOLEON.

1801—1815.

1576. THE treaty of Lunéville was of far greater import than the treaties which had ended the struggle of the first coalition. It was, in effect, the close of the attack which revolutionary France had directed against the continental powers. With it expired the outer energy of the revolution, as its inner energy expired with the elevation of Bonaparte to the first consulate. The change that the French onset had wrought in the aspect of Europe had no doubt been great. In the nine years which had passed since the earlier league of the powers against her, France had won all and more than all that the ambition of her older statesmen had ever aimed at. She had absorbed the Netherlands. She was practically mistress of Holland, Switzerland and Piedmont, whose dependent republics covered her frontier; while she had revived that union with Spain which had fallen for a time with the family compact of the house of Bourbon. But, in spite of this growth, the

dread of French aggression was far less keenly felt by her neighbor states in the early years of the war. What they had dreaded then was not so much the political reconstruction of Europe as the revolutionary enthusiasm which would have pushed this political reconstruction into a social revolution. But at the opening of the nineteenth century the enthusiasm of France had faded away. She was again Christian. She was again practically monarchical. What her neighbors saw in her after all these years of change was little more than the old France with a wider frontier; and, now that they could look upon those years as a whole, it was clear that much of this widening of her borders was only a fair counterbalance for the widened borders of the states around her. If France had grown great, other powers had grown in greatness too. If France had pushed her frontier to the Rhine and established dependencies across the Rhone and the Alps, Russia during the same period had annexed the bulk of Poland, and the two great German powers had enlarged themselves both to the east and the west. The empire had practically ceased to be; but its ruin had given fresh extension and compactness to the states which had profited by it. The cessions of Prussia had been small beside her gains. The losses of Austria had been more than counterbalanced in Italy by her acquisition of Venice, and far more than counterbalanced by secularizations and annexations within Germany itself.

1577. Although, therefore, the old Europe and its balance of power had passed away, the new Europe

which had taken its place presented a balance of power which might be regarded as even more effective; and the peace of Lunéville was in reality the recognition on both sides of a European settlement on the basis of such a balance. But in the mind of Bonaparte it was far more than this. It was the first step in an entire reversal of the policy which revolutionary France had pursued in her dealings with the world. It was a return to the older policy of the French monarchy. Under the guidance of the revolutionists, France had striven for supremacy among the states of Europe. But for such a supremacy the first consul cared comparatively little. What he cared for was what Choiseul and the statesmen who followed him cared for, the supremacy of the world. And he saw that with every year of war on the continent such a supremacy grew more distant than ever. The very victories of France, indeed, were playing into the hands of England. Amid all the triumphs of the revolutionary war, the growth of the British empire had been steady and ceaseless. She was more than ever mistress of the sea. The mastery of Holland by the French had only ended in the removal of one of the obstacles to such a mastery by the ruin of the Dutch navy and the transfer of the rich Dutch colonies to the British crown. The winning of Egypt had but spurred her to crush the only Mussulman power that could avert her rule over southern India. But her growth was more than a merely territorial growth. She was turning her command of the seas to a practical account. Not only was she monopolizing the carrying trade of the European nations,

but the sudden uprush of her industries was making her the workshop as well as the market of the world. From the first, the mind of Bonaparte had been set on a struggle with this growing world-power. Even amid his earliest victories he had dreamed of wresting from England her dominion in the East; and, if his Egyptian expedition had done nothing for India, it had secured in Egypt itself a stepping-stone for further efforts. But, now that France was wholly at his disposal, the first consul resolved to free his hands from the strife with the continent, and to enter on that struggle with Britain which was henceforth to be the task of his life.

1578. The significance, then, of the peace of Lunéville lay in this, not only that it was the close of the earlier revolutionary struggle for supremacy in Europe, the abandonment by France of her effort to "liberate the peoples," to force new institutions on the nations about her by sheer dint of arms; but that it marked the concentration of all her energies on a struggle with Britain for the supremacy of the world. For England herself, the event which accompanied it, the sudden withdrawal of William Pitt from office, which took place in the very month of the treaty, was hardly less significant. To men of our day the later position of William Pitt seems one of almost tragic irony. An economist heaping up millions of debt, a peace minister dragged into the costliest of wars, he is the very type of the baffled statesman; and the passionate loyalty with which England clung to him through the revolutionary struggle is one of the least intelligible passages of our history.

But if England clung to Pitt through these years of gloom, it was because then, more than ever, she saw in him her own representative. His strength had lain throughout in his reflection of public opinion; and public opinion saw itself reflected in him still. At the outset of his career the set of opinion had been toward a larger and more popular policy than of old. New facilities of communication, new industrial energy, and a quick accumulation of wealth, as well as the social changes which followed hard on these economical changes, all pointed forward to political progress, to an adaptation of our institutions to the varied conditions of the time. The nation was quivering with a new sense of life; and it faced eagerly questions of religion, of philanthropy, of education, of trade, as, one after another, they presented themselves before it. Above all, it clung to the young minister whose ideas were its own, who, alien as his temper seemed from that of an innovator, came boldly to the front with projects for a new parliament, a new finance, a new international policy, a new imperial policy, a new humanitarian policy. It was this oneness of Pitt's temper with the temper of the men he ruled that made him sympathize, in spite of the alarm of the court, with the first movements of the revolution in France, and deal fairly, if coldly, with its after-course. It was this that gave him strength to hold out so long against a struggle with it.

1579. But, as the alarm deepened, as the nation saw its social, political, and religious traditions alike threatened, the bulk of Englishmen swung round into an attitude of fierce resistance. The craving for

self-preservation hushed all other cravings. What men looked for in Pitt now was not the economist or the reformer, but the son of Chatham, the heir of his father's courage, of his father's faith in the greatness of England. And what they looked for they found. Pitt was no born war minister; he had none of the genius that commands victory, or of the passionate enthusiasm that rouses a nation to great deeds of arms. But he had faith in England. Even when she stood alone against the world he never despaired. Reading him as we read him now, we see the sickness and the gloom of his inner soul; but no sign betrayed it to the world. As the tempest gathered about them, men looked with trust that deepened into awe on the stately figure that embodied their faith in England's fortunes, and huddled in the darkness round "the pilot that weathered the storm." But there were deeper and less conscious grounds for their trust in him. Pitt reflected far more than the nation's resolve. He reflected the waverings and inconsistencies of its political temper in a way that no other man did. In the general swing round to an attitude of resistance, the impulse of progress had come utterly to an end. Men doubted of the truth of principles that seemed to have brought about the horrors of the revolution. They listened to Burke as he built up his theory of political immobility on the basis of an absolute perfection in the constitution of things as they were. But, even in this moment of reaction, they still clung unconsciously to a belief in something better, to a trust that progress would again be possible, and to the man who reflected their

trust. Like them, Pitt could understand little of the scene about him, that seething ocean of European change, where states vanished like dreams, and the very elements of social life seemed to melt in the mist; his mind, like theirs, was baffled with doubt and darkness, with the seeming suicide of freedom, the seeming triumph of violence and wrong. But, baffled and bewildered as he was, he never ceased to believe in liberty, or to hope that the work of reform which he had begun might yet be carried into effect.

1580. It was as the representative of this temper of the people at large, of its mingled mood of terror at the new developments of freedom, and yet of faith in freedom itself, of its dread of progress, and yet its hope of a time when a larger national life should again become possible, that Pitt had gathered the nation round him from the opening of the war. Much, indeed, of the seeming weakness and uncertainty of his statesmanship throughout the struggle sprang from the fidelity with which he reflected this double aspect of national opinion. He has been blamed for fighting the French revolution at all, as he has been blamed for not entering on an anti-revolutionary crusade. But his temper was that of the nation as a whole. He shrank from the fanaticism of Burke as he shrank from the fanaticism of Tom Paine; his aim was not to crush France or the revolution, but to bring the struggle with them to such an end as might enable England to return in safety to the work of progress which the struggle had interrupted. And it was this that gave significance to

his fall. It was a sign that the time had come when the national union which Pitt embodied must dissolve with the disappearance of the force that created it; when resistance had done its work, and the arrest of all national movement had come to an end with the attitude of mere resistance from which it sprang; when, in face of a new France and a new French policy, England could again return to her normal political life, and the impulses toward progress which had received so severe a check in 1792 could again flow in their older channels. In such a return Pitt himself took the lead; and his proposal of Catholic emancipation was as significant of a new era of English life as the peace of Lunéville was significant of a new settlement of Europe.

1581. In Pitt's mind, the union which he brought about in 1800 was more than a mere measure for the security of the one island; it was a first step in the regeneration of the other. The legislative connection of the two countries was only part of the plan which he had conceived for the conciliation of Ireland. With the conclusion of the union, indeed, his projects of free trade between the two countries, projects which had been defeated a few years back by the folly of the Irish parliament, came quietly into play; and in spite of insufficient capital and social disturbance, the growth of the trade, shipping, and manufactures of Ireland has gone on without a check from that time to this. The change which brought Ireland directly under the common parliament was followed, too, by a gradual revision of its oppressive laws and an amendment in their administration;

while taxation was lightened, and a faint beginning made of public instruction. But in Pitt's mind, the great means of conciliation was the concession of religious equality. In proposing to the English parliament the union of the two countries, he pointed out that when thus joined to a Protestant country like England all danger of a Catholic supremacy in Ireland, even should Catholic disabilities be removed, would be practically at an end. In such a case, he suggested that "an effectual and adequate provision for the Catholic clergy" would be a security for their loyalty. His words gave strength to the hopes of "Catholic emancipation," as the removal of what remained of the civil disabilities of Catholics was called, which were held out by his agent, Lord Castlereagh, in Ireland itself as a means of hindering any opposition to the project of union on the part of the Catholics. It was agreed on all sides that their opposition would have secured its defeat; and the absence of such a Catholic opposition showed the new trust in Pitt which was awakened by the hints of Lord Castlereagh. The trust had good grounds to go on. After the passing of the bill, Pitt prepared to lay before his cabinet a measure which would have raised not only the Irish Catholic but the Irish dissenter to a perfect equality of civil rights. He proposed to remove all religious tests which limited the exercise of the franchise, or which were required for admission to parliament, the magistracy, the bar, municipal offices, or posts in the army or the service of the state. An oath of allegiance and of fidelity to the constitution was substituted for the sacramen-

tal test, while the loyalty of the Catholic and dissenting clergy was secured by a grant of some provision to both on the part of the state. To win over the Episcopal church to such an equality, measures were added for strengthening its modes of discipline, as well as for increasing the stipends of its poorer ministers; while a commutation of tithes was planned as a means of removing a constant source of quarrel between the Protestant clergy and the Irish people.

1582. But the scheme was too large and statesman-like to secure the immediate assent of the cabinet; and before the assent could be won, or the plan laid with full ministerial sanction before the king, it was communicated through the treachery of the chancellor, Lord Loughborough, to George the Third. "I count any man my personal enemy," George broke out angrily to Dundas, "who proposes any such measure." Pitt answered this outburst by submitting his whole plan to the king. "The political circumstances under which the exclusive laws originated," he wrote, "arising either from the conflicting power of hostile and nearly balanced sects, from the apprehension of a popish queen as successor, a disputed succession and a foreign pretender, a division in Europe between Catholic and Protestant powers, are no longer applicable to the present state of things." But argument was wasted upon George the Third. In spite of the decision of the lawyers whom he consulted, the king declared himself bound by his coronation oath to maintain the tests; and his obstinacy was only strengthened by a knowledge that such a refusal must drive Pitt from office.

George was weary of his minister's supremacy. He was longing for servants who would leave him more than a show of power, and he chose his ground for a struggle, with all the cunning of his earlier years. It was by his command of public opinion that Pitt had been able to force his measures on the king. But, in the question of Catholic emancipation, George knew that opinion was not with his minister, but with himself. On this point his bigotry was at one with the bigotry of the bulk of his subjects, as well as with their political distrust of Catholics and Irishmen. He persisted, therefore, in his refusal; and it was followed by the event he foresaw. In February, 1801, at the moment of the peace of Lunéville, William Pitt resigned his office into the hands of the king.

1583. It was with a sense of relief that George found himself freed from the great minister whose temper was so alien from his own. But it was with a yet greater sense of relief that he saw him followed into retirement not only by Lord Grenville, but by nearly all the more liberal section of the ministry, by men like Wyndham and Lord Spencer, the representatives of the "old Whigs," who had joined Pitt on the disruption of their party through the French revolution. Such a union, indeed, could hardly have lasted much longer. The terror which had so long held these whigs in their alliance with the tories who formed the bulk of the administration was now at an end; and we have already seen their pressure for a more liberal policy in the action of Lord Fitzwilliam as lord-lieutenant of Ireland. But the ques-

tion of emancipation finally brought about a restoration of the natural position of parties; and from this moment the old whigs, who accepted Lord Grenville as their head, fell into alliance with the more revolutionary whigs who had remained faithful to Fox. The whig party thus became again a powerful element in English politics, while in face of the reunited whigs stood the tories, relieved like themselves from the burden of an alliance which grew hourly more distasteful. The bulk of the old ministry returned in a few days to office with Mr. Addington at their head, and his administration received the support of the whole tory party in parliament.

1584. Without the walls of parliament, however, the nation looked on such a change with dismay. Addington was regarded as a weak and narrow-minded man; and the favor with which the king welcomed him was due to a consciousness of their common bigotry. Of Lord Hawkesbury, who succeeded Lord Grenville in the conduct of foreign affairs, nothing was known outside the house of commons. It was with anxiety that England found itself guided by men like these at a time when every hour brought darker news. The scarcity of bread was mounting to a famine. Taxes were raised anew, and yet the loan for the year amounted to five-and-twenty millions. The country stood utterly alone, while the peace of Lunéville secured France from all hostility on the continent. And it was soon plain that this peace was only the first step to a new policy on the part of the first consul. What he had done was to free his hands for a decisive conflict with

Britain itself, both as a world-power and as a center of wealth. England was at once the carrier of European commerce and the workshop of European manufactures. While her mines, her looms, her steam-engines, were giving her almost a monopoly of industrial production, her merchant-ships sufficed not only to spread her own products through the world, but to carry to every part of it the products of other countries. Though the war had already told on both these sources of wealth, it was far from having told fatally. It had long closed France, indeed, to English exports, while the waste of wealth in so wide a strife had lessened the buying power of Europe at large. But in Europe the loss was to some extent made up for the moment by the artificial demand for supplies which war creates; the home market still sufficed to absorb a vast quantity of manufactures; and America, which was fast growing into the most important of English customers, remained unaffected by the struggle. Industry had thus suffered but little loss, while commerce believed itself to have greatly gained. All rivals save one had in fact been swept from the sea; the carrying-trade of France and Holland alike had been transferred to the British flag, and the conquest of their wealthier settlements had thrown into British hands the whole colonial trade of the world.

1585. To strike at England's wealth had been among the projects of the directory; it was now the dream of the first consul. It was in vain for England to produce, if he shut her out of every market. Her carrying-trade must be annihilated if he closed

every port against her ships. It was this gigantic project of a "continental system" that revealed itself as soon as Bonaparte became finally master of France. From France itself and its dependencies in Holland and the Netherlands English trade was already excluded. But Italy also was shut against her after the peace of Lunéville, and Spain not only closed her own ports but forced Portugal to break with her English ally. In the Baltic Bonaparte was more active than even in the Mediterranean. In a treaty with America, which was destined to bring this power also in the end into his great attack, he had formally recognized the rights of neutral vessels, which England was hourly disputing; and in her disregard of them he not only saw the means of bringing the northern powers into his system of exclusion, but of drawing on their resources for a yet more decisive blow. He was set upon challenging not only England's wealth but her world-empire; and his failure in Egypt had taught him that the first condition of success in such an enterprise was to wrest from her her command of the seas. The only means of doing this lay in a combination of naval powers; and the earlier efforts of France had left but one naval combination for Bonaparte to try. The directory had been able to assail England at sea by the joint action of the French fleet with those of Holland and of Spain. But the Spanish navy had been crippled by the battle of Cape St. Vincent, and the Dutch fleet destroyed in the victory of Camperdown. The only powers which now possessed naval resources were the powers of the north. The fleets

of Denmark, Sweden, and Russia numbered forty sail of the line, and they had been untouched by the strife. Both the Scandinavian states resented the severity with which Britain enforced that right of search which had brought about their armed neutrality at the close of the American war; while Denmark was, besides, an old ally of France, and her sympathies were still believed to be French. The first consul, therefore, had little trouble in enlisting them in a league of neutrals, which was in effect a declaration of war against England, and which Prussia, as before, showed herself ready to join.

1586. Russia, indeed, seemed harder to gain. Since Paul's accession she had been the moving spirit in the confederacy which had only been broken up by the victory of Marengo. But the spirit of revolutionary aggression, which had nominally roused Paul to action, had, as the czar believed, been again hushed by the first consul. Bonaparte had yielded to his remonstrance, in preserving the independence of Naples and Sardinia; and with Italian subtlety he now turned the faith in French moderation which these concessions created in the mind of Paul into a dread of the ambition of England and a jealousy of her sovereignty of the seas. But his efforts would have been in vain had they not fallen in with the general current of Russian policy. From the first outbreak of the revolutionary struggle, Russia, as we have seen, had taken advantage of the strife among the western nations to push forward her own projects in the East. Catharine had aimed at absorbing Poland, and at becoming the mistress of European

Turkey. In the first she had been successful, but the second still remained unaccomplished when her empire passed to her son. For a time Paul had been diverted from the task by the turn of affairs in western Europe, where the victories of the French republic threatened an utter overthrow of the powers opposed to it, which would have foiled the plans of Russia by bringing about a European union that must have paralyzed her advance. The czar, therefore, acted strictly in the spirit of Catharine's policy when he stepped in again to feed the strife by raising the combatants to a new equality, and when he withdrew his armies at the very moment that this was done. But, successful as his diversion had been, Paul saw that one obstacle remained in the way of his projects upon Turkey. Pitt had never hidden his opposition to the Russian plans. His whole policy at the outbreak of the revolution had been guided by a desperate hope of binding the powers again together to prevent the ruin of Poland, or of hindering it by a league of England and France alone. Foiled as he had been in these efforts, he was even more resolute to check the advance of Russia on Constantinople. Already her growing empire in India was telling on the European policy of England, and the security of Egypt, of Syria, of Turkey at large, was getting deemed to be essential to the maintenance of her communication with her great dependency. The French descent on Egypt, the attack on Syria, had bound Britain and Turkey together; and Paul saw that an attack on the one would bring him a fresh opponent in the other.

1587. It was to check the action of Britain in the East that the czar now turned to the French consul, and seconded his efforts for the formation of a naval confederacy in the north, while his minister, Rostopchin, planned a division of the Turkish empire in Europe between Russia and her allies. Austria was to be satisfied with the western provinces of the Balkan peninsula; Russia gained Moldavia, Bulgaria, and Roumelia as far as Constantinople; while Greece fell to the lot of France, whose troops were already on the Italian shores, at a day's sail from the Illyrian coast. A squabble over Malta, which had been blockaded since its capture by Bonaparte, and which surrendered at last to a British fleet, but whose possession the czar claimed as his own on the ground of an alleged election as grand master of the order of St. John, served as a pretext for a quarrel with England; and, at the close of 1800, Paul openly prepared for hostilities. In October he announced an armed neutrality; in December he seized 300 English vessels in his ports, and sequestered all English goods found in his empire. The Danes, who throughout the year had been struggling to evade the British right of search, at once joined this neutral league, and were followed by Sweden in their course. It was plain that, as soon as the spring of 1801 opened the Baltic, the fleets of the three powers would act in practical union with those of France and Spain. But the command of the seas which such a union threatened was a matter for England of life and death, for at this very moment the peace of Lunéville left Bonaparte without a foe on the continent, and able to deal as he

would with the whole military resources of France. Once master of the channel, he could throw a force on the southern coast of England which she had no means of meeting in the field. But, dexterous as the combination was, it was shattered at a blow. On the 1st of April, 1801, a British fleet of eighteen men-of-war forced the passage of the Belt, appeared before Copenhagen, and at once attacked the city and its fleet. In spite of a brave resistance from the Danish batteries and gun-boats, six Danish ships were taken, and the crown-prince was forced to conclude an armistice which enabled the English ships to enter the Baltic, where the Russian fleet was still detained by the ice. But their work was really over. The seizure of English goods and the declaration of war had bitterly irritated the Russian nobles, whose sole outlet for the sale of the produce of their vast estates was thus closed to them; and on the 24th of March, nine days before the battle of Copenhagen, Paul fell in a midnight attack by conspirators in his own palace. With Paul fell the confederacy of the north. The policy of his successor—the Czar Alexander—was far more in unison with the general feeling of his subjects. In June, a convention between England and Russia settled the vexed questions of the right of search and contraband of war, and this convention was accepted by Sweden and Denmark.

1588. The first consul's disappointment was keen; but he saw clearly that with this dissolution of the northern alliance the war came virtually to an end. He no longer had any means of attacking Britain save by the efforts of France itself, and, even with

the aid of Holland and Spain, France was at this moment helpless before the supremacy of England at sea. On the other hand, the continuance of the struggle would give triumph after triumph to his foes. One such blow had already fallen. Even in the midst of his immense schemes against Britain at home, Bonaparte had not abandoned the hope of attacking her in India. Egypt was needful to such a scheme; and from the first moment of his power he strained every nerve to retain Egypt in the hands of France. Menou, who commanded there, was ordered to hold the country; an expedition was fitted out in the Spanish ports for its relief, and light vessels were hurried from the Italian coast with arms and supplies. But at the very moment of the attack on Copenhagen, a stroke as effective wrecked his projects in the East. England had not forgotten the danger to her dependency. Ever since Bonaparte's expedition her fleet had blockaded Malta, the island-fortress, whose possession gave France a first stepping-stone in any enterprise against it; and the surrender of Malta left her unquestioned mistress of the Mediterranean. From Malta she now turned to Egypt itself. Triumphant as England had been at sea since the opening of the war, her soldiers had proved no match for the French on land. Two expeditions had been sent against Holland, and each had ended in a disastrous retreat. But at this moment England re-appeared as a military power. In March, 1801, a force of 15,000 men under General Abercromby anchored in Aboukir bay. Deserted as they were by Bonaparte, the French had firmly

maintained their hold on Egypt. They had suppressed a revolt at Cairo, driven back Turkish invaders in a fresh victory, and by native levies and re-enforcements raised the number of their troops to 30,000 men. But their army was foolishly scattered, and Abercromby was able to force a landing five days after his arrival on the coast. The French, however, rapidly concentrated; and on the 21st of March their general attacked the English army on the ground it had won with a force equal to its own. The battle was a stubborn one, and Abercromby fell mortally wounded ere its close; but, after six hours' fighting, the French drew off with heavy loss; and their retreat was followed by the investment of Alexandria and Cairo, into which Menou had drawn his army. All hope, however, was over. Five thousand Turks, with a fresh division from England and India, re-enforced the besiegers; and, at the close of June, the capitulation of the 13,000 soldiers who remained closed the French rule over Egypt.

1589. Bitter as was the anger with which the first consul received the news of this surrender, it only strengthened his resolve to suspend a war of which Britain only could now reap the fruits, and whose continuance might, in the present temper of Russia and its czar, disturb that peace of the continent on which all his plans against England rested. It was to give time for such an organization of France and its resources as might enable him to re-open the struggle with other chances of success that the first consul opened negotiations for peace at the close of 1801. His offers were at once met by the English

government. In the actual settlement of the continent, indeed, England saw only an imperfect balance to the power of France; but it had no means of disputing the settlement, as France had no means of disturbing its supremacy at sea. If Bonaparte wished to husband his resources for a new attack, all but the wilder Tories were willing to husband the resources of England for the more favorable opportunity of renewing it which would come with a revival of European energy. With such a temper on both sides, the conclusion of peace became easy; and the negotiations which went on through the winter between England and the three allied powers of France, Spain, and the Dutch brought about in March, 1802, the peace of Amiens. The terms of the peace were necessarily simple; for as England had no claim to interfere with the settlement of the continent, which had been brought about by the treaties of its powers with the French republic, all that remained for her was to provide that the settlement should be a substantial one by a pledge on the part of France to withdraw its forces from southern Italy, and to leave to themselves the republics it had set up along its border in Holland, Switzerland, and Piedmont. In exchange for this pledge England recognized the French government, restored all the colonies which they had lost (save Ceylon and Trinidad) to France and its allies, acknowledged the Ionian islands as a free republic, and engaged to restore Malta within three months to its old masters, the knights of St. John.

1590. There was a general sense of relief at the

close of so long a struggle; and for a moment the bitter hatred which England had cherished against France seemed to give place to more friendly feelings. The new French ambassador was drawn in triumph on his arrival through the streets of London; and thousands of Englishmen crossed the channel to visit a country which had conquered the world, and to gaze on the young general who, after wonderful victories, had given a yet more wonderful peace to Europe. But amid all the glare of success, shrewd observers saw the dangers that lay in the temper of the first consul. Whatever had been the errors of the French revolutionists, even their worst attacks on the independence of the nations around them had been veiled by a vague notion of freeing the peoples whom they invaded from the yoke of their rulers. But the aim of Bonaparte was simply that of a vulgar conqueror. He was resolute to be master of the western world, and no notions of popular freedom or sense of national right interfered with his resolve. The means at his command for carrying out such a design were immense. The political life of the revolution had been cut short by his military despotism; but the new social vigor which the revolution had given to France through the abolition of privileges and the creation of a new middle class on the ruins of the clergy and the nobles still lived on; and while the dissensions which tore the country asunder were hushed by the policy of the first consul, by his restoration of the church as a religious power, his recall of the exiles, and the economy and wise administration that dis-

tinguished his rule, the centralized system of government that had been bequeathed by the monarchy to the revolution and by the revolution to Bonaparte enabled him easily to seize this national vigor for the profit of his own despotism. On the other hand, the exhaustion of the brilliant hopes raised by the revolution, the craving for public order, the military enthusiasm, and the impulse of a new glory given by the wonderful victories France had won, made a tyranny possible; and in the hands of Bonaparte this tyranny was supported by a secret police, by the suppression of the press and of all freedom of opinion, and, above all, by the iron will and immense ability of the first consul himself.

1591. Once chosen consul for life, he felt himself secure at home, and turned restlessly to the work of outer aggression. The pledges given at Amiens were set aside. The republics established on the borders of France were brought into mere dependence on his will. Piedmont and Parma were actually annexed to France; and a French army occupied Switzerland. The temperate protests of the English government were answered by demands for the expulsion of the French exiles who had been living in England ever since the revolution, and for its surrender of Malta, which was retained till some security could be devised against a fresh seizure of the island by the French fleet. Meanwhile, huge armaments were preparing in the French ports; and a new activity was seen in those of Spain. Not for a moment, indeed, had Bonaparte relinquished his design of attacking Britain. He had made peace because

peace would serve his purpose, both in strengthening the tranquillity of the continent, which was essential to his success in any campaign across the channel, and in giving him time to replace by a new combination the maritime schemes which had broken down. Beaten as it had been, the Spanish fleet was still powerful; and a union with the French fleet, which the first consul was forming, might still enable it to dispute the command of the sea. All that he wished for was time; and time was what the peace gave him. But delay was as dangerous to England, now that it discerned his plans, as it was profitable to France; and in May, 1803, the British government anticipated his attack by a declaration of war.

1592. The breach only quickened Bonaparte's resolve to attack his enemy at home. The difficulties in his way he set contemptuously aside. "Fifteen millions of people," he said, in allusion to the disproportion between the population of England and France, "must give way to forty millions;" and the invasion was planned on a gigantic scale. A camp of 100,000 men was formed at Boulogne, and a host of flat-bottomed boats gathered for their conveyance across the channel. The peril of the nation forced Addington from office and recalled Pitt to power. His health was broken, and as the days went by, his appearance became so haggard and depressed that it was plain death was drawing near. But dying as he really was, the nation clung to him with all its old faith. He was still the representative of national union; and he proposed to include Fox and the leading

whigs in his new ministry, but he was foiled by the bigotry of the king; and the refusal of Lord Grenville and of Wyndham to take office without Fox, as well as the loss of his post at a later time by his ablest supporter, Dundas, left him almost alone. But lonely as he was, he faced difficulty and danger with the same courage as of old. The invasion seemed imminent when Bonaparte, who now assumed the title of the Emperor Napoleon, appeared in the camp at Boulogne. A slight experience, however, showed him the futility of his scheme for crossing the channel in open boats in the teeth of English men-of-war; and he turned to fresh plans of securing its passage. "Let us be masters of the channel for six hours," he is reported to have said, "and we are masters of the world." A skillfully combined plan, by which the British fleet would have been divided while the whole French navy was concentrated in the channel, was delayed by the death of the admiral destined to execute it. But the alliance with Spain placed the Spanish fleet at Napoleon's disposal, and in 1805 he planned its union with that of France, the crushing of the squadron which blocked the ports of the channel before the English ships which were watching the Spanish armament could come to its support, and a crossing of the vast armament thus protected to the English shore.

1593. Though 300,000 volunteers mustered in England to meet the coming attack, such a force would have offered but small hindrance to the veterans of the grand army had they once crossed the channel.

But Pitt had already found them work elsewhere. It was not merely the danger of Britain, and the sense that without this counterpoise they would be helpless before the new French empire, that roused the alarm of the continental powers. They had been scared by Napoleon's course of aggression since the settlement at Lunéville, and his annexation of Genoa brought their alarm to a head. Pitt's offer of subsidies removed the last obstacle in the way of a league; and Russia, Austria, and Sweden joined in an alliance to wrest Italy and the Low Countries from the grasp of the French emperor. Napoleon, meanwhile, swept the sea in vain for a glimpse of the great armament, whose assembly in the channel he had so skillfully planned. Admiral Villeneuve, uniting the Spanish ships with his own squadron from Toulon, drew Nelson in pursuit to the West Indies, and then, suddenly returning to Cadiz, hastened to form a junction with the French squadron at Brest and to crush the English fleet in the channel. But a headlong pursuit brought Nelson up with him ere the maneuver was complete, and the two fleets met on the 21st of October, 1805, off Cape Trafalgar. "England," ran Nelson's famous signal, "expects every man to do his duty;" and though he fell himself in the hour of victory, twenty French sail had struck their flag ere the day was done. The French and Spanish navies were, in fact, annihilated. From this hour the supremacy of England at sea remained unquestioned, and the danger of any invasion of England rolled away like a dream.

1594. Her allies were less fortunate. "England

has saved herself by her courage," Pitt said in what were destined to be his last public words; "she will save Europe by her example!" But even before the victory of Trafalgar, Napoleon had abandoned the dream of invading England to meet the coalition in his rear; and swinging round his forces on the Danube, he forced an Austrian army to capitulation in Ulm three days before his naval defeat. From Ulm he marched on Vienna, and at the close of November he crushed the combined armies of Austria and Russia in the battle of Austerlitz. "Austerlitz," Wilberforce wrote in his diary, "killed Pitt." Though he was still but forty-seven, the hollow voice and wasted frame of the great minister had long told that death was near; and the blow to his hopes proved fatal. "Roll up that map," he said, pointing to a map of Europe which hung upon the wall; "it will not be wanted these ten years!" Once only he rallied from stupor, and those who bent over him caught a faint murmur of, "My country! How I leave my country!" On the 23d of January, 1806, he breathed his last; and was laid in Westminster Abbey in the grave of Chatham. "What grave," exclaimed Lord Wellesley, "contains such a father and such a son? What sepulcher embosoms the remains of so much human excellence and glory?" So great was felt to be the loss that nothing but the union of parties, which Pitt had in vain desired during his lifetime, could fill up the gap left by his death. In the new ministry, Fox, with the small body of popular whigs who were bent on peace and internal reform, united with the

aristocratic whigs under Lord Grenville and with the tories under Lord Sidmouth. All home questions, in fact, were subordinated to the need of saving Europe from the ambition of France, and in the resolve to save Europe Fox was as resolute as Pitt himself. His hopes of peace, indeed, were stronger; but they were foiled by the evasive answer which Napoleon gave to his overtures, and by a new war which he undertook against Prussia, the one power which seemed able to resist his arms. On the 14th of October, 1806, a decisive victory at Jena laid North Germany at the emperor's feet. From Berlin Napoleon marched into the heart of Poland to bring to terms the last opponent now left him on the continent; and though checked in the winter by the stubborn defense of the Russian forces on the field of Eylau, in the summer of 1807 a decisive victory at Friedland brought the czar to consent to the peace of Tilsit.

1595. The peace of Tilsit marked an overthrow for the time of that European settlement and balance of power which had been established five years before by the peace of Lunéville. The change in his policy had been to a great extent forced on Napoleon; for the league of 1805 had shown that his plan of such a continental peace as would suffer him to concentrate his whole strength on an invasion of Britain was certain to be foiled by the fears of the continental states; and that an unquestioned supremacy over Europe was a first condition in the struggle with his great rival. Even with such a supremacy, indeed, his plans for a descent on Britain itself, or for win-

ning the command of the sea, which was the necessary preliminary to such a descent, still remained impracticable. The battle of Trafalgar had settled the question of an invasion of England; and a thousand victories on land would not make him master, even for "six hours," of the "silver streak" of sea that barred his path. But Napoleon was far from abandoning his struggle against Britain; on the contrary, he saw in his mastery of Europe the means of giving fresh force and effectiveness to his attack in a quarter where his foe was still vulnerable. It was her wealth that had raised up that European coalition against him which had forced him to break up his camp at Boulogne; and in his mastery of Europe he saw the means of striking at her wealth. His earlier attempt at the enforcement of a "continental system" had broken down with the failure of the northern league; but he now saw a yet more effective means of realizing his dream. It was this gigantic project which revealed itself as soon as Jena had laid Prussia at his feet. Napoleon was able to find a pretext for his new attack in England's own action. By a violent stretch of her rights as a combatant she had declared the whole coast occupied by France and its allies, from Dantzic to Triest, to be in a state of blockade. It was impossible to enforce such an order as this, even with the immense force at her disposal; but it was ostensibly to meet this "paper blockade" that Napoleon issued from Berlin on the 21st of November, 1806, a decree which—without a single ship to carry it out—placed the British islands in a state of blockade. All commerce or communi-

cation with them was prohibited; all English goods or manufactures found in the territory of France or its allies were declared liable to confiscation; and their harbors were closed not only against vessels coming from Britain, but against all who had touched at her ports. An army of inspectors spread along the coasts to carry out this decree.

1596. But it was almost impossible to enforce such a system. It was foiled by the rise of a wide-spread contraband trade, by the reluctance of Holland to aid in its own ruin, by the connivance of officials along the Prussian and Russian shores, and by the pressure of facts. It was impossible even for Napoleon himself to do without the goods he pretended to exclude; an immense system of licenses soon neutralized his decree; and the French army which marched to Eylau was clad in great coats made at Leeds, and shod with shoes made at Northampton. Vexatious, therefore, as the system might be at once to England and to Europe, it told on British industry mainly by heightening the price of its products, and so far by restricting the market for them. But it told far more fatally on British commerce. Trade at once began to move from English vessels, which were subject to instant confiscation, and to shelter itself under neutral flags, where goods had at least to be proved to be British before they could be seized, America profited most by this transfer. She was now entering on that commercial career which was to make her England's chief trading rival; and she rapidly availed herself of the Berlin decree to widen her carrying-trade. But the British government at once

felt the pressure of the merchant class. As yet, this class had profited above all others by the war and by the monopoly which war placed in its hands; and now that not only its monopoly but its very existence was threatened, it called on the government to protect it. It was to this appeal that the administration of Lord Grenville replied in January, 1807, by an order in council which declared all the ports of the coast of France and her allies under blockade, and any neutral vessels trading between them to be good prize.

1597. Such a step, however, though it arbitrarily shut neutral vessels out from the coasting trade of most of Europe, was far from satisfying the British merchants, for it left the whole trade between Europe and other countries, which virtually included the colonial trade, untouched; and this passed as of old into American bottoms. But their appeal was no longer to Lord Grenville. The work which his ministry had set itself to do was to continue the double work of Pitt—his resolute maintenance of English greatness, and his endeavor to carry on, even amid the stress of the fight, that course of philanthropic and political progress which was struggling back into renewed vigor after its long arrest through the French revolution. But the forces of ignorance and bigotry, which had been too strong for Pitt, were too strong for the Grenville ministry, weakened as it was by the death of Fox at the close of the previous year. Its greatest work, the abolition of the slave-trade, in February, 1807, was done in the teeth of a vigorous opposition from the tories

and the merchants of Liverpool; and in March the first indication of its desire to open the question of religious equality by allowing Catholic officers to serve in the army was met on the part of the king by the demand of a pledge not to meddle with the question. On the refusal of this pledge the ministry was dismissed. Its fall was the final close of that union of parties in face of the war with France which had brought about the junction of the bulk of the whig party with the tories, and which had been to some extent renewed after the temporary breach in Pitt's last ministry by the junction of Lord Sidmouth and a large body of the tories with the whigs. The union had been based on the actual peril to England's existence, and on the suspension of all home questions in face of the peril. But with the break-up of the camp at Boulogne and the victory of Trafalgar, the peril of invasion had disappeared. England again broke into the party that called for progress and the party that resisted it.

1598. The last was still the stronger; for in the mass of the nation progress was still confounded with the destruction of institutions, the passion for war absorbed public attention, and the tories showed themselves most in earnest in the prosecution of the war. From this time, therefore, to the end of the war England was wholly governed by the tories. The nominal head of the ministry which succeeded that of Lord Grenville was the Duke of Portland; its guiding spirit was the foreign secretary, George Canning, a young and devoted adherent of Pitt, whose brilliant rhetoric gave him power over the house of

commons, while the vigor and breadth of his mind gave a new energy and color to the war. At no time had opposition to Napoleon seemed so hopeless as at the moment of his entry into power. From foes the two emperors of western and eastern Europe had become friends, and the hope of French aid in the conquest of Turkey drew Alexander to a close alliance with Napoleon. Russia not only enforced the Berlin decrees against British commerce, but forced Sweden, the one ally that England still retained on the continent, to renounce her alliance. The Russian and Swedish fleets were thus placed at the service of France; and the two emperors counted on securing in addition the fleet of Denmark, and again threatening by this union the maritime supremacy which formed England's real defense. The hope was foiled by the decision of the new ministers. In July, 1807, an expedition was promptly and secretly equipped by Canning, with a demand for the surrender of the Danish fleet into the hands of England, on pledge of its return at the close of the war. On the refusal of the Danes, the demand was enforced by a bombardment of Copenhagen; and the whole Danish fleet, with a vast mass of naval stores, was carried into British ports. It was in the same spirit of almost reckless decision that Canning turned to meet Napoleon's continental system. The cry of the British merchant fell upon willing ears. Of trade or the laws of trade Canning was utterly ignorant; nor could he see that the interests of the country were not necessarily the interests of a class; but he was resolute at any cost to hinder the transfer of

commerce to neutral flags; and he saw in the crisis a means of forcing the one great neutral power, America, to join Britain in her strife with France. In November, 1807, therefore, he issued fresh orders in council. By these, France, and every continental state from which the British flag was excluded, was put in a state of blockade, and all vessels bound for their harbors were held subject to seizure unless they had touched at a British port. The orders were at once met by another decree of Napoleon's issued at Milan, in December, which declared every vessel, of whatever nation, coming from or bound to Britain or any British colony, to have forfeited its character as a neutral, and to be liable to seizure.

1599. The policy of Napoleon was at any rate a consistent one in these measures, for his sole aim was to annihilate the industry as well as the commerce of Britain; and he had little to fear from the indignation of America. But the aim of Britain was to find outlets for her manufactures: and of these outlets America was now far the most important. She took, in fact, 10,000,000 of our exports every year, not only for her own consumption, but for the illicit trade which she managed to carry on with the continent. To close such an outlet as this was to play into Napoleon's hands. And yet the first result of Canning's policy was to close it. In the long strife between France and England, America had already borne much from both combatants, but above all from Britain. Not only had the English government exercised its right of search, but it asserted a right of seizing English seamen found in Ameri-

can vessels; and as there were few means of discriminating between English seamen and American, the sailor of Maine or Massachusetts was often impressed to serve in the British fleet. Galled, however, as was America by outrages such as these, she was hindered from resenting them by her strong disinclination to war, as well as by the profit which she drew from the maintenance of her neutral position; and she believed, in the words of Jefferson, that "it will ever be in our power to keep so even a stand between France and England as to inspire a wish in neither to throw us into the scale of his adversary." But the orders in council and the Milan decree forced her into action, and she at once answered them by an embargo of trade with Europe.

1600. Such a step was a menace of further action, for it was plain that America could not long remain in utter isolation, and that if she left it she must join one combatant or the other. But she had as yet shown no military power outside her own bounds, either by land or sea; and England looked with scorn on the threats of a state which possessed neither army nor fleet. "America," Lord Sidmouth wrote at this time, "is a bugbear; there is no terror in her threats!" Canning, indeed, saw in the embargo only a carrying out of his policy by the very machinery of the American government. The commerce of America ceased to exist. Her seamen were driven to seek employment under the British flag; and Britain again absorbed the carrying-trade of the world. But what he really looked forward to was something far beyond this. He saw that the

embargo was but a temporary expedient; and he believed that its failure would force the United States into union with England in her war with France. Nothing shows the world-wide nature of the struggle more than such a policy as this; but for a while it seemed justified by its results. After a year's trial America found it impossible to maintain the embargo; and at the opening of 1809 she exchanged it for an act of non-intercourse with France and England alone. But this act was as ineffective as the embargo. The American government was utterly without means of enforcing it on its land frontier, and it had small means of enforcing it at sea. Throughout 1809, indeed, vessels sailed daily for British ports. The act was thus effective against France alone, and part of Canning's end was gained. At last the very protest which it embodied was given up, and in May, 1810, the non-intercourse act was repealed altogether. All that America persisted in maintaining was an offer that if either power would repeal its edicts, it would prohibit American commerce with the other.

1601. What the results of this offer were to be we shall see hereafter. But at the moment the attitude of America was one of utter submission; and the effect of the continental system on Britain had thus been to drive it to a policy of aggression upon neutral states, which seemed to be as successful as it was aggressive. The effect of his system on Napoleon himself was precisely the same. It was to maintain this material union of Europe against Britain that he was driven to aggression after aggression in North Germany, and to demands upon Russia which threatened

the league that had been formed at Tilsit. Above all, it was the hope of more effectually crushing the world-power of Britain that drove him, at the very moment when Canning was attacking America, to his worst aggression, the aggression upon Spain. Spain was already his subservient ally; but her alliance became every hour less useful. The country was ruined by misgovernment; its treasury was empty, its fleet rotted in its harbors. To seize the whole Spanish peninsula, to develop its resources by an active administration, to have at his command not only a regenerated Spain and Portugal, but their mighty dominions in Southern and Central America, to renew with these fresh forces the struggle with Britain for her empire of the seas, these were the designs by which Napoleon was driven to the most ruthless of his enterprises. He acted with his usual subtlety. In October, 1807, France and Spain agreed to divide Portugal between them; and on the advance of their forces the reigning house of Braganza fled helplessly from Lisbon to a refuge in Brazil. But the seizure of Portugal was only a prelude to the seizure of Spain. Charles the Fourth, whom a riot in his capital drove at this moment to abdication, and his son and successor, Ferdinand the Seventh, were alike drawn to Bayonne, in May, 1808, and forced to resign their claims to the Spanish crown; while a French army entered Madrid, and proclaimed Joseph Bonaparte as king of Spain.

1602. High-handed as such an act was, it was in harmony with the general system which Napoleon was pursuing elsewhere, and which had, as yet,

stirred no national resistance. Holland had been changed into a monarchy by a simple decree of the French emperor, and its crown bestowed on his brother Louis. For another brother, Jerome, a kingdom of Westphalia had been built up out of the electorates of Hesse Cassel and Hanover. Joseph himself had been set as king over Naples before his transfer to Spain. But the spell of submission was now suddenly broken, and the new king had hardly entered Madrid when Spain rose as one man against the stranger. Desperate as the effort of its people seemed, the news of the rising was welcomed throughout England with a burst of enthusiastic joy. "Hitherto," cried Sheridan, a leader of the whig opposition, "Bonaparte has contended with princes without dignity, numbers without ardor, or peoples without patriotism. He has yet to learn what it is to combat a people who are animated by one spirit against him." Tory and whig alike held that "never had so happy an opportunity existed for Britain to strike a bold stroke for the rescue of the world;" and Canning at once resolved to change the system of desultory descents on colonies and sugar islands for a vigorous warfare in the peninsula. Supplies were sent to the Spanish insurgents with reckless profusion, and two small armies placed under the command of Sir John Moore and Sir Arthur Wellesley for service in the peninsula. In July, 1808, the surrender at Baylen of a French force which had invaded Andalusia gave the first shock to the power of Napoleon, and the blow was followed by one almost as severe. Landing at the Mondego

with 15,000 men, Sir Arthur Wellesley drove the French army of Portugal from the field of Vimiera, and forced it to surrender in the convention of Cintra on the 30th of August. But the tide of success was soon roughly turned. Napoleon appeared in Spain with an army of 200,000 men; and Moore, who had advanced from Lisbon to Salamanca to support the Spanish armies, found them crushed on the Ebro, and was driven to fall hastily back on the coast. His force saved its honor in a battle before Corunna on the 16th of January, 1809, which enabled it to embark in safety; but elsewhere all seemed lost. The whole of northern and central Spain was held by the French armies; and even Saragossa, which had once heroically repulsed them, submitted after a second equally desperate resistance.

1603. The landing of the wreck of Moore's army and the news of the Spanish defeats turned the temper of England from the wildest hope to the deepest despair; but Canning remained unmoved. On the day of the evacuation of Corunna he signed a treaty of alliance with the junta which governed Spain in the absence of its king; and the English force at Lisbon, which had already prepared to leave Portugal, was re-enforced with 13,000 fresh troops and placed under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley. "Portugal," Wellesley wrote coolly, "may be defended against any force which the French can bring against it." At this critical moment the best of the French troops with the emperor himself were drawn from the peninsula to the Danube; for the Spanish rising had

roused Austria as well as England to a renewal of the struggle. When Marshal Soult, therefore, threatened Lisbon from the north, Wellesley marched boldly against him, drove him from Oporto in a disastrous retreat, and, suddenly changing his line of operations, pushed with 20,000 men by Abrantes on Madrid. He was joined on the march by a Spanish force of 30,000 men; and a bloody action with a French army of equal force at Talavera in July, 1809, restored the renown of English arms. The losses on both sides were enormous, and the French fell back at the close of the struggle; but the fruits of the victory were lost by a sudden appearance of Soult on the English line of advance. Wellesley was forced to retreat hastily on Badajos, and his failure was embittered by heavier disasters elsewhere; for Austria was driven to sue for peace by a decisive victory of Napoleon at Wagram, while a force of 40,000 English soldiers which had been dispatched against Antwerp in July returned home baffled after losing half its numbers in the marshes of Walcheren.

1604. The failure at Walcheren brought about the fall of the Portland ministry. Canning attributed this disaster to the incompetence of Lord Castlereagh, an Irish peer, who, after taking the chief part in bringing about the union between England and Ireland, had been raised by the Duke of Portland to the post of secretary of war; and the quarrel between the two ministers ended in a duel and in their resignation of their offices in September, 1809. The Duke of Portland retired with Canning; and a new

ministry was formed out of the more tory members of the late administration under the guidance of Spencer Perceval, an industrious mediocrity of the narrowest type; while the Marquis of Wellesley, a brother of the English general in Spain, succeeded Canning as foreign secretary. But if Perceval and his colleagues possessed few of the higher qualities of statesmanship, they had one characteristic which in the actual position of English affairs was beyond all price. They were resolute to continue the war. In the nation at large the fit of enthusiasm had been followed by a fit of despair; and the city of London even petitioned for a withdrawal of the English forces from the peninsula. Napoleon seemed irresistible, and now that Austria was crushed and England stood alone in opposition to him, the emperor determined to put an end to the strife by a vigorous prosecution of the war in Spain. Andalusia, the one province which remained independent, was invaded in the opening of 1810, and, with the exception of Cadiz, reduced to submission; while Marshal Massena with a fine army of 80,000 men marched upon Lisbon. Even Perceval abandoned all hope of preserving a hold on the peninsula in face of these new efforts, and threw on Wellesley, who had been raised to the peerage as Lord Wellington after Talavera, the responsibility of resolving to remain there.

1605. But the cool judgment and firm temper which distinguished Wellington enabled him to face a responsibility from which weaker men would have shrunk. "I conceive," he answered, "that the honor and interest of our country require that we

should hold our ground here as long as possible; and, please God, I will maintain it as long as I can." By the addition of Portuguese troops who had been trained under British officers, his army was now raised to 50,000 men; and though his inferiority in force compelled him to look on while Massena reduced the frontier fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, he inflicted on him a heavy check at the heights of Busaco, and finally fell back in October, 1810, on three lines of defense which he had secretly constructed at Torres Vedras, along a chain of mountain heights crowned with redoubts and bristling with cannon. The position was impregnable; and able and stubborn as Massena was he found himself forced, after a month's fruitless efforts, to fall back in a masterly retreat; but so terrible were the privations of the French army in passing again through the wasted country that it was only with 40,000 men that he reached Ciudad Rodrigo in the spring of 1811. Re-enforced by fresh troops, Massena turned fiercely to the relief of Almeida, which Wellington had besieged. Two days' bloody and obstinate fighting, however, in May, 1811, failed to drive the English army from its position at Fuentes d'Onore, and the Marshal fell back on Salamanca and relinquished his effort to drive Wellington from Portugal. But great as was the effect of Torres Vedras in restoring the spirit of the English people, and in reviving throughout Europe the hope of resistance to the tyranny of Napoleon, its immediate result was little save the deliverance of Portugal. If Massena had failed, his colleagues had succeeded in their enter-

prises; the French were now masters of all Spain save Cadiz and the eastern provinces, and even the east coast was reduced in 1811 by the vigor of General Suchet.

1606. While England thus failed to rescue Spain from the aggression of Napoleon, she was suddenly brought face to face with the result of her own aggression in America. The repeal of the non-intercourse act in 1810 had, in effect, been a triumph for Britain; but the triumph forced Napoleon's hand. As yet all he had done by his attack on neutral rights had been to drive the United States practically to join England against him. To revenge himself by war with them would only play England's game yet more; and with characteristic rapidity Napoleon passed from hostility to friendship. He seized on the offer with which America had closed her efforts against the two combatants, and after promising to revoke his Berlin and Milan decrees he called on America to redeem her pledge. In February, 1811, therefore, the United States announced that all intercourse with Great Britain and her dependencies was at an end. The effect of this step was seen in a reduction of English exports during this year by a third of their whole amount. It was in vain that Britain pleaded that the emperor's promises remained unfulfilled, that neither of the decrees was withdrawn, that Napoleon had failed to return the American merchandise seized under them, and that the enforcement of non-intercourse with England was thus an unjust act and an act of hostility. The pressure of the American policy, as well as news of the

warlike temper which had at last grown up in the United States, made submission inevitable; for the industrial state of England was now so critical that to expose it to fresh shocks was to court the very ruin which Napoleon had planned.

1607. During the earlier years of the war, indeed, the increase of wealth had been enormous. England was sole mistress of the seas. The war gave her possession of the colonies of Spain, of Holland, and of France; and if her trade was checked for a time by the Berlin decree, the efforts of Napoleon were soon rendered fruitless by the smuggling system which sprang up along the southern coasts and the coast of North Germany. English exports, indeed, had nearly doubled, since the opening of the century. Manufactures were profiting by the discoveries of Watt and Arkwright; and the consumption of raw cotton in the mills of Lancashire rose during the same year from fifty to a hundred millions of pounds. The vast accumulation of capital, as well as the vast increase of the population at this time, told upon the land, and forced agriculture into a feverish and unhealthy prosperity. Wheat rose to famine prices, and the value of land rose in proportion with the price of wheat. Inclosures went on with prodigious rapidity; the income of every land-owner was doubled, while the farmers were able to introduce improvements into the processes of agriculture which changed the whole face of the country. But if the increase of wealth was enormous, its distribution was partial. During the fifteen years which preceded Waterloo, the number of the

population rose from ten to thirteen millions, and this rapid increase kept down the rate of wages, which would naturally have advanced in a corresponding degree with the increase in the national wealth. Even manufactures, though destined in the long-run to benefit the laboring classes, seemed at first rather to depress them; for one of the earliest results of the introduction of machinery was the ruin of a number of small trades which were carried on at home, and the pauperization of families who relied on them for support. In the winter of 1811 the terrible pressure of this transition from handicraft to machinery was seen in the Luddite, or machine-breaking, riots which broke out over the northern and midland counties; and which were only suppressed by military force. While labor was thus thrown out of its older grooves, and the rate of wages kept down at an artificially low figure by the rapid increase of population, the rise in the price of wheat, which brought wealth to the land-owner and the farmer, brought famine and death to the poor, for England was cut off by the war from the vast corn-fields of the continent or of America, which nowadays redress from their abundance the results of a bad harvest. Scarcity was followed by a terrible pauperization of the laboring classes. The amount of the poor-rate rose fifty per cent, and with the increase of poverty followed its inevitable result, the increase of crime.

1608. The national relation of trade and commerce to the general wealth of the people at large was thus disturbed by the peculiar circumstances of the time.

The war enriched the land-owner, the farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer; but it impoverished the poor. It is, indeed, from these fatal years that we must date that war of classes, that social severance between employers and employed, which still forms the main difficulty of English politics. But it is from these, too, that we must date the renewal of that progressive movement in politics which had been suspended since the opening of the war. The publication of the *Edinburgh Review*, in 1802, by a knot of young lawyers at Edinburgh, marked a revival of the policy of constitutional and administrative progress which had been reluctantly abandoned by William Pitt. Jeremy Bentham gave a new vigor to political speculation by his advocacy of the doctrine of utility, and his definition of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" as the aim of political action. In 1809 Sir Francis Burdett revived the question of parliamentary reform. Only fifteen members supported his motion; and a reference to the house of commons, in a pamphlet which he subsequently published, as "a part of our fellow-subjects collected together by means which it is not necessary to describe," was met by his committal to the Tower, where he remained till the prorogating of the parliament. A far greater effect was produced by the perseverance with which Canning pressed year by year the question of Catholic emancipation. So long as Perceval lived, both efforts at reform were equally vain; but the advancing strength of a more liberal sentiment in the nation was felt by the policy of "moderate concession" which was adopted

by his successors. Catholic emancipation became an open question in the cabinet itself, and was adopted in 1812 by a triumphant majority in the house of commons, though it was still rejected by the lords.

1609. With social and political troubles thus awakening anew to life about them, even tory statesmen were not willing to face the terrible consequences of a ruin of English industry such as might follow from the junction of America with Napoleon. They were, in fact, preparing to withdraw the orders in council, when their plans were arrested by the dissolution of the Perceval ministry. Its position had from the first been a weak one. A return of the king's madness made it necessary in the beginning of 1811 to confer the regency on the Prince of Wales; and the whig sympathies of the prince threatened for a while the cabinet with dismissal. Though this difficulty was surmounted, their hold of power remained insecure, and the insecurity of the ministry told on the conduct of the war; for the apparent inactivity of Wellington during 1811 was really due to the hesitation and timidity of the cabinet at home. But in May, 1812, the assassination of Perceval by a madman named Bellingham brought about the dissolution of his ministry; and fresh efforts were made by the regent to install the whigs in office. Mutual distrust, however, again foiled his attempts; and the old ministry returned to office under the headship of Lord Liverpool, a man of no great abilities, but temperate, well-informed, and endowed with a remarkable skill

in holding discordant colleagues together. The most important of these colleagues was Lord Castlereagh, who became secretary for foreign affairs. Time has long ago rendered justice to the political ability of Castlereagh, disguised as it was to men of his own day by a curious infelicity of expression; and the instinctive good sense of Englishmen never showed itself more remarkably than in their preference, at this crisis, of his cool judgment, his high courage, his discernment, and his will, to the more showy brilliancy of Canning. His first work, indeed, as a minister was to meet the danger in which Canning had involved the country by his orders in council. On the 23d of June, only twelve days after the ministry had been formed, these orders were repealed. But quick as was Castlereagh's action, events had moved even more quickly. At the opening of the year, America, in despair of redress, had resolved on war; congress had voted an increase of both army and navy, and laid, in April, an embargo on all vessels in American harbors. Actual hostilities might still have been averted by the repeal of the orders, on which the English cabinet was resolved; but in the confusion which followed the murder of Perceval, and the strife of parties for office through the month that followed, the opportunity was lost. When the news of the repeal reached America, it came six weeks too late. On the 18th of June an act of congress had declared America at war with Great Britain.

1610. Had Napoleon been able to reap the fruits of the strife which his policy had thus forced on the

two English peoples, it is hard to say how Britain could have coped with him. Cut off from her markets alike in east and west, her industries checked and disorganized, a financial crisis added to her social embarrassment, it may be doubted whether she must not have bowed in the end before the pressure of the continental system. But if that system had thrust her into aggression and ruin, it was as inevitably thrusting the same aggression and ruin on her rival. The moment when America entered into the great struggle was a critical moment in the history of mankind. Six days after President Madison issued his declaration of war, Napoleon crossed the Niemen on his march to Moscow. Successful as his policy had been in stirring up war between England and America, it had been no less successful in breaking the alliance which he had made with the czar at Tilsit and in forcing on a contest with Russia. On the one hand, Napoleon was irritated by the refusal of Russia to enforce strictly the suspension of all trade with England, though such a suspension would have ruined the Russian land-owners. On the other, Alexander saw with growing anxiety the advance of the French empire which sprang from Napoleon's resolve to enforce his system by a seizure of the northern coasts. In 1811, Holland, the Hanseatic towns, part of Westphalia, and the duchy of Oldenburg, were successively annexed, and the duchy of Mecklenburg threatened with seizure. A peremptory demand on the part of France for the entire cessation of intercourse with England brought the quarrel to a head; and prep-

arations were made on both sides for a gigantic struggle.

1611. Even before it opened, this new enterprise gave fresh vigor to Napoleon's foes. The best of the French soldiers were drawn from Spain to the frontier of Poland; and Wellington, whose army had been raised to a force of 40,000 Englishmen and 20,000 Portuguese, profited by the withdrawal to throw off his system of defense and to assume an attitude of attack. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos were taken by storm during the spring of 1812; and at the close of June, three days before Napoleon crossed the Niemen, in his march on Moscow, Wellington crossed the Agueda in a march on Salamanca. After a series of masterly movements on both sides, Marmont with the French army of the north attacked the English on the hills in the neighborhood of that town on the 22d of July. While he was marching round the right of the English position his left wing remained isolated; and with a sudden exclamation of "Marmont is lost!" Wellington flung on it the bulk of his force, crushed it, and drove the whole army from the field. The loss on either side was nearly equal, but failure had demoralized the French army; and its retreat forced Joseph to leave Madrid, and Soult to evacuate Andalusia and to concentrate the southern army on the eastern coast. While Napoleon was still pushing slowly over the vast plains of Poland, Wellington made his entry into Madrid in August, and began the siege of Burgos. The town, however, held out gallantly for a month, till the advance of the two

French armies, now concentrated in the north and south of Spain, forced Wellington, in October, to a hasty retreat on the Portuguese frontier.

1612. If Wellington had shaken the rule of the French in Spain in this campaign, his ultimate failure showed how firm a military hold they still possessed there. But the disappointment was forgotten in the news which followed it. At the moment when the English troops fell back from Burgos began the retreat of the grand army from Moscow. Victorious in a battle at Borodino, Napoleon had entered the older capital of Russia in triumph, and waited impatiently to receive proposals of peace from the czar. But a fire kindled by its old inhabitants reduced the city to ashes; Alexander still remained silent; and the gathering cold bent even the stubborn will of Napoleon to own the need of retreat. The French were forced to fall back amid the horrors of a Russian winter; and of the 400,000 combatants who formed the grand army at its first outset, only a few thousand recrossed the Niemen in December. In spite of the gigantic efforts which Napoleon made to repair his losses, the spell which he had cast over Europe was broken. Prussia rose against him as the Russians crossed the Niemen in the spring of 1813; and the forces which held it were at once thrown back on the Elbe. In this emergency the military genius of the French emperor rose to its height. With a fresh army of 200,000 men whom he had gathered at Mainz he marched on the allied armies of Russia and Prussia in May, cleared Saxony by a victory over them at

Lutzen, and threw them back on the Oder by a fresh victory at Bautzen. Disheartened by defeat and by the neutral attitude which Austria still preserved, the two powers consented in June to an armistice, and negotiated for peace. But Austria, though unwilling to utterly ruin France to the profit of her great rival in the east, was as resolute as either of the allies to wrest from Napoleon his supremacy over Europe; and at the moment when it became clear that Napoleon was only bent on playing with her proposals, she was stirred to action by news that his army was at last driven from Spain. Wellington had left Portugal in May with an army which had now risen to 90,000 men; and overtaking the French forces in retreat at Vitoria on the 21st of June, he inflicted on them a defeat which drove them in utter rout across the Pyrenees. Madrid was at once evacuated, and Clauzel fell back from Saragossa into France. The victory not only freed Spain from its invaders; it restored the spirit of the allies. The close of the armistice was followed by a union of Austria with the forces of Prussia and the czar; and in October a final overthrow of Napoleon at Leipsic forced the French army to fall back in rout across the Rhine.

1613. The war now hurried to its close. Though held at bay for a while by the sieges of San Sebastian and Pampeluna, as well as by an obstinate defense of the Pyrenees, Wellington succeeded in the very month of the triumph at Leipsic in winning a victory on the Bidassoa, which enabled him to enter France. He was soon followed by the allies. On

the last day of 1813 their forces crossed the Rhine; and a third of France passed, without opposition, into their hands. For two months more Napoleon maintained a wonderful struggle with a handful of raw conscripts against their overwhelming numbers; while in the south Soult, forced from his intrenched camp near Bayonne and defeated at Orthes, fell back before Wellington on Toulouse. Here their two armies met in April in a stubborn and indecisive engagement. But though neither leader knew it, the war was even then at an end. The struggle of Napoleon himself had ended at the close of March with the surrender of Paris; and the submission of the capital was at once followed by the abdication of the emperor and the return of the Bourbons.

1614. England's triumph over its enemy was dashed by the more doubtful fortunes of the struggle across the Atlantic. The declaration of war by America seemed an act of sheer madness, for its navy consisted of a few frigates and sloops, its army was a mass of half-drilled and half-armed recruits, while the states themselves were divided on the question of the war, and Connecticut, with Massachusetts, refused to send either money or men. Three attempts to penetrate into Canada during the summer and autumn were repulsed with heavy loss. But these failures were more than redeemed by unexpected successes at sea, where in two successive engagements between English and American frigates the former were forced to strike their flag. The effect of these victories was out of all proportion to

their real importance; for they were the first heavy blows which had been dealt at England's supremacy over the seas. In 1813 America followed up its naval triumphs by more vigorous efforts on land. Its forces cleared Lake Ontario, captured Toronto, destroyed the British flotilla on Lake Erie, and made themselves masters of Upper Canada. An attack on Lower Canada, however, was successfully beaten back; and a fresh advance of the British and Canadian forces in the heart of the winter again recovered the upper province. The reverse gave fresh strength to the party in the United States which had throughout been opposed to the war, and whose opposition to it had been imbibited by the terrible distress brought about by the blockade and the ruin of American commerce. Cries of secession began to be heard, and Massachusetts took the bold step of appointing delegates to confer with delegates from the other New England states "on the subject of their grievances and common concerns."

1615. In 1814, however, the war was renewed with more vigor than ever; and Upper Canada was again invaded. But the American army, after inflicting a severe defeat on the British forces in the battle of Chippewa in July, was itself defeated a few weeks after in an equally stubborn engagement, and thrown back on its own frontier; while the fall of Napoleon enabled the English government to devote its whole strength to the struggle with an enemy which it had ceased to despise. General Ross, with a force of 4,000 men, appeared in the Potomac, captured Washington, and, before evacuating the

city, burnt its public buildings to the ground. Few more shameful acts are recorded in our history; and it was the more shameful in that it was done under strict orders from the government at home. But the raid upon Washington was intended simply to strike terror into the American people; and the real stress of the war was thrown on two expeditions whose business was to penetrate into the states from the north and from the south. Both proved utter failures. A force of 9,000 peninsular veterans which marched in September to the attack of Plattsburg on Lake Champlain was forced to fall back by the defeat of the English flotilla which accompanied it. A second force, under Gen. Packenham, appeared in December at the mouth of the Mississippi and attacked New Orleans, but was repulsed by Gen. Jackson with the loss of half its numbers. Peace, however, had already been concluded. The close of the French war, if it left untouched the grounds of the struggle, made the United States sensible of the danger of pushing it further. Britain herself was anxious for peace; and the warring claims, both of England and America, were set aside in silence in the treaty of 1814.

1616. The close of the war with the United States freed England's hands at a moment when the re-appearance of Napoleon at Paris called her to a new and final struggle with France. By treaty with the allied powers Napoleon had been suffered to retain a fragment of his former empire—the island of Elba, off the coast of Tuscany; and from Elba he looked on at the quarrels which sprang up between his con-

querors as soon as they gathered at Vienna to complete the settlement of Europe. The most formidable of these quarrels arose from a claim of Prussia to annex Saxony and that of Russia to annex Poland; but their union for this purpose was met by a counter-league of England and Austria with their old enemy France, whose ambassador, Talleyrand, labored vigorously to bring the question to an issue by force of arms. At the moment, however, when a war between the two leagues seemed close at hand Napoleon landed on the coast, near Cannes, and, followed only by a thousand of his guards, marched over the mountains of Dauphiné upon Grenoble and Lyons. He counted, and counted justly, on the indifference of the country to its new Bourbon rulers, on the longing of the army for a fresh struggle which should restore its glory, and, above all, in the spell of his name over soldiers whom he had so often led to victory. In twenty days from his landing he reached the Tuileries unopposed, while Louis the Eighteenth fled helplessly to Ghent. But whatever hopes he had drawn from the divisions of the allied powers were at once dispelled by their resolute action on the news of his descent upon France. Their strife was hushed and their old union restored by the consciousness of a common danger. An engagement to supply a million of men for the purposes of the war and a recall of their armies to the Rhine answered Napoleon's efforts to open negotiations with the powers.

1617. England furnished subsidies to the amount of 11,000,000, and hastened to place an army on the

frontier of the Netherlands. The best troops of the force which had been employed in the peninsula, however, were still across the Atlantic; and, of the 80,000 men who gathered round Wellington, only about half were Englishmen; the rest mainly raw levies from Belgium and Hanover. The duke's plan was to unite with the 150,000 Prussians under Marshal Blücher who were advancing on the lower Rhine, and to enter France by Mons and Namur while the forces of Austria and Russia closed in upon Paris by way of Belfort and Alsace. But Napoleon had thrown aside all thought of a merely defensive warfare. By amazing efforts he had raised an army of 250,000 men in the few months since his arrival in Paris; and in the opening of June, 1815, 120,000 Frenchmen were concentrated on the Shambré at Charleroi, while Wellington's troops still lay in cantonments on the line of the Scheldt from Ath to Nivelles, and Blücher's on that of the Meuse from Nivelles to Liége. Both the allied armies hastened to unite at Quatre Bras; but their junction there was already impossible. Blücher, with 80,000 men, was himself attacked by Napoleon at Ligny, and, after a desperate contest, driven back with terrible loss upon Wavre. On the same day, Ney with 20,000 men, and an equal force under D'Erlon in reserve, appeared before Quatre Bras, where, as yet, only 10,000 English and the same force of Belgian troops had been able to assemble. The Belgians broke before the charges of the French horse; and only the dogged resistance of the English infantry gave time for Wellington to bring up corps after corps till

at the close of the day, Ney saw himself heavily out-numbered, and withdrew baffled from the field.

1618. About 5,000 men had fallen on either side in this fierce engagement; but heavy as was Wellington's loss, the firmness of the English army had already done much to foil Napoleon's effort at breaking through the line of the allies. Blücher's retreat, however, left the English flank uncovered; and on the following day, while the Prussians were falling back on Wavre, Wellington, with nearly 70,000 men—for his army was now well in hand—withdrew in good order, followed by the mass of the French forces under the emperor himself. Napoleon had detached 30,000 men under Grouchy to hang upon the rear of the beaten Prussians, while with a force of 80,000 he resolved to bring Wellington to battle. On the morning of the 18th of June the two armies faced one another on the field of Waterloo, in front of the forest of Soignies, on the high-road to Brussels. Napoleon's one fear had been that of a continued retreat. "I have them!" he cried, as he saw the English line drawn up on a low rise of ground which stretched across the high-road from the château of Hougomont on its right to the farm and straggling village of La Haye Sainte on its left. He had some grounds for his confidence of success. On either side the forces numbered between seventy and eighty thousand men; but the French were superior in guns and cavalry, and a large part of Wellington's force consisted of Belgian levies who broke and fled at the outset of the fight. A fierce attack

upon Hougomont opened the battle at eleven; but it was not till midday that the corps of D'Erlon advanced upon the center near La Haye Sainte, which from that time bore the main brunt of the struggle. Never has greater courage, whether of attack or endurance, been shown on any field than was shown by both combatants at Waterloo. The columns of D'Erlon, repulsed by the English foot, were hurled back in disorder by a charge of the Scots Greys; but the victorious horsemen were crushed in their turn by the French cuirassiers, and the mass of the French cavalry, 12,000 strong, flung itself in charge after charge on the English front, carrying the English guns and sweeping with desperate bravery round the unbroken squares, whose fire thinned their ranks. With almost equal bravery the French columns of the center again advanced, wrested at last the farm of La Haye Sainte from their opponents, and pushed on vigorously though in vain under Ney against the troops in its rear.

1619. But meanwhile every hour was telling against Napoleon. To win the battle he must crush the English army before Blücher joined it; and the English army was still uncrushed. Terrible as was his loss, and many of his regiments were reduced to a mere handful of men, Wellington stubbornly held his ground while the Prussians, advancing from Wavre through deep and miry forest roads, were slowly gathering to his support, disregarding the attack on their rear by which Grouchy strove to hold

them back from the field. At half-past four their advance-guard deployed at last from the woods; but the main body was far behind, and Napoleon was still able to hold his ground against them till their increasing masses forced him to stake all on a desperate effort against the English front. The Imperial Guard—his only reserve, and which had as yet taken no part in the battle—was drawn up at seven in two huge columns of attack. The first, with Ney himself at its head, swept all before it as it mounted the rise beside La Haye Sainte, on which the thin English line still held its ground, and all but touched the English front, when its mass, torn by the terrible fire of musketry with which it was received, gave way before a charge. The second, 3,000 strong, advanced with the same courage over the slope near Hougomont, only to be repulsed and shattered in its turn. At the moment when these masses fell slowly and doggedly back down the fatal rise, the Prussians pushed forward on Napoleon's right, their guns swept the road to Charleroi, and Wellington seized the moment for a general advance. From that hour all was lost. Only the guard stood firm in the wreck of the French army; and though darkness and exhaustion checked the English in their pursuit of the broken troops as they hurried from the field, the Prussian horse continued the chase through the night. Only 40,000 Frenchmen with some thirty guns recrossed the Sambree, while Napoleon himself fled hurriedly to Paris. His second abdication was followed by a triumphant entry of the English and

Prussian armies into the French capital; and the long war ended with his exile to St. Helena, and the return of Louis the Eighteenth to the throne of the Bourbons.

THE END

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